{"id":392421,"date":"2026-08-05T14:00:20","date_gmt":"2026-08-05T08:30:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=392421"},"modified":"2026-08-05T14:25:54","modified_gmt":"2026-08-05T08:55:54","slug":"supreme-court-july-2026-explore-key-judgments-and-stories","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/08\/05\/supreme-court-july-2026-explore-key-judgments-and-stories\/","title":{"rendered":"From Misuse of Court Live-Streams to the Release of Elderly and Terminally Ill Prisoners: Supreme Court’s 30+ Biggest Rulings of July 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

The Supreme Court’s July 2026 docket witnessed a remarkable blend of constitutional adjudication, criminal justice reforms, commercial law, technology, environmental governance, and human rights jurisprudence. From recognising the need for systemic reforms in compensation for stray animal attacks, safeguarding student protesters against coercive action, restriction on misuse of court live-stream videos, meaningful consent safeguards under the APAAR digital education scheme to expanding equality principles in compassionate appointment for married daughters, reaffirming zero tolerance for AI-generated fake precedents and expanding protections for elderly prisoners, the Court delivered several decisions with far-reaching legal and social implications. It also addressed important questions concerning environmental clearances, electronic evidence under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam<\/a>, election disclosures, motor accident compensation, railway liability, remission policies, corruption prosecutions, misuse of live-streamed court proceedings, Advocates’ disciplinary jurisdiction and the IBA Caution List, Motor accident compensation principles based on ITRs, and access to urgent constitutional remedies.<\/p>\n

This edition of the Supreme Court July 2026 Roundup brings together the month’s landmark judgments, significant constitutional developments, institutional updates, along with features on judicial appointments, collegium recommendations, and the popular Know Thy Judge series.<\/p>\n

Don’t miss out on the latest Supreme Court judgments and important updates featured in SCC Weekly, capturing the evolving landscape of Indian jurisprudence.<\/p>\n

Top Stories<\/p>\n

1,300 Deaths a Year due to Stray Animals: Supreme Court Awards Compensation, Issues Recommendations and Calls for a National Fix<\/a><\/p>\n

While considering an appeal against the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision relegating the claimants to a civil suit in a compensation claim arising from a fatal stray bull attack, a Division Bench comprising of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ., held that after the efflux of nearly 2 decades, directing the claimants to pursue a civil remedy would leave them “remediless”, rendering such a course unjust, unfair and inequitable.<\/p>\n

Observing that bovine-related accidents are “not few and far between”, the Court awarded a lump sum compensation of ₹15 lakhs to the appellant, while issuing a series of recommendations to the Union and State Governments for the implementation of cattle laws, development of a compensation mechanism for bovine-related accidents, mandatory tagging of animals, and strengthening of animal shelter management to safeguard both human lives and animal welfare. Citing government data, the Court noted that animal attacks killed 1,130 persons across India in 2018, 1,425 in 2019, and 1,305 in 2020.<\/p>\n

[Nisha<\/span> v. Municipal Council Sangrur<\/span>, SLP(C) No(s). 4663 of 2026, decided on 31-7-2026]<\/p>\n

What the Supreme Court Actually Directed on NEET Paper Leak Protest Violence<\/a><\/p>\n

In connected petitions pertaining to the students’ protest against NEET Paper Leak, the three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJI, Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ., held that there was a prima facie case for an independent and impartial investigation into the incidents of violence; notice was issued to States of Maharashtra, Bihar, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Kerala.<\/p>\n

The Court, as an interim measure, directed that:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    all CCTV footage, drone footage, body-worn camera recordings, videography, wireless communication records, and PCR lodge collections related to the students’ protest be preserved;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    personal information and digital data of the protestors, collected during the students’ protests, are preserved and are not disclosed to the public domain for the time being;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    public data\/details of the protestors, especially students, are not to be published by the respondents;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    States may proceed with the investigation of the FIRs registered; however, no coercive measures shall be taken against the protesting students, except persons with criminal antecedents;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    all States were hereby instructed to release children under the age of 18, who were reported to be arrested or detained in connection with the ongoing protests and who do not possess any criminal antecedents.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    [Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, SLP (Crl.) No. 280 of 2025, ordered on 28-7-2026]<\/p>\n

    Inside the Order: Why and How the Supreme Court Curbed, Clipped, Out-of-Context Court Videos on Social Media<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    While considering this writ petition raising concerns over misuse of video conferencing and live-streaming facility in judicial proceedings, especially selective circulation of out-of-context, cropped and misleading clips from court hearings on digital platforms, the three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJI, Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ., gave an interim direction prohibiting extraction, dissemination, monetisation, posting, re-posting, uploading, transmitting, modification, storing, or hosting of the audio-video recordings of the judicial proceedings on social media or any other digital platforms without prior permission of the Secretary General of the Supreme Court or the Registrar Generals of the jurisdictional High Courts.<\/p>\n

    The Court however, clarified that the aforesaid interim order shall have no bearing on the reporting of court proceedings by recognised news outlets.<\/p>\n

    [Harshita Grover<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1393<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    Supreme Court: Reliance on AI-Generated Fake Precedents Vitiates Adjudication; Zero Tolerance for Hallucinated Citations<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In an appeal arising from insolvency proceedings against Essel Infraprojects Ltd. (EIL), the corporate guarantor of Pan India Utilities Distribution Company Ltd. (PIUDCL), a Division Bench of Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ., set aside the orders of the NCLT and NCLAT which had admitted a Section 7 application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016<\/a> (IBC). The Court held that the adjudicatory process stood vitiated as the tribunals had relied upon non-existent, fake and hallucinated precedents, allegedly generated through artificial intelligence, thereby undermining the integrity of adjudication.<\/p>\n

