{"id":395624,"date":"2026-09-08T14:30:30","date_gmt":"2026-09-08T09:00:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=395624"},"modified":"2026-09-08T14:32:13","modified_gmt":"2026-09-08T09:02:13","slug":"indias-arbitration-wish-list-at-ghac-arbitration-week-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/08\/indias-arbitration-wish-list-at-ghac-arbitration-week-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"India’s arbitration wish list: Finality, institutionalisation and judicial discipline at GHAC Arbitration Week 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The Gujarat High Court Arbitration Centre (GHAC) Arbitration Week 2026<\/span> started its third day with a session titled “A Judge’s wish list of what the law ought to be”<\/span>, inviting the judiciary to articulate what India’s arbitration framework should aspire to become. The discussion moved beyond the conventional question of excessive judicial intervention and examined the responsibilities of arbitral tribunals, counsel, courts, institutions and the Government in creating an arbitration system that delivers speed, cost-effectiveness and finality.<\/p>\n

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[In the picture from left to right: Mr Saurabh N. Soparkar, Justice R. V. Raveendran, Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice A. P. Shah]<\/p>\n

The panel featured Justice Sunita Agarwal<\/span>, Chief Justice, High Court of Gujarat, Justice R. V. Raveendran<\/span>, Former Judge, Supreme Court of India and Justice A. P. Shah<\/span>, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court. The session was moderated by Mr Saurabh N. Soparkar<\/span>, Senior Advocate.<\/p>\n

A judge’s wish list: transparency, accountability and predictability<\/p>\n

Opening the session, Justice Sunita Agarwal<\/span> described the theme as an unusual opportunity for judges to consider the arbitration framework not merely in terms of legislative intention, but through the experience of applying the law in practice.<\/p>\n

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[In picture: Justice Sunita Agarwal]<\/p>\n

She observed that judges generally answer the question, “what is the law?”, whereas the session posed the more fundamental question of what the law ought to be. In her view, experience should not be understood as criticism of the past, but as an opportunity to improve the future. Arbitration, she noted, derives much of its strength from its ability to evolve, learn from experience and address difficulties as they arise.<\/p>\n

Justice Agarwal said that the wish list of judges should ultimately coincide with that of arbitration users:<\/p>\n

“…a clearer law, disciplined procedure, greater institutional trust and finality of adjudication<\/span>.”<\/p>\n

Reducing her vision to three words, she identified transparency, accountability and predictability. For users, she explained, the law should provide clarity before a dispute arises, confidence in the process while the dispute is being adjudicated, and certainty that the dispute will finally come to an end.<\/p>\n

Judicial intervention begins with the quality of arbitration<\/p>\n

Justice R. V. Raveendran<\/span> approached the question from the perspective of a former judge who now acts as an arbitrator. He cautioned against beginning the discussion with the assumption that the principal problem was excessive judicial intervention.<\/p>\n

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[In picture: Justice R. V. Raveendran]<\/p>\n

According to him, the more fundamental questions were whether arbitration was being conducted expeditiously, whether it was cost-effective and whether arbitral awards were solid, sound and valid. If these objectives were achieved, the justification for judicial intervention would correspondingly diminish.<\/p>\n

Justice Raveendran was particularly critical of the culture of routinely challenging arbitral awards. He observed that Section 34 proceedings had effectively become another appellate stage, despite arbitration being intended to provide finality.<\/p>\n

He argued that arbitrators, arbitration lawyers, corporate general counsel, law firms and Government lawyers recommending challenges must also examine their own role before attributing excessive intervention to the courts. Arbitral tribunals, he pointed out, may spend several years dealing with thousands of pages of material and produce lengthy awards, only for virtually every award to be challenged.<\/p>\n

In his view, the burden on courts could be reduced by improving the quality of arbitral awards. The more responsible the arbitral tribunal, the less likely it would be that courts would be confronted with awards requiring intervention.<\/p>\n

The DMRC dilemma: when judicial conscience meets arbitral finality<\/p>\n

Justice Raveendran then turned to the difficult question of why judges sometimes intervene despite knowing that Section 34<\/a>, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a> (Arbitration and Conciliation Act) jurisdiction is intended to remain narrow.<\/p>\n

He explained that judges are trained to resist injustice. When confronted with an award that appears manifestly unjust, a judge may face a conflict between the statutory limits on judicial review and the judicial instinct to prevent injustice. He referred extensively to DMRC Ltd<\/span>. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd<\/span>., (2024) 6 SCC 357<\/a> arbitration litigation to illustrate this tension.<\/p>\n

Justice Raveendran noted that the controversy surrounding the DMRC<\/span> award involved, among other things, the manner in which the arbitral tribunal had dealt with contractual language and evidence. The award involved substantial monetary claims, and the matter eventually reached the Supreme Court and subsequently the Court’s curative jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

His broader point was that simply repeating that judicial review is limited would not eliminate the underlying tension. If arbitral tribunals produce awards that courts perceive as perverse or fundamentally unsustainable, judges may feel compelled to find a means of correcting them.<\/p>\n

