{"id":395368,"date":"2026-09-07T09:00:37","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T03:30:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=395368"},"modified":"2026-09-06T09:16:39","modified_gmt":"2026-09-06T03:46:39","slug":"e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/","title":{"rendered":"The E-Rupee Pilot: A Detailed Study of the Legal Framework and Privacy Implications of India’s Central Bank Digital Currency"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

An analysis of India’s e-rupee pilot, examining the legal framework for the Central Bank Digital Currency, its design architecture, privacy implications under K.S. Puttaswamy, data protection concerns, programmability, and the regulatory gaps that must be addressed before large-scale adoption.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/p>\n

There is something quietly unprecedented about what Reserve Bank of India has been doing since November 2022. It has been issuing money, actual, government-backed legal tender, in a form that no Central Bank statute in India originally anticipated. The Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934<\/a>1<\/sup><\/a> was written for paper currency and metallic coins. It did not contemplate tokens stored on mobile phones, wallets linked to blockchain-derived ledgers, or programmable rupees with potential conditional or time-bound features. And yet, through a series of legislative amendments and a carefully sequenced pilot program, India’s digital rupee or e-Rs has arrived.<\/p>\n

The Government of India announced the digital rupee in the Union Budget speech on 1 February 2022. The Finance Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman stated that the introduction of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) would give a “big boost to the digital economy”. Within two months, the amendments to the RBI Act were notified through a Gazette Notification dated 30 March 20222<\/sup><\/a>. The Reserve Bank released its Concept Note in October 2022, setting out the motivation, design, and policy framework for the instrument3<\/sup><\/a>. A wholesale pilot began on 1 November 2022, followed by a retail pilot on 1 December 2022, starting in four cities with four banks. That retail pilot, initially confined to State Bank of India (SBI), ICICI Bank, YES Bank, and IDFC First Bank in Mumbai, Delhi, Bengaluru and Bhubaneswar, has since expanded to 19 banks and several fintech entities4<\/sup><\/a>. Circulation figures tell their own story: From Rs 103 crores in December 2023 to over Rs 1016 crores by March 2025. Whatever doubts existed about whether India was serious about this project, those numbers suggest institutional commitment that is not easily reversed.<\/p>\n

But growth in circulation does not resolve the legal questions the project raises. Two sets of questions, in particular, seem underexplored in public discourse. First<\/span>, what is the precise legal basis on which the RBI issues e-Rs, and does the amended statutory framework actually cover all the design choices the Concept Note contemplates? Second<\/span>, and more pressing from a civil liberties standpoint: What happens to the financial transaction data of every person who uses a CBDC wallet? The Supreme Court’s nine-Judge Bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.)<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/a>5<\/sup><\/a> held that privacy is a fundamental right. That ruling, read alongside the data trail any CBDC system necessarily generates, creates a constitutional dimension that has not received sufficient attention in academic or policy literature.<\/p>\n

CBDC: Definition and genesis in India<\/p>\n

What the RBI means by “CBDC”<\/p>\n

The Reserve Bank defines CBDC as “the legal tender issued by a Central Bank in a digital form”6<\/sup><\/a>. It is exchangeable one-to-one with physical currency, a Rs 100 e-Rs token is worth exactly one physical Rs 100 note. Unlike private cryptocurrencies, which have no intrinsic backing and derive value from speculative demand, e-Rs is a direct liability on the RBI’s balance sheet. That liability side classification is legally significant: The instrument carries the same sovereign guarantee as any bank note issued under Section 26(1)<\/a>, RBI Act<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Concept Note draws an important distinction between CBDC and existing digital money. When a person pays through Unified Payments Interface (UPI) or National Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT), the underlying asset transferred is a commercial bank liability, a demand deposit. That deposit rests on the faith that the commercial bank will honour it. CBDC, by contrast, is a direct liability of the Central Bank. There is no commercial bank credit risk anywhere in the chain. This distinction matters practically for settlement finality and systemic risk. It also carries implications for data custody, the entity that holds the liability is, in some design models, the entity that holds the transaction record.<\/p>\n