    Reiterating a “zero-tolerance” approach towards reliance on unverified or AI-generated precedents, the Court held that a decision based on such material is no decision in the eyes of law and even an iota of such reliance vitiates the adjudication. While clarifying that artificial intelligence may be used as an aid, the Court emphasised that judicial decision-making must remain under human control. Accordingly, the impugned orders were set aside, the Section 7 IBC application was restored for fresh adjudication, and the matter was directed to be decided expeditiously on merits.<\/p>\n

    “Judicial process and the judgment under challenge are tainted by the usage of materials which are said to be precedents, but in reality, they are unreal, fake, and do not exist at all. A decision of a Court or an adjudicating authority based on material which is fake and hallucinated is no decision at all, and it amounts to subversion of the rule of law. Such a decision is unsustainable and has to be set aside at the earliest.”<\/p>\n

    [Pooja Ramesh Singh<\/span> v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1258<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    E-Filing, Vacation Officers, Midnight Hearings: Supreme Court says System Already Ensures Round the Clock Access to Urgent Constitutional Remedies<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    While considering a public interest writ petition seeking the creation of a permanent institutional mechanism to ensure round-the-clock access to Constitutional Courts in cases involving imminent threats to life, personal liberty and other fundamental rights, a three-Judge Bench comprising of Surya Kant, CJI, Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ., held that the concerns raised by the petitioner were already substantially addressed through the existing institutional, procedural and technological framework. Emphasising that “access to constitutional remedies ought not to be held hostage to the clock”<\/span>, the Court observed that the e-filing system, virtual hearing infrastructure, dedicated mechanisms for urgent listing, designated Vacation Officers and the long-standing practice of convening Benches beyond notified court hours sufficiently ensure timely access to constitutional remedies in cases involving exceptional urgency.<\/p>\n

    [Maheravish Rein<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span>, Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 376 of 2026, decided on 14-7-2026]<\/p>\n

    5,393 Elderly and Terminally Ill Prisoners Identified by NALSA. SC Says Criminal Justice System Needs Systemic Recalibration; Issues Comprehensive Directions<\/a><\/p>\n

    While considering this writ petition bringing forth before the Court systemic concerns regarding continued incarceration of convicted prisoners who are of advanced age (above 70 years) or are terminally ill, the Division Bench of Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta*<\/span>, JJ., directed the Central Government, States and Union Territories to formulate and notify a comprehensive policy for early or premature release of prisoners who are of advanced age and\/or are terminally ill. The Court further directed that the policy so framed, must clearly define the eligibility criteria and procedural framework for consideration of release. In particular, the policy must expressly provide a clear and uniform definition of “terminal illness” and mandate constitution of independent Medical Boards at the Divisional and State levels for objective medical assessment and certification of terminal illness or advanced medical vulnerability.<\/p>\n

    [National Legal Services Authority<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1341<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    Notable Supreme Court Judgments in July<\/p>\n

    ARBITRATION AND ADR<\/p>\n

    Article 227 cannot be invoked to challenge Arbitral Tribunal’s rejection of Section 16 application; Remedy lies under Section 34 after final award: Supreme Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In a batch of appeals against the interim order and the order passed by the Gauhati High Court , whereby the High Court stayed the notice issued by the Arbitral Tribunal to respondents and rejected the appellant’s preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a revision petition under Article 227<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>, the Division Bench of K.V. Viswanathan and Vijay Bishnoi*<\/span>, JJ., held that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the challenge under Article 227 to an order of the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting jurisdictional objections under Section 16<\/a> Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a> (1996 Act). The Court set aside the impugned orders, observing that interference under Article 227 is permissible only in exceptional cases involving a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction, and that the appropriate remedy against rejection of a Section 16 application lies under Section 34<\/a> of the Act, 1996<\/a> after the pronouncement of final arbitral award.<\/p>\n

    [Manash Kamal Bezboruah<\/span> v. Bokahola Tea Company (P) Ltd.<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC<\/span> 1330<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    Exclusive jurisdiction clause can indicate seat of arbitration: Supreme Court dismisses SLP against Delhi HC order appointing Sole Arbitrator<\/a><\/p>\n

    While considering a special leave petition challenging the order passed by the Delhi High Court appointing a Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(5)<\/a> read with Section 11(6)<\/a>, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a>, a Division Bench comprising of J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., held that there was no good ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court.<\/p>\n

    [Sliksync Technologies (P) Ltd.<\/span> v. Pidge Technologies (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1394<\/span><\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    BAIL, PAROLE AND FURLOUGH<\/p>\n

    Meghalaya honeymoon murder case | Supreme Court sets aside Sonam Raghuvanshi’s bail; fresh bail plea permitted if trial is not concluded within six months<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In an appeal challenging the bail granted to the wife, Sonam Raghuvanshi, in the Raja Raghuvanshi murder case, the Division Bench of M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ., held that a plea regarding the adequacy of the grounds of arrest cannot be invoked in a subsequent bail application after earlier bail rejections on merits. Distinguishing such a case from complete non-service of the grounds of arrest, the Court set aside the respondent’s bail while permitting a fresh bail application if the trial is not concluded within 6 months.<\/p>\n