He therefore placed a corresponding responsibility on arbitral tribunals.<\/p>\n

“The more the limitation on restriction or restriction on the judicial review, the greater the responsibility of the arbitral tribunal.”<\/p>\n

Justice Raveendran said arbitrators must strictly follow the contract, deal with material evidence, address important submissions, provide reasons where required and ensure that their conclusions can reasonably be sustained by the contractual terms and evidentiary record.<\/p>\n

He ultimately described the desired balance as one in which responsible tribunals produce proper awards while responsible courts respect the limits of their jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

“We want a system in which responsible arbitral tribunals make proper awards and responsible courts respect the limits of their jurisdiction.”<\/p>\n

Consistency in Supreme Court jurisprudence is essential<\/p>\n

Justice Raveendran also addressed what he regarded as uncertainty caused by changing judicial approaches to Section 34<\/a>, Arbitration and Conciliation Act<\/a>. He referred to the line of decisions involving ONGC<\/span> v. Saw Pipes Ltd.<\/span>, (2003) 5 SCC 705<\/a>, ONGC<\/span> v. Western Geco International Ltd<\/span>., (2014) 9 SCC 263<\/a>, Associate Builders<\/span> v. DDA<\/span>, (2015) 3 SCC 49<\/a> and DMRC Ltd.<\/span> v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd<\/span>., (2024) 6 SCC 357<\/a>, observing that the Supreme Court bears a heightened responsibility to maintain consistency, certainty and uniformity in the law it lays down.<\/p>\n

He explained that judges can approach apparently unjust awards differently. Some may adhere strictly to the statutory limitations, while others may be more willing to intervene where they perceive a serious failure of justice. This produces uncertainty for parties and lower courts dealing with arbitral challenges.<\/p>\n

The problem, according to Justice Raveendran, becomes particularly acute when concepts such as public policy and patent illegality are interpreted expansively. He warned that repeated exposure to poorly reasoned or unsustainable awards could encourage courts to expand these concepts, thereby gradually shifting the boundaries of judicial review.<\/p>\n

Section 29A and the responsibility to control delay<\/p>\n

Justice Raveendran questioned the effectiveness of the statutory timeline under Section 29A<\/a>, Arbitration and Conciliation Act<\/a> particularly the expectation that arbitrations should ordinarily conclude within the prescribed period.<\/p>\n

He asked how many arbitrations actually conclude within the statutory period and how often courts actively require tribunals to explain delays. In his assessment, the statutory provision would have limited value if tribunals did not control delays and courts routinely extended the timelines.<\/p>\n

The central point, however, was not simply to impose tighter statutory controls. Justice Raveendran argued that tribunals must themselves recognise that the greater the protection given to arbitral awards from judicial review, the greater their responsibility to conduct proceedings properly.<\/p>\n

India’s arbitration problem is also a problem of institutional culture<\/p>\n

Justice A. P. Shah<\/span>, drawing upon his experience as former Chairman of the 20th Law Commission of India, placed India’s arbitration journey within the broader history of legislative reform.<\/p>\n

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[In picture: Justice A. P. Shah]<\/p>\n

He noted that the 2015 amendments, the B. N. Srikrishna Committee’s 2017 report, the 2019 amendments, the T. K. Viswanathan Committee’s work and subsequent reform proposals had repeatedly attempted to improve arbitration in India. Yet, despite decades of legislative refinement, he observed that domestic companies and foreign investors could still perceive Indian arbitration as “civil litigation by another name in another venue”, sometimes at greater cost.<\/p>\n

Justice Shah identified the fundamental promises of arbitration as speed, cost-effectiveness and finality and argued that all three remained under strain.<\/p>\n

“Due process paranoia” and the need for procedural discipline<\/p>\n

Justice Shah referred to the T. K. Viswanathan Committee’s description of “due process paranoia”, under which arbitrators may become excessively concerned about the possibility of an award being challenged and therefore permit lengthy arguments, cross-examinations and repeated procedural applications.<\/p>\n

Although the Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a> (CPC) and the Evidence Act, 1872<\/a> do not govern arbitrations in the same manner as ordinary civil litigation, Justice Shah observed that their practices frequently become the de facto norm in arbitration.<\/p>\n

He also raised concerns about the professional bandwidth of arbitrators. Referring to the Viswanathan Committee’s recommendation that an arbitrator should ordinarily have no more than 15 active matters, he argued that arbitrators accepting excessive appointments can make continuous hearings virtually impossible. The result is fragmented hearings, fading memory, repeated arguments and prolonged proceedings.<\/p>\n

Justice Shah argued for procedural standards including limits on written submissions, focused oral hearings and defined time for cross-examination. He also suggested that model procedural rules could be adopted by arbitral institutions without necessarily being incorporated directly into legislation.<\/p>\n

A structural shift from ad hoc to institutional arbitration<\/p>\n

Justice Shah strongly advocated a transition from ad hoc arbitration to institutional arbitration.<\/p>\n

He argued that ad hoc arbitration can become a replica of civil litigation because there are often no standardised procedural rules or administrative structures. While India has developed several arbitral institutions, he cautioned that institutions must provide much more than physical infrastructure and administrative services.<\/p>\n

He highlighted the advantages of institutional arbitration, including:<\/p>\n