The road to the pilot<\/p>\n

India’s engagement with CBDC started earlier than most observers realise. A formal High-Level Inter-Ministerial Committee was constituted in November 2017 under the Secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs to examine the policy and legal framework for virtual currencies.7<\/sup><\/a> That Committee recommended the introduction of CBDC as a digital form of sovereign currency. The RBI set up an Internal Working Group in October 2020, whose February 2021 report made specific recommendations, including the need to amend the RBI Act to bring digital currency within the definition of “bank note”.<\/p>\n

The global context mattered too. As of July 2022, 105 countries, covering 95 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP), were in some stage of exploring CBDCs.8<\/sup><\/a> A 2021 Bank for International Settlements Survey found that 90 per cent of the 81 Central Banks it surveyed were engaged in CBDC work in some form9<\/sup><\/a>. China’s e-Centralised National Currency (e-CNY) was already in an advanced pilot. The Bahamian Sand Dollar had launched in 2020. Jamaica’s Digital Exchange (JAM-DEX) followed. India was not early to this conversation, but it moved faster than many once it decided to move.<\/p>\n

The legal framework governing e-Rs<\/p>\n

Constitutional basis<\/p>\n

The constitutional authority for currency management in India rests primarily with Parliament under Entry 36 of List I (Union List) of the Seventh Schedule<\/a> to the Constitution of India<\/a>, which covers “currency, coinage and legal tender”. The RBI derives its functional authority from the RBI Act, whose Preamble mandates the Reserve Bank “to regulate the issue of bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India”.10<\/sup><\/a> The 2022 amendments extended that mandate expressly to digital currency. The constitutional basis for CBDC issuance is, therefore, not in dispute, it sits squarely within the Union’s existing currency powers. The more interesting constitutional question is privacy, which is addressed in Part V. For now, it is enough to note that the permissibility of the issuance itself is well-established; the contested ground is how the issuance should be governed once privacy rights are engaged.<\/p>\n

Amendments to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934<\/a><\/p>\n

The Finance Act, 2022<\/a> amended the RBI Act in three key respects. First<\/span>, it expanded the definition of “bank note” in Section 2 to include “currency in digital form”. Second<\/span>, it amended Section 22, which confers on the RBI the exclusive right to issue bank notes, to cover digital currency as well. Third<\/span>, it carved out specific provisions of the RBI Act that apply only to physical currency and made those non-applicable to digital forms.<\/p>\n

Section 24 governs the denomination of bank notes, and Section 25 deals with their form11<\/sup><\/a>. Both now apply to e-Rs, which is why the Concept Note specifies that e-Rs should be issued in the same denominations as physical currency, Rs 500, Rs 100, Rs 50, and so on, to maintain public familiarity and trust. Section 26(1) establishes legal tender status.12<\/sup><\/a> The RBI’s own FAQ confirms that “every e-Rs bank note shall be legal tender at any place in India in payment or on account for the amount expressed therein and is guaranteed by the Central Government”.13<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

One area where the amended framework is arguably thin relates to intermediaries. The Concept Note contemplates an “indirect” or “intermediate” model in which the RBI creates and issues e-Rs tokens to banks and authorised entities, called token service providers (TSPs), who then distribute them to end-users.14<\/sup><\/a> But the RBI Act, as amended, does not specifically define or regulate TSPs. Their obligations, liabilities, and duties vis-à-vis consumers are currently governed by general banking and payment laws rather than CBDC-specific provisions. This is a gap worth monitoring as the pilot expands.<\/p>\n

The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007<\/a><\/p>\n

The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007<\/a> (PSS Act<\/a>) regulates payment systems in India.15<\/sup><\/a> It defines a “payment system” as one that enables payment to be affected between a payer and a beneficiary, involving clearing, payment, or settlement service. CBDC infrastructure, the wallets, the transaction validation systems, the settlement rails, falls within this definition. Entities operating CBDC-related services must comply with PSS Act<\/a> requirements, including authorisation from the RBI. India’s existing payment systems, Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS), NEFT, Immediate Payment Service (IMPS), UPI, were all built within the PSS Act<\/a> framework, and the RBI has considerable experience regulating payment system operators under that statute.16<\/sup><\/a> The Concept Note explicitly anticipates interoperability between e-Rs and UPI infrastructure. That interoperability raises a quiet question: Does a single PSS Act<\/a> authorisation cover a combined CBDC-UPI transaction, or are separate authorisations needed? No official document addresses this directly.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Information Technology Act, 2000<\/a> and the DPDP Act<\/a><\/p>\n