    [State of Meghalaya<\/span> v. Sonam Raghuvanshi<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1392<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    Pre-Trial Incarceration Beyond 11 Months Unwarranted Where Strict Bail Conditions Can Adequately Safeguard Prosecution’s Interests; SC Grants Bail<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In an appeal against refusal to grant bail, the Division Bench of Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ., granted bail to an attesting witness accused in a forged Power of Attorney case, holding that prolonged pre-trial incarceration was unnecessary where strict bail conditions could safeguard the prosecution’s interests.<\/p>\n

    [Raju Prasad<\/span> v. State of Rajasthan<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1353<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    ADVOCATES’ RIGHTS AND DUTIES<\/p>\n

    Whether An Advocate Be Placed on IBA Caution List for Alleged Negligence in Providing Legal Opinion? Supreme Court Answers<\/a><\/p>\n

    The instant appeal challenged the dismissal of a writ petition by the Allahabad High Court (impugned order), wherein the appellant, an advocate, had challenged Canara Bank’s decision to remove him from its panel and, more significantly, to have his name entered in the “Caution List” maintained by the Indian Banks’ Association (IBA). While asserting that the controversy was not confined to a private contractual dispute between a bank and its panel advocate but involved the advocate’s right to practise law, the public-law character of the Caution List, and the statutory framework governing professional discipline of advocates, the Division Bench of P.S. Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe, JJ., set aside the impugned order, holding that the writ petition was maintainable as the operation of the IBA Caution List had a public-law character and directly affected the appellant’s right to practise his profession.<\/p>\n

    Accordingly, the Court directed the respondents to remove the appellant’s name from the Caution List with immediate effect. The Court also directed the Bar Council of India (BCI) to undertake a performance audit of its disciplinary mechanisms and to take steps towards institutionalising continuing legal education (CLE) and considering the establishment of a National Legal Academy (NLA) for the advocates.<\/p>\n

    [Ajay Vijh<\/span> v. Indian Banks Assn.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1295<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    From Blacklisting to Reform: Supreme Court’s IBA Caution List Ruling Opens Door to Mandatory Continuing Legal Education and National Legal Academy for Advocates<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    The Court directed the Bar Council of India (BCI) to undertake a performance audit of its disciplinary mechanisms and to take steps towards institutionalising continuing legal education (CLE) and considering the establishment of a National Legal Academy (NLA) for the advocates.<\/p>\n

    [Ajay Vijh<\/span> v. Indian Banks Assn.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1295<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    CONTRACT AND SPECIFIC RELIEF<\/p>\n

    A No-Interest Clause is Enforceable, but Delay in Refund Attracts Interest; SC reiterates Courts Can’t Rewrite Clear Commercial Contract Terms<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    After travelling through multiple rounds of litigation before the High Court and the Supreme Court with regards to enforceability of a contractual clause providing that a contractor’s security deposit shall not carry interest under a government mining contract, the ultimate question culminated in the present appeal was whether such an express contractual term could be invalidated on equitable grounds and whether the State becomes liable to pay interest if it retains the security deposit beyond the period stipulated for its refund. Reaffirming the principle that a court cannot rewrite or modify clear terms of a commercial contract merely on considerations of equity or perceived unfairness, the Division Bench of Surya Kant, CJ. and V. Mohana*, J.<\/span>, held that while the no-interest clause on security deposit is valid and binding, however, it does not authorise the State to retain the security deposit indefinitely without incurring liability to pay interest. Accordingly, the Court upheld the validity of Clause 19 and set aside the High Court’s declaration that the clause was contrary to law or public policy.<\/p>\n

    [State of Haryana<\/span> v. Jai Durgaa Finvest (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1323<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    CRIME AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN<\/p>\n

    Murder is “Heinous Offence” under JJ Act; JJ Board Must Holistically Evaluate All Relevant Material During Preliminary Assessment: SC<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    The appeal arose from the Patna High Court’s judgment dated 24 July 2025 affirming the order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chapra, directing that the appellant, a child in conflict with law aged above 16 years, be tried as an adult for offences punishable under Sections 302<\/a>, 201<\/a> and 34<\/a>, Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (IPC). The Court examined the legality of the preliminary assessment under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015<\/a> (JJ Act), the classification of murder as a “heinous offence” the scope of appellate powers under Section 101(2), JJ Act, and the principles governing preliminary assessment under Section 15. The Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala*<\/span> and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ., upheld the High Court’s judgment, the trial court’s order directing trial before the Children’s Court and the classification of murder under Section 302<\/a> IPC<\/a> as a “heinous offence” under the JJ Act.<\/p>\n

    The Court also held that<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. \n

      An offence punishable under Section 302<\/a> IPC<\/a> is a “heinous offence” within the meaning of Section 2(33), JJ Act because imprisonment for life constitutes its minimum punishment by necessary implication.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    2. \n

      Section 21, JJ Act modifies only the manner in which punishment is served by a child and has no bearing upon classification of offences.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    3. \n

      The expression “may” in Section 101(2), JJ Act is directory. The Sessions Court possesses discretion to obtain assistance from psychologists or medical specialists whenever the facts of the case make such assistance necessary.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    4. \n

      While conducting preliminary assessment under Section 15, the Juvenile Justice Board (JJ Board) must independently evaluate the expert opinion together with the social background report, social investigation report, witness statements, interaction with the child and every other relevant circumstance. No single piece of evidence can exclusively determine the outcome.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      [X4<\/span> v. State of Bihar<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1363<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      CRIMINAL LAW<\/p>\n

      Mere Call Records Cannot Establish Criminal Conspiracy: Supreme Court Upholds Husband’s Conviction for Wife’s Murder; Acquits Co-Accused<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In a batch of criminal appeals arising from the conviction of a husband and his co-conspirators for the murder of his wife, a Division Bench of Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma*<\/span>, JJ., upheld the conviction of the husband (A1) and 2 co-accused (A4 and A5), holding that the prosecution had successfully established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence proving a premeditated conspiracy to murder the deceased. The Court held that the call detail records, CCTV footage, location data, recoveries made under Section 27<\/a>, Evidence Act, 1872<\/a>, and the unnatural conduct of the husband before and after the incident formed an unbroken chain pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the accused.<\/p>\n

      Observing that frequent telephonic conversations, by themselves, could not establish participation in a criminal conspiracy, the Court upheld the acquittal of the alleged co-conspirator (A2), holding that suspicion, however strong, could not substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in the absence of evidence connecting her with the other accused or the execution of the offence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the convicted accused as well as the State’s appeal challenging A2’s acquittal.<\/p>\n

      “Marriage is often dubbed as one of the most significant decisions in the life of a person. The consequences of a marital discord could be drastic and at times, even fatal. The present case depicts an extreme scenario wherein two lives have met an irreversible fate as a consequence of their marital discord.”<\/p>\n

      [Piyush Shyamdasani<\/span> v. State of U.P.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1357<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      “Wrong statement” is not the same as “false statement”: Supreme Court quashes prosecution under Section 340<\/a> CrPC<\/a> against litigant and counsel<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      While deciding an appeal concerning the initiation of criminal proceedings under Section 340<\/a>, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a> (CrPC), against a litigant and his counsel for allegedly making false statements in pleadings, a Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar*<\/span>, JJ., held that a mere prima facie finding of “wrong statements” is insufficient to direct prosecution for offences under Sections 193<\/a>, 199<\/a> and 200<\/a>, Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (IPC). The Court observed that before invoking Section 340<\/a> CrPC<\/a>, the Court must record its satisfaction not only that a prima facie case of making a “false statement” is made out, but also that it is “expedient in the interests of justice” to hold such an inquiry. Holding that inadvertent or typographical errors cannot, by themselves, be equated with deliberate falsehood, and finding that the statutory requirements under Section 340<\/a> CrPC<\/a> had not been satisfied, the Court quashed the orders directing prosecution and allowed the appeal.<\/p>\n

      [Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram<\/span> v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1367<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      Section 38 BNSS Confers Right to Meet, Not Continuous Presence of Advocate During Interrogation: SC Modifies Police Custody Conditions<\/a><\/p>\n

      The appeal arose from the investigation into an alleged custodial death, challenging the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s judgment dated 7 July 2026 partly modifying the Magistrate’s directions granting police custody of the respondent-accused subject to extensive conditions, thus, examining the permissible extent of judicial regulation of police custody and custodial interrogation under the Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023<\/a> (BNSS). The Division Bench of Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta*<\/span>, JJ., held that<\/p>\n

        \n
      1. \n

        While safeguards against custodial violence are inherent in Article 21 and deserve to be preserved, conditions regulating police custody cannot be so onerous as to frustrate the statutory purpose of investigation.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      2. \n

        Confining interrogation exclusively to prison held “unworkable and unjustified” where recovery of dead body, CCTV hard disks and discoveries under Section 23<\/a>, Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a> (BSA) were yet to be effected.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      3. \n

        Section 187<\/a> BNSS<\/a> permits police custody, not exceeding an aggregate of 15 days, to be granted in parts during the first 40 or 60 days of detention. Courts cannot prematurely foreclose that discretion.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      4. \n

        Section 38<\/a> BNSS<\/a> entitles arrested person to meet an advocate during interrogation but does not contemplate continuous physical presence throughout interrogation.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      5. \n

        Directions regarding continuous audio-visual recording of interrogation and recovery proceedings are salutary safeguard, but uninterrupted videography of transit was impracticable direction.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        [State of A.P.<\/span> v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1389<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        DECREE\/ORDER\/COMPROMISE DECREE<\/p>\n

        Counsel cannot enter into compromise affecting property rights without express authority; Limitation cannot validate illegal compromise decree: Supreme Court<\/a><\/p>\n

        In a civil appeal arising from a challenge to a compromise decree passed in a partition suit nearly three decades earlier, a Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ., dismissed the appeal and upheld the orders of the Trial Court and the Patna High Court setting aside the compromise decree. The Court held that a compromise under Order 23 Rule 3<\/a>, Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a> (CPC) must be in writing and signed by the parties or by a duly authorised representative acting with express authorisation or under exigent circumstances, and that a counsel cannot act merely on implied authority to bind a party to a compromise affecting valuable property rights.<\/p>\n

        Observing that the compromise petition had not been signed by Defendant 5 and that there was no material to establish either his express consent or any circumstance justifying his counsel’s execution of the compromise on his behalf, the Court held that the mandatory requirement of a voluntary and lawful compromise had not been fulfilled. The Court further held that although the challenge to the compromise decree had been brought after nearly twenty-five years, the law of limitation could not be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or defeat substantive rights where the compromise itself was contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the setting aside of the compromise decree and directed that the partition suit be decided through a full-fledged trial on merits.<\/p>\n

        [Krishna Kumar Ojha<\/span> v. Jitendra Chaudhary<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1255<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        Pre-2016 DRT Recovery Certificate Is Not “Decree or Order” u\/S. 9(2), Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act; Cannot Trigger Insolvency Proceedings: Supreme Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