The Information Technology Act, 2000<\/a> (IT Act<\/a>) provides the baseline legal framework for electronic transactions and cybersecurity. CBDC wallets and transactions fall within the IT Act’s definition of “electronic records”. Section 43-A<\/a><\/span>, IT Act<\/a> imposes a duty on bodies corporate handling sensitive personal data to maintain reasonable security practices. CBDC intermediaries, banks, TSPs, are bodies corporate and would be liable under this provision for security failures involving personal financial data.<\/span><\/p>\n

The more consequential law is the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023<\/a> (<\/span>DPDP Act<\/a>), enacted in August 2023 after nearly five years of legislative effort following the<\/span> Puttaswamy<\/span><\/a> judgment17<\/sup><\/a>. The DPDP Act<\/a> classifies entities that process personal data as “data fiduciaries” and imposes obligations including purpose limitation, data minimisation, and user rights such as the right to correction and erasure. Banks operating CBDC wallets will be data fiduciaries in respect of their users’ transaction data. The RBI itself, to the extent it operates a central ledger in the hybrid architecture, may also qualify as a significant data fiduciary under the Act.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

Design architecture and its legal implications<\/p>\n

Retail versus wholesale CBDC<\/p>\n

The Concept Note distinguishes between CBDC-R (retail, available to the public) and CBDC-W (wholesale, restricted to financial institutions). The legal implications of the two differ considerably. CBDC-W is designed for interbank settlement, securities transactions, and call money market operations, essentially, it replaces or supplements settlement infrastructure within a closed ecosystem of licensed entities. Consumer protection and privacy concerns are significantly attenuated in that context, because the users are sophisticated regulated institutions rather than individual citizens.<\/p>\n

CBDC-R is where the harder legal questions cluster. Here, the users are ordinary people, potentially including those with low financial literacy, those in rural areas, those who have never previously engaged with a digital payment system. The RBI Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) note that currently 19 banks are offering CBDC wallets18<\/sup><\/a>. Fintech entities like CRED and MobiKwik have also joined the pilot.19<\/sup><\/a> The expansion beyond banks to non-bank entities raises questions about who bears consumer liability when something goes wrong, a question the existing legal framework does not answer with sufficient clarity.<\/span><\/p>\n

Token-ased versus account-based structure<\/p>\n

The Concept Note recommends a token-based architecture for CBDC-R and an account-based form for CBDC-W20<\/sup><\/a>. The legal significance of this choice is not trivial. An account-based CBDC requires identity verification before every transaction, ownership of the balance tracks identity at all times. A token-based CBDC is a “bearer instrument”, like physical cash: Whoever holds the token is presumed to own it, and identity verification is not required at the transaction level. For privacy, token-based architecture is theoretically preferable, it more closely approximates cash’s anonymity. But the Concept Note immediately qualifies this preference by adopting “managed anonymity”: Small-value transactions may enjoy a degree of privacy, but high-value transactions will be traceable. Where exactly the threshold sits, what counts as “small” and “high” value, is not determined in any publicly available document. That is a significant gap, because the threshold determination is, in effect, a policy choice about how much privacy citizens will enjoy, and it is currently being made outside any transparent regulatory or legislative process.<\/span><\/p>\n