        The appeal concerned with the interpretation of Section 9(2)<\/a>, Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909<\/a> (Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act), and whether a recovery certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) can be treated as a “decree or order” for initiating insolvency proceedings. Reaffirming the principle that insolvency laws must be strictly construed due to their serious civil consequences, the Division Bench of Dipankar Datta*<\/span> and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ., held that a recovery certificate issued by the DRT before the insertion of Section 19(22-A)<\/a>, Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993<\/a> (Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act), i.e., 2016 Amendment, could not be treated as a “decree or order” under Section 9(2), Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act and, therefore, could not form the basis of an insolvency notice under Section 9(2), Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act.<\/p>\n

        [HDFC Bank Ltd.<\/span> v. Kishore K. Mehta<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1320<\/span><\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        EDUCATION LAW<\/p>\n

        Parents Get the Right to Refuse: SC Directs APAAR Consent Form to Include Opt-Out Option; Restricts Disclosure of Student Data Beyond Lawful Purposes<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

        The instant writ petition instituted under Article 32<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>, challenging the constitutional validity of the Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry (APAAR) Scheme, which provides every student with an Aadhaar-linked lifelong digital academic identifier. While declining to interfere with the operation of the APAAR Scheme, the three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJI., Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ., directed that the prescribed consent form must expressly provide parents or guardians with the option to withhold consent, holding that such a safeguard is essential to ensure that consent is “meaningful and informed”. The Court further clarified that all collection, processing, storage, retention and sharing of personal data under the APAAR Scheme are subject to the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023<\/a> (DPDP Act), and that student information cannot be disclosed to private entities or third parties except in accordance with law.<\/p>\n

        [Abhishek Baxi<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1391<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n

        ELECTION<\/p>\n

        Disclosure of Spouse’s Separate Assets Required, Erroneous Cognizance under Representation of the People Act Curable; SC Remands Matter for Fresh Cognizance<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

        Supreme Court: The appeal challenged the Gujarat High Court’s order refusing to quash proceeding and Chief Judicial Magistrate’s summoning order dated 8 November 2017, arising from a complaint alleging that the appellant had failed to disclose the full extent of landed property owned by herself and her spouse while contesting for the post of Councillor, while holding that the disclosure obligation extended to the spouse’s independently owned assets, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ., found that the Representation of the People Act, 1951<\/a> (RP Act) did not govern municipal elections. The Court nevertheless treated the erroneous cognizance taken by the Magistrate under the RP Act as a curable irregularity and remanded the matter for fresh cognizance under the appropriate law, without deciding the merits of the allegations.<\/p>\n

        [Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda<\/span> v. State of Gujarat<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1252<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        ENVIRONMENT LAW<\/p>\n

        Can an Office Memorandum Create a Perpetual Ex Post Facto Environmental Clearance Regime? Supreme Court Answers<\/a><\/p>\n

        A batch of writ petitions, civil appeals and interlocutory applications challenged the validity of the Notification dated 14 March 2017 (2017 Notification) and the Office Memorandum dated 7 July 2021 (2021 Office Memorandum) issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC), which enabled consideration of environmental clearance applications in respect of projects that had commenced without obtaining the mandatory prior environmental clearance under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 (2006 EIA Notification) and Madras High Court’s decision in Fatima v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4514, insofar as it gave only prospective effect to the quashing of the 2021 Office Memorandum. The three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJ., Joymalya Bagchi*<\/span> and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ., reaffirmed that prior environmental clearance under the 2006 EIA Notification was mandatory, and projects commenced without prior environmental clearance cannot ordinarily be regularised unless a valid statutory notification provides otherwise. The Court upheld the 2017 Notification as a valid, narrowly tailored, and time-bound delegated legislation issued under Section 3, Environment Protection Act read with Section 21<\/a>, General Clauses Act, 1897<\/a> (General Clauses Act).<\/p>\n

        [Vanashakti<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1404<\/span><\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        EVIDENCE\/DIGITAL EVIDENCE<\/p>\n

        Hash value is an electronic fingerprint; Section 63(4) BSA certificate requirement is valid: Supreme Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

        In a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 63(4)<\/a>, Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a> (BSA), read with the Schedule appended to it, which requires electronic records tendered as evidence to be accompanied by a prescribed certificate, the three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJ., Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ., upheld the validity of Section 63(4) BSA against the challenge of manifest arbitrariness.<\/p>\n

        However, the Court clarified that the Madras High Court’s view in R.<\/span> v. B.<\/span>, (2024) 1 HCC (Mad) 531, requiring Part B to be signed exclusively by Section 79-A-notified Examiner of Electronic Evidence shall not operate as a binding precedent, and kept the question regarding the scope of expert certification under Part B open for consideration in an appropriate case.<\/p>\n

        [Pune Bar Assn.<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1297<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        FAMILY AND PERSONAL LAWS<\/p>\n

        Marriage Doesn’t Sever a Daughter’s Ties to Her Family; Restricting Compassionate Jobs to “Divorced or Deserted” Daughters Violates Article 14: Supreme Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

        In an appeal from an order of the Patna High Court, which upheld the rejection of the appellants’ request for compassionate appointment of her daughter following the death of her husband, the Division Bench of MM Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. held that a policy restricting compassionate appointment to only divorced or deserted daughters is violative of Article 14<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>. The Court observed that a married daughter cannot be excluded from consideration based on stereotypical assumptions that marriage severs her relationship with her parental family. It reiterated that any classification between sons and daughters based solely on gender or marital status is constitutionally impermissible and that a daughter’s entitlement to consideration for compassionate appointment cannot be denied merely because she is married.<\/p>\n

        [Sayara Khatoon<\/span> v. State of Bihar<\/span>, C.A. No. 009779 of 2026, decided on 23-7-2026]<\/p>\n

        SC Upholds Delhi HC’s Order Allowing Wife to Obtain Husband’s Hotel and Call Records to Prove Adultery in Divorce Proceeding<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

        In a civil appeal challenging Delhi High Court’s judgment dated 10 May 2023, wherein it upheld the Family Court’s directions for preservation and production of the hotel records and call detail records in sealed cover, holding that seeking hotel stay and call record details to prove the charge of adultery would not violate right to privacy, the Division Bench of Manmohan and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., upheld the impugned judgment.<\/p>\n

        [Sachin Arora<\/span> v. Manju Arora<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1298<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        Uncle-in-law cannot make niece’s husband a “Ghardamad” to claim inheritance rights under Oraon customary law: Supreme Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

        Supreme Court: In a significant ruling on the proof of customary law governing Oraon tribal succession, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and N.K. Singh, JJ. held that an uncle-in-law cannot induct his niece’s husband as a ghardamad (resident son-in-law) under the recognised customary law of the Oraon tribal community to confer inheritance rights over ancestral property. The Court reiterated that the party relying upon a custom bears the burden of proving its existence, antiquity, certainty, and continuous observance, and that courts cannot recognise or enforce an unproved custom. Accordingly, finding that the respondents had failed to establish the alleged custom, the Court set aside the concurrent judgments of the trial court, the First Appellate Court, and the Jharkhand High Court, and allowed the appeal.<\/p>\n

        [Bejla Oraon<\/span> v. Kali Das Oraon<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1302<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        Preferential Right of Class I Heirs under Section 22, Hindu Succession Act Extends to Agricultural Property: Supreme Court<\/a><\/p>\n

        In an appeal, revolving around long-standing question of whether the preferential right conferred upon Class I heirs under Section 22<\/a>, Hindu Succession Act, 1956<\/a> (Hindu Succession Act) extends to inherited agricultural land, wherein the First Appellate Court upheld the plaintiff’s preferential right and the High Court affirmed the First Appellate Court’s judgment, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and N. Kotiswar Singh**<\/span>, JJ., upheld the impugned judgments, holding that:<\/p>\n

          \n
        1. \n

          Section 22, Hindu Succession Act applies to inherited agricultural land.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        2. \n

          Babu Ram<\/span> v. Santokh Singh<\/span><\/span>, (2019) 14 SCC 162<\/span><\/a>, correctly states the law and does not require reconsideration by a larger Bench.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        3. \n

          Atam Prakash<\/span> v. State of Haryana<\/span><\/span>, (1986) 2 SCC 249<\/span><\/a>, does not invalidate Section 22, Hindu Succession Act.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        4. \n

          Parliament possessed legislative competence under Entry 5, List III to enact Section 22.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

        5. \n

          Since the plaintiff asserted his preferential right before execution of the sale deed, no separate challenge to the sale deed was necessary.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          [Mahinder<\/span> v. Puran Singh<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1335<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          GAMING\/GAMBLING, LOTTERIES AND PRIZE COMPETITIONS<\/p>\n

          Betting on games of skill is gambling, not business: Here’s why Supreme Court upheld Tamil Nadu and Karnataka laws prohibiting online gaming with stakes<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          In a batch of civil appeals concerning the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Gaming and Police Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021<\/a>, the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Online Gambling and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2022, and the Karnataka Police (Amendment) Act, 2021<\/a>, a Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ., upheld the legislative competence of the States to prohibit online games played with stakes, holding that once the element of staking money on an uncertain outcome enters the picture, the nature of the underlying game, whether of skill or chance, ceases to be relevant and the activity falls within the ambit of “betting and gambling” under Entry 34, List II of the Seventh Schedule.<\/p>\n

          Holding that betting or wagering on games of skill is res extra commercium and does not enjoy protection under Article 19(1)(g), the Court overruled the contrary views of the Madras and Karnataka High Courts, upheld the impugned State legislations as constitutionally valid, and further held that the States were also competent to enact such measures under Entry 1 (public order), List II, in view of the demonstrable social harm caused by online betting and gambling.<\/p>\n

          [State of T.N.<\/span> v. Junglee Games India (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1014<\/span><\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT<\/p>\n

          S. 66 IT Act is bailable offence; Supreme Court clarifies S. 77-B must be read to ascertain nature of offence under S. 66<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          In an appeal against the order passed in a habeas corpus petition wherein Section 66<\/a>, Information Technology Act, 2000<\/a> (IT Act) was treated as a non-bailable offence, the Division Bench of M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ., held that Section 77-B, IT Act has to be read to ascertain the nature of the offence provided under Section 66 and set aside the High Court order.<\/p>\n

          [Maharaj Saran<\/span> v. State of Punjab<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1378]<\/p>\n

          INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE<\/p>\n

          Section 14 IBC Moratorium Applies Only to Corporate Debtor: Supreme Court<\/a><\/p>\n

          While deciding appeals concerning the effect of a moratorium under Section 14<\/a>, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016<\/a> (IBC) on pending consumer proceedings, a Division Bench of Vikram Nath*<\/span> and Sandeep Mehta, JJ., held that the statutory moratorium operates only against the corporate debtor and cannot be extended to promoters, directors, landowners or other respondents unless expressly provided by the statute.<\/p>\n