The intermediate distribution Model and liability chains<\/p>\n

The Concept Note settles on the “indirect” or “intermediate” model, in which the RBI issues e-Rs to banks and authorised intermediaries who distribute to end-users. The rationale is sound: The RBI lacks the customer-facing infrastructure to onboard individual users, conduct KYC checks, or handle transaction disputes at scale. Banks and fintech entities have that infrastructure. But the intermediate model creates a multi-party liability chain that the current legal framework does not fully trace. When a user’s CBDC wallet fails, who is responsible, the issuing bank, the TSP, or the RBI? The Concept Note identifies “accountability risk” as a consumer protection concern and states that “the identification of who is accountable to consumers in case of loss is crucial”, but stops short of resolving it. The RBI’s consumer grievance framework, built for commercial bank products, may need CBDC-specific rules before the system scales to tens of millions of users.<\/p>\n

Programmability: Legal promise and legal risk<\/p>\n

The programmability feature of e-Rs, the ability to encode spending conditions into the currency itself, is among the most legally novel aspects of the project21<\/sup><\/a>. The RBI FAQs describe use cases including direct benefit transfer (DBT) schemes, interest subvention programs, employee allowances restricted to defined purposes, and agricultural lending. A farmer’s crop credit could theoretically be programmed to ensure it is spent only at input stores, preventing diversion. That could have genuine developmental impact. The legal questions raised by programmability remain underexplored. If the government programs CBDC tokens received as welfare payments to expire within a certain period, is that consistent with the right to property? If tokens are programmed to be usable only at certain merchants, does that restrict the legal tender quality of the currency, given that Section 26(1)<\/a><\/span><\/span>, RBI Act<\/a> declares e-Rs legal tender “at any place in India”? These questions have no ready answers in existing law, and neither the Concept Note nor the amendments to the RBI Act address them explicitly.<\/span><\/p>\n

Privacy implications of the e-rupee<\/p>\n

The constitutional baseline:<\/span> Puttaswamy<\/a> and financial privacy<\/span><\/p>\n

The nine-Judge Constitutional Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a>22<\/sup><\/a>, settled that privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>. The judgment distinguishes between different aspects of privacy, bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and informational privacy, and it is the last that is most directly engaged by CBDC. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s concurring opinion is particularly relevant: “The right to privacy is not a gift of the Constitution<\/a>. It is the inherent natural right of every individual. The right to live with dignity involves being free to exercise choices about one’s own life without undue government intrusion.”23<\/sup><\/a> Financial transactions are among the most revealing choices a person makes — they disclose spending habits, political donations, religious activities, health expenditures, and social associations. The Concept Note acknowledges this explicitly, citing the Puttaswamy<\/span><\/a> ruling to note that “privacy of personal data and facts is an essential aspect of the right to privacy”.24<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The “managed anonymity” framework: A legal analysis<\/p>\n

The Concept Note’s approach to anonymity is anchored in a recognised trade-off: Complete anonymity would make CBDC a vehicle for money laundering and tax evasion; zero anonymity would violate constitutional privacy rights and contradict the user expectations built around cash25<\/sup><\/a>. The chosen middle path, “anonymity for small value, traceable for high value”, mirrors how physical cash operates in India, where transactions above Rs 2 lakhs require Permanent Account Number (PAN) disclosure under the Income Tax Act. That analogy is defensible but not perfect. Physical cash, once handed over, leaves no digital record in any system. An e-Rs transaction, even one designated as “anonymous” at the user interface level, runs over digital infrastructure that generates logs, timestamps, wallet identifiers, and device metadata. The question is not only whether the Central Bank sees the data, it is who else sees it, under what legal authority, and for how long it is retained. The Concept Note describes the “custodian model” of token storage, in which a TSP manages wallet keys on behalf of the user. In that model, the TSP “shall always have visibility over the token movements in and out of the wallet”, a candid admission that even in a token-based retail CBDC, the intermediary has transactional visibility. This is precisely the kind of third-party data access that the DPDP Act<\/a> was designed to regulate. Yet there are no CBDC-specific data governance rules under the DPDP Act<\/a> framework as of writing.<\/span><\/p>\n