          The Court observed that the protective sweep of the moratorium must remain within the 4 walls of the IBC and cannot be enlarged in a manner that stultifies remedies available under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019<\/a>. Holding that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) had erroneously declined to proceed against the non-corporate debtor respondents at the interlocutory stage, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the NCDRC to adjudicate the consumer complaint against Respondents 2 to 7 in accordance with law, while clarifying that the proceedings against the corporate debtor would continue to remain governed by the moratorium under Section 14 IBC.<\/p>\n

          [Tejas J. Shah & Amisha T. Shah<\/span> v. Mantri Technology Constellations (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1388<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIM\/COMPENSATION<\/p>\n

          How ITRs can be used to assess annual income of deceased persons in Motor Accident Claims? Supreme Court lays down the method<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          While deciding this appeal challenging Orissa High Court’s decision to reduce the compensation amount so determined by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), the Court had to deliberate that whether to assess the annual income of a deceased person\/claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988<\/a> (MV Act), the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for the previous year is appropriate or average of the past 2\/3 years is to be taken into consideration. The Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ., noting that ITRs being statutory documents, are an important reference point when it comes to assessing one’s income for the purposes of compensation under the MV Act<\/a>, laid down important guidelines for assessment annual income of salaried persons and self-employed individuals using ITRs in respect of determining the compensation in motor accident claims.<\/p>\n

          [Rashmirekha Tripathy<\/span> v. Sriram General Insurance Co. Ltd.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1256<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          “Arising Out Of” Is Causal Link, Without This, Liability Falls; Alleged Murder Not Compensable Under MV Act Without Proof Connecting Vehicle to Death: SC<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          In a civil appeal arising out of special leave petition (SLP) concerning compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988<\/a> (Motor Vehicles Act) where the deceased, who had last travelled in the appellant’s car, was later found murdered, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Augustine George Masih, JJ., set aside the impugned judgments of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) awarding compensation and High Court affirming the same, holding that deceased’s death did not arise out of the use of the motor vehicle within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act. Consequently, neither the owner nor the insurer incurred liability to pay compensation under the Act.<\/p>\n

          The Court held that a claim under Sections 165 and 166, Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable only where the claimant establishes a causal nexus between the injury or death and the use of the motor vehicle. Although the expression “arising out of” receives a broad interpretation and compensation proceedings are governed by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, the existence of “some link whatsoever between the car, and the death has to be established”. Mere presence or involvement of a vehicle in the chain of circumstances, without evidence linking the use of the vehicle to the injury, is insufficient to attract statutory liability under the Act.<\/p>\n

          [Dilip Agarwal<\/span> v. Rajshri Agarwal<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1374<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCHEDULED CASTES<\/p>\n

          Whether NCSC can adjudicate service disputes and issue binding directions under Article 338 of the Constitution? Supreme Court Answers<\/a><\/p>\n

          While examining the constitutional limits of the powers vested in the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) under Article 338<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> in terms of adjudicating service disputes concerning deprivation of the Scheduled Castes’ rights and issuing binding directions, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Augustine George Masih, JJ., held that although the NCSC and similar constitutional commissions under Articles 338-A and 338-B perform a socially beneficial function, “the Legislature has prescribed a role that is recommendatory and advisory, but certainly not adjudicatory”.<\/span> while NCSC has powers to requisition documents and receive evidence, but it does not have the power to make an order in furtherance of that evidence. Thus, NCSC does not possess adjudicatory authority to issue binding directions in service matters.<\/p>\n

          Consequently, the Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgment and declared NCSC’s direction requiring the appellant, Mumbai Port Authority, to pay arrears within 30 days was contrary to the Constitution and non est in law.<\/p>\n

          [Mumbai Port Authority<\/span> v. National Commission for Scheduled Castes<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1398<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          PRINCIPLE OF SENTENCING<\/p>\n

          Remission Policy issued under Article 161 Prevails over Statutory Remission Policy under CrPC; SC Declares State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar Per Incuriam<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          While determining an important question in an appeal, whether the appellant’s application for grant of remission to the State of Haryana would be governed by the “Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002” (2002 Policy) dated 12 April 2002 or the subsequent Policy, “Premature Release of Life Convicts 2008” (2008 Policy) dated 13 August 2008 notified by the Jails and Judicial Department, Government of Haryana, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ., held that the appellant’s remission claim must be considered under the 2002 Policy, not under the later 2008 Policy. The Court held that a remission policy that is substantively framed for the exercise of the Governor’s power under Article 161<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> retains its constitutional character even if issued in the form of a government memorandum. A later remission policy framed under Sections 432<\/a> and 433<\/a>, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a> (CrPC) cannot override, supersede or nullify that constitutional policy.<\/p>\n

          [Parveen Kumar<\/span> v. State of Haryana<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1250<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          Sentencing Must Strike Judicious Balance Between Interests of Victim, Society and Accused; SC Modifies Gang Rape Sentence to 20 Years of Rigorous Imprisonment<\/a><\/p>\n

          Supreme Court: In an appeal while examining the scope of the doctrine of proportionality in sentencing while considering whether imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life under Section 376-D<\/a>, Penal Code, 1860<\/a> was justified, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Augustine George Masih, JJ., affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 376-D<\/a> IPC<\/a>, but modified the sentence from imprisonment for the remainder of natural life to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years with benefit of remission, if otherwise admissible in law, holding that while the statute mandates at least the minimum punishment, it does not require that every conviction must necessarily result in imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. Sentencing must conform to the doctrine of proportionality, thereby, “striking a judicious balance between the interest of the victim, society and the accused, after following the due process of law”.<\/span><\/p>\n