AML\/CFT requirements and the privacy tension<\/p>\n

The CBDC framework must comply with Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML\/CFT) requirements26<\/sup><\/a>. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has issued guidance on virtual assets that, while primarily directed at private crypto, also informs CBDC design27<\/sup><\/a>. FATF’s “travel rule” requires that identifying information accompany value transfers above a threshold, currently USD 1000 in most FATF member countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Concept Note assigns AML\/CFT responsibility to Payment Interface Providers, essentially, the commercial banks operating under the intermediate model. Under the existing AML framework (primarily the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002<\/a>), banks are responsible for customer due diligence, enhanced due diligence for high-risk transactions, and suspicious transaction reporting. Opening a CBDC wallet is presently linked to an existing bank savings account, which means Know Your Customer (KYC) has already been completed, leveraging existing infrastructure efficiently.<\/p>\n

The structural tension, though, is real. For AML purposes, CBDC transactions above the threshold must be traceable. For privacy purposes, citizens using digital currency for ordinary expenditures expect informational privacy analogous to cash. The Concept Note’s solution, a tiered approach where small transactions are anonymous and large ones traceable, satisfies neither constituency fully. Privacy advocates will note that even “anonymous” small transactions generate platform-level metadata. Enforcement agencies will observe that a fixed threshold creates obvious structuring incentives.<\/p>\n

The DPDP Act<\/a> and CBDC data<\/p>\n

The DPDP Act<\/a> is India’s first comprehensive data protection statute. It applies to the processing of “digital personal data”, defined broadly to include any data that identifies an individual, including financial transaction data. CBDC wallet data, which links a person’s identity to their spending patterns, clearly falls within this definition.<\/p>\n

The DPDP Act<\/a> imposes obligations on data fiduciaries including purpose limitation, data may only be processed for the purpose for which it was collected, data minimisation, and the right to erasure upon user request28<\/sup><\/a>. Banks operating CBDC wallets are data fiduciaries in respect of their users’ e-Rs data. The RBI, to the extent it maintains a central ledger of retail transactions, may be a “significant data fiduciary” subject to enhanced obligations.<\/span><\/p>\n

There is a real tension between the DPDP Act’s<\/a> data minimisation principle and the surveillance architecture implicit in a traceable CBDC system. The Concept Note itself notes that the CBDC platform “is expected to generate huge sets of data in real time” and that analytics of this “Big Data” can “assist in evidence-based policy making” and serve as “a rich data source for service providers for financial product insights”.29<\/sup><\/a> Those are legitimate objectives, but they presuppose data retention and secondary use that must now be reconciled with the DPDP Act’s<\/a> purpose limitation requirements. No specific CBDC data governance rules exist under the Act as of writing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pilot performance and emerging challenges<\/p>\n

Retail segment growth<\/p>\n

The retail pilot’s trajectory is striking. Circulation rose from Rs 103 crores in December 2023 to Rs 1016 crores by March 2025, roughly a tenfold increase in 15 months30<\/sup><\/a>. The user base exceeded 60 lakh registered users. The retail segment as a whole grew by 3800 per cent between March 2023 and March 202431<\/sup><\/a>. These figures suggest that, among early adopters, the e-Rs product has been functionally acceptable. Whether this reflects genuine preference or reflects incentive structures created by participating banks is a question the pilot data does not answer directly.<\/span><\/p>\n

Wholesale segment decline<\/p>\n

The wholesale segment tells a different story. CBDC-W transaction volume fell by 99.20 per cent from March 2023 to March 2024, from Rs 10.6 crores to Rs 0.08 crore. The Concept Note had identified CBDC-W as particularly valuable for government securities settlement, call money market operations, and certificate of deposit tokenisation. The steep decline likely reflects the dominance of existing, well-functioning settlement infrastructure, RTGS, NEFT, the RBI’s Negotiated Dealing System, rather than any fundamental flaw in CBDC-W. Established systems have entrenched users and operational habits; displacing them requires either a compelling efficiency advantage or regulatory mandate, and neither is currently in place.<\/p>\n

Bank participation and voucher metrics<\/p>\n

A 2025 study analysing National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) voucher data for January 2024 to February 2025 found significant variation in bank participation. Indian bank created 24,38,454 vouchers but redeemed only 4.19 per cent of them. SBI created 13,49,915 vouchers and achieved a redemption rate of approximately 54 per cent. Bank of Baroda had the highest redemption rate at 84.12 per cent, but created far fewer vouchers overall, 61,403. The overall system redemption rate was approximately 23 per cent, suggesting that created vouchers are either lying unused or encountering friction at the redemption stage. Private sector banks showed higher redemption efficiency (approximately 37 per cent) than public sector banks (approximately 22 per cent), despite participating in smaller numbers32<\/sup><\/a>. This may reflect better customer engagement practices in private banks, or it may reflect that private bank customers skew toward more digitally literate demographics. Either way, it points to a user experience problem that the legal framework, on its own, cannot fix.<\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

The e-rupee project is legally authorised. The 2022 amendments to the RBI Act are constitutionally grounded, the legal tender status of e-Rs is clear, and the PSS Act<\/a> provides a workable regulatory scaffold for payment infrastructure. That much is settled.<\/p>\n

The harder questions lie in the gaps. The “managed anonymity” framework is a policy choice with direct constitutional implications under<\/span> Puttaswamy<\/span><\/a>33<\/sup><\/a>, it determines how much of citizens’ financial lives will be visible to the State, but it has been made administratively rather than through legislation or transparent regulatory process. The threshold between anonymous and traceable transactions has not been publicly specified. The liability chain in the intermediate distribution model has not been clearly assigned. The interaction between CBDC data flows and the DPDP Act<\/a> has not been analysed in any official document.<\/span><\/p>\n

None of these gaps are fatal to the project, but they should be addressed before the pilot scales to a mass-market product. A CBDC-specific privacy regulation, perhaps a direction issued under Section 35-A, RBI Act<\/a>, or a dedicated rule under the DPDP Act<\/a>, would help. Explicit statutory authorisation for programmability features, with safeguards preserving the legal tender quality of e-Rs, would remove a real ambiguity. A published, transparent policy on the anonymity threshold would honour the<\/span> Puttaswamy<\/span><\/a> ruling in spirit as well as in form.<\/span><\/p>\n

The e-rupee is not just a payment instrument. It is simultaneously a potential surveillance instrument, a financial inclusion tool, a monetary policy lever, and a programmable welfare delivery mechanism. Getting the legal framework right for all of those functions simultaneously is genuinely hard. The RBI’s Concept Note is an intellectually serious document, and the phased cautious approach of the pilot reflects institutional prudence. But caution in deployment is not a substitute for clarity in law. India’s digital currency deserves the same quality of legal architecture that supports its physical predecessor, and that architecture, as this paper has tried to show, is not yet complete.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n

*LLM Candidate (2025-2026), National Law University, Jodhpur. Author can be reached at: utsavsingh28022002@gmail.com<\/a>.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

**LLM Candidate (2025-2026), National Law University, Jodhpur. Author can be reached at: garimawadhwa278@gmail.com<\/a>.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.<\/a> Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934<\/a>, S. 22<\/a>.<\/p>\n

2.<\/a> Finance Act, 2022<\/a>; Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section I (30-3-2022) (notifying amendments to Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934<\/a>). 6 of 2022<\/p>\n

3.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency, 7-10-2022 (hereinafter “RBI Concept Note”).<\/p>\n

4.<\/a> Reserve Bank of India, Frequently Asked Questions on Digital Rupee (e-Rs) 5 (4-2-2026) (hereinafter “RBI e-Rs FAQs”).<\/p>\n

5.<\/a> (2017) 10 SCC 1<\/a>.<\/p>\n

6.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 15, Ch. 2, para 2.1 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

7.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 13, Ch. 1, paras 1.10, 1.16 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

8.<\/a> Atlantic Council, Central Bank Digital Currency Tracker (July 2022) (noting 105 countries, covering 95 per cent of global GDP, in some stage of CBDC exploration), available at <https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/cbdctracker\/<\/a>>.<\/p>\n

9.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 12, Ch. 1, para 1.8 (7-10-2022) (citing BIS Survey on CBDCs, 2021, which found 90 per cent of 81 surveyed central banks engaged in CBDC work).<\/p>\n