          [Ehsaan<\/span> v. State (NCT of Delhi)<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1356<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT<\/p>\n

          “Political Dictate” Can’t Influence Sanction; Section 19 PC Act Decision-Making Cannot Be A “Hamlet’s Soliloquy”: Supreme Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          Describing the case as one where “political dictate is blatantly displayed”, the Court observed that the decision-making process under Section 19<\/a>, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988<\/a> (the Act), cannot resemble the dilemma in Hamlet’s Soliloquy, i.e., “to be or not to be” and reiterated that sanction is intended to protect honest public servants from false, frivolous and vexatious prosecution, not to shield the guilty.<\/p>\n

          Reaffirming the statutory safeguard embodied in Section 19 and holding that a decision refusing sanction for prosecution cannot be reviewed on the same material merely because a different view is subsequently preferred under political influence and the sanctioning authority must exercise an independent application of mind free from external pressure, the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., upheld the Rajasthan High Court’s decision quashing the sanction granted against a government doctor after it had earlier been declined.<\/p>\n

          Observing that the State ought to have accepted the High Court’s interference with the “patently illegal and blatantly tainted” sanction order, it dismissed the special leave petition (SLP) and imposed costs of ₹50,000 each before the High Court and the Supreme Court, directing payment within 2 months.<\/p>\n

          [State of Rajasthan<\/span> v. Dev Kant Meena<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1401<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          RAILWAYS AND METROS<\/p>\n

          The Ticket Was in the Bag That Was Never Found: Supreme Court Grants ₹8 Lakh to Widow, Says Absence of Ticket Alone Cannot Defeat a Bona Fide Passenger’s Claim<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          In an appeal filed by the wife of a deceased train passenger, challenging the concurrent dismissal of her compensation claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Bhopal Bench, and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. allowed the appeal, holding that compensation under Section 124-A<\/a>, Railways Act, 1989<\/a> cannot be denied merely because the deceased’s railway ticket was not recovered after an untoward incident. The Court reiterated that the provision embodies a no-fault liability regime and is intended to provide expeditious relief to victims and their dependants. It held that while the claimant must initially establish the foundational facts of the journey and occurrence of the incident, such burden can be discharged through relevant evidence, including an affidavit, after which the burden shifts to the Railways to rebut the claim. The Court emphasised that a technical approach cannot defeat the beneficial purpose of the legislation and that the absence of a ticket on the deceased’s person, particularly where the ticket may have been lost along with belongings during the accident, is not by itself sufficient to deny compensation.<\/p>\n

          Accordingly, the Court set aside the judgments of the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court and directed the Railways to pay ₹8,00,000 to the appellant under the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules. 1990 within 4 weeks of receiving her bank account details, failing which the amount would carry interest at 8 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.<\/p>\n

          [Lata<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1350<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

          Supreme Court: Railways not liable for shortage of goods booked at “owner’s risk” unless negligence or misconduct is proved under Section 97, Railways Act<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          Supreme Court: While deciding an appeal arising from the rejection of a claim for shortage of goods during railway transit, a Division Bench of Sanjay Karol*<\/span> and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ., held that where goods are booked at “owner’s risk”, liability of the Railway Authorities can be fastened only upon proof of negligence or misconduct under Section 97<\/a>, Railways Act, 1989<\/a>. The Court observed that in cases where the consignment is not verified by Railway employees, the burden of proving the quantity of goods lies upon the consignor, consignee or endorsee under Section 65(2) of the Act. Finding that the goods were loaded without railway supervision, the sender’s weight was accepted, and the railway receipt contained a “said to contain” endorsement, the Court held that the appellant failed to establish negligence on the part of the Railways and dismissed the appeal.<\/p>\n

          [Bajaj Trading Co.<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1343<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          VIOLATION OF UNDERTAKING<\/p>\n

          Supreme Court imposes ₹3 lakh costs on Samay Raina and other comedians over alleged brazen violation of undertakings<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

          While considering compliance in proceedings arising out of W.P. (C) No. 460 of 2025, a three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJ, Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ. observed that it had “no reason to doubt” that Respondents 6—10, including comedians Samay Raina, Vipul Goyal, Balraj Paramjeet Singh Ghai, Sonali Thakkar alias Sonali Aditya Desai, and Nishant Jagdish Tanwar, had acted in brazen violation of the undertakings and statements made before the Court.<\/p>\n

          [Ranveer Gautam Allahabadia<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1345<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

          Supreme Court Case Disposal and Pendency Status<\/span>1<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

          Pending Cases<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n
          \n

          Case Type<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          Numbers<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          Civil<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          73826<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          Criminal<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          21564<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          95390<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

          Coram wise pending cases<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
          \n

          Coram<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          Pendency (incl. Civil & Criminal)<\/span>2<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          3-Judges Bench<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          224 Cases<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          5-Judges Bench<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          22 Cases<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          7-Judges Bench<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          5 Cases<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          9-Judges Bench<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          2 Cases<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

          Disposal Status<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n
          \n<\/td>\n\n

          Civil Cases<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          Criminal Cases<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          Total<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          Cases disposed of in Last Month<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          4,106<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          2,159<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          6,265<\/span><\/a> Cases<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

          \n

          Cases disposed of in Current Year<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          29,816<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          13,583<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

          		\n

          43,399<\/span><\/a> Cases<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

          Appointments, Recommendations, Transfers, Designations in July<\/p>\n