10.<\/a> Constitution<\/a><\/span> of India, Seventh Schedule List I Entry 36<\/a>; Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934<\/a>, Preamble.<\/span><\/p>\n

11.<\/a> Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934<\/a>, Ss. 24<\/a>–25<\/a>.<\/p>\n

12.<\/a> Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934<\/a>, S. 26(1)<\/a> (as amended by Finance Act, 2022<\/a>).<\/p>\n

13.<\/a> Reserve Bank of India, Frequently Asked Questions on Digital Rupee (e-Rs) 4, Question 18 (4-2-2026).<\/p>\n

14.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 39, Ch. 6, para 6.3.1(iii) (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

15.<\/a> Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007<\/a>.<\/p>\n

16.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 11, Ch. 1, para 1.5 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

17.<\/a> Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023<\/a>.<\/p>\n

18.<\/a> Reserve Bank of India, Frequently Asked Questions on Digital Rupee (e-Rs) 5, Question 22 (4-2-2026) (listing 19 pilot banks currently offering CBDC wallets, including SBI, ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, and 16 others).<\/p>\n

19.<\/a> Dr P. Govindan, “A Study on the Evolution of the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Digital Rupee (e-Rs) — An Innovative Initiative for Digital Financial Inclusion in India” (2026) 15(4) Paripex — Indian Journal of Research 1, 2.<\/p>\n

20.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 27—28, Ch. 4, para 4.3.4 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

21.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 34, Ch. 5, para 5.7 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

22.<\/a> (2017) 10 SCC 1<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

23.<\/a> (2017) 10 SCC 1<\/a>, Para 301 (Chandrachud, J., concurring).<\/p>\n

24.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 46, Ch. 7, para 7.7.3 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

25.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 29, Ch. 4, para 4.3.5 (7-10-2022) (Box: “Trade-off: Anonymity<\/span> v. AML\/CFT<\/span> compliance”).<\/p>\n

26.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 45, Ch. 7, para 7.6.1 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

27.<\/a> Financial Action Task Force, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers<\/span> (Paris, 2019).<\/p>\n

28.<\/a> Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023<\/a>, Ss. 4<\/a>–8<\/a> (governing processing of personal digital data and imposing obligations on data fiduciaries).<\/p>\n

29.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 37, Ch. 5, para 5.10 (7-10-2022).<\/p>\n

30.<\/a> Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, Issuance of Concept Note on Central Bank Digital Currency 37, Ch. 5, para 5.10 (7-10-2022). See also<\/span> Times of India Business Desk, “RBI to Explore Cross-Border CBDC Pilots as E-rupee Circulation Surges to 1016 Crores”, Times of India<\/span>, 29-5-2025).<\/p>\n

31.<\/a> Anupama Prajapati and Dr Rajesh Kumar Patel, “The Analysis of E-Rupee Growth: A Study of Bank Participation and Voucher Metrics” (2005) 7(2) (March-April) International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research 1, 6.<\/p>\n

32.<\/a> Anupama Prajapati and Dr Rajesh Kumar Patel, “The Analysis of E-Rupee Growth: A Study of Bank Participation and Voucher Metrics”, (2005) 7(2) (March-April) International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research 1, 5 (comparing public sector redemption efficiency of<\/span> \u223c<\/span>22 per cent against private sector efficiency of<\/span> \u223c<\/span>37 per cent).<\/span><\/p>\n

33.<\/a> K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.)<\/span> v.<\/span> Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2017) 10 SCC 1<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by Utsav Singh* and Garima Wadhwa**<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":67011,"featured_media":395430,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[42503,1191],"tags":[114047,114045,114044,114042,114048,114043,114049,114046],"class_list":["post-395368","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-legal-analysis","category-op-ed","tag-cbdc-data-protection-india","tag-central-bank-digital-currency-india","tag-digital-rupee-privacy","tag-e-rupee-india","tag-e-rupee-puttaswamy-privacy","tag-india-cbdc-legal-framework","tag-programmable-digital-currency-india","tag-rbi-e-rupee-pilot"],"yoast_head":"\nIndia's E-Rupee: Legal Framework and Privacy Implications | SCC Times<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"An analysis of India's e-rupee pilot, examining the CBDC legal framework, privacy concerns, data protection, programmability and regulatory gaps.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The E-Rupee Pilot: A Detailed Study of the Legal Framework and Privacy Implications of India\u2019s Central Bank Digital Currency\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"An analysis of India's e-rupee pilot, examining the CBDC legal framework, privacy concerns, data protection, programmability and regulatory gaps.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"SCC Times\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/scc.online\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-09-07T03:30:37+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"886\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"590\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Editor\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Editor\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"21 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Editor\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe\"},\"headline\":\"The E-Rupee Pilot: A Detailed Study of the Legal Framework and Privacy Implications of India’s Central Bank Digital Currency\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-09-07T03:30:37+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":4442,\"commentCount\":0,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp\",\"keywords\":[\"CBDC data protection India\",\"central bank digital currency India\",\"digital rupee privacy\",\"e-rupee India\",\"e-rupee Puttaswamy privacy\",\"India CBDC legal framework\",\"programmable digital currency India\",\"RBI e-rupee pilot\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Op Eds\",\"OP. ED.\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/\",\"name\":\"India's E-Rupee: Legal Framework and Privacy Implications | SCC Times\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-09-07T03:30:37+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe\"},\"description\":\"An analysis of India's e-rupee pilot, examining the CBDC legal framework, privacy concerns, data protection, programmability and regulatory gaps.\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp\",\"width\":886,\"height\":590,\"caption\":\"India e-rupee legal framework\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/07\\\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The E-Rupee Pilot: A Detailed Study of the Legal Framework and Privacy Implications of India’s Central Bank Digital Currency\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/\",\"name\":\"SCC Times\",\"description\":\"Bringing you the Best Analytical Legal News\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe\",\"name\":\"Editor\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Editor\"},\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/author\\\/editor_4\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"India's E-Rupee: Legal Framework and Privacy Implications | SCC Times","description":"An analysis of India's e-rupee pilot, examining the CBDC legal framework, privacy concerns, data protection, programmability and regulatory gaps.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The E-Rupee Pilot: A Detailed Study of the Legal Framework and Privacy Implications of India\u2019s Central Bank Digital Currency","og_description":"An analysis of India's e-rupee pilot, examining the CBDC legal framework, privacy concerns, data protection, programmability and regulatory gaps.","og_url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/","og_site_name":"SCC Times","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/scc.online\/","article_published_time":"2026-09-07T03:30:37+00:00","og_image":[{"width":886,"height":590,"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Editor","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Editor","Est. reading time":"21 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/"},"author":{"name":"Editor","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe"},"headline":"The E-Rupee Pilot: A Detailed Study of the Legal Framework and Privacy Implications of India’s Central Bank Digital Currency","datePublished":"2026-09-07T03:30:37+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/"},"wordCount":4442,"commentCount":0,"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp","keywords":["CBDC data protection India","central bank digital currency India","digital rupee privacy","e-rupee India","e-rupee Puttaswamy privacy","India CBDC legal framework","programmable digital currency India","RBI e-rupee pilot"],"articleSection":["Op Eds","OP. ED."],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/","url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/","name":"India's E-Rupee: Legal Framework and Privacy Implications | SCC Times","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp","datePublished":"2026-09-07T03:30:37+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe"},"description":"An analysis of India's e-rupee pilot, examining the CBDC legal framework, privacy concerns, data protection, programmability and regulatory gaps.","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp","width":886,"height":590,"caption":"India e-rupee legal framework"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/09\/07\/e-rupee-india-cbdc-legal-framework-privacy\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The E-Rupee Pilot: A Detailed Study of the Legal Framework and Privacy Implications of India’s Central Bank Digital Currency"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/","name":"SCC Times","description":"Bringing you the Best Analytical Legal News","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe","name":"Editor","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Editor"},"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/author\/editor_4\/"}]}},"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/India-e-rupee-legal-framework.webp","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/395368","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/67011"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=395368"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/395368\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/395430"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=395368"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=395368"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=395368"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}