{"id":391598,"date":"2026-07-28T14:00:01","date_gmt":"2026-07-28T08:30:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=391598"},"modified":"2026-07-28T13:38:47","modified_gmt":"2026-07-28T08:08:47","slug":"75-landmark-constitutional-law-judgments-2025-supreme-court-india-part-ii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/07\/28\/75-landmark-constitutional-law-judgments-2025-supreme-court-india-part-ii\/","title":{"rendered":"75 Landmark Constitutional Law Judgments in 2025 by the Supreme Court of India (Part II of IV)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

This article is a roundup of all the landmark constitutional law judgments delivered and reported in the second half of 2025 inclusive of all the judgments that showcased consideration, interpretation and evolution of important constitutional law principles. The judgments in Part II of the 4-part series are as follows:<\/p>\n

Abbreviations for various common terminologies in the judgments<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/colgroup>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Art.<\/span> — Article<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

AOR<\/span> — Advocate-on-Record<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Assn.<\/span> — Association<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Anr.<\/span> — another<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

BCI<\/span> — Bar Council of India<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

BNSS<\/span> — Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

BNS<\/span> — Nyaya Sanhita, 2023<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

BSA<\/span> — Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

BRS<\/span>— Bharat Rashtra Samithi<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Commission<\/span> — Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

CJ<\/span> — Civil Judge<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

CB<\/span> — Constitution Bench<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

COI<\/span> — Constitution of India<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

CAD<\/span> — Constituent Assembly Debates<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Co.<\/span> — Company<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

CJI<\/span> — Chief Justice of India<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

CJ (JD)<\/span> — Civil Judge (Junior Division)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n  <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

CrPC<\/span>— Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

CG<\/span> — Central Government<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

CST<\/span>— Central Sales Tax Act, 1956<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

DB<\/span> — Division Bench<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

DJs<\/span> — District Judges<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

DPSP<\/span> — Directive Principles of State Policy<\/p>\n

\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

D&C<\/span> — Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

DRI<\/span> — Department of Revenue Intelligence<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

EIA<\/span> — Environment Impact Assessment<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

EP Act<\/span> — Environment (Protection) Act, 1986<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

FIR<\/span> — first information report<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

GC<\/span> — General Conditions<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Govt.<\/span> — Government<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

HC<\/span> — High Court<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

HCJs<\/span> — High Court Judges<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

HCJ Act<\/span> — High Court Judges Salaries and Conditional Service Act, 1954<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

HSA<\/span> — Hindu Succession Act, 1956<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

IPC<\/span> — Penal Code, 1860<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

IEA<\/span> — Evidence Act, 1872<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

IO<\/span> — investigating officer<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

IMFL<\/span> — Indian Made Foreign Liquor<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

INC<\/span> — Indian National Congress<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

LPF<\/span> — level playing field<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Ltd.<\/span> — limited<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

MM<\/span> — Metropolitan Magistrate<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

MoEFCC<\/span> — Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

MPET<\/span> — Madhya Pradesh Entry Tax Act, 1976<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

MEIs<\/span> — Minority Educational Institutions<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

MPJS Rules<\/span> — Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

MLA<\/span> — Member of Legislative Assembly<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

NCTE<\/span> — National Council for Teacher Education<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

NDPS Act<\/span> — Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

NPS<\/span> — New Pension Scheme<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

NITs<\/span> — notice inviting tenders<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Ors.<\/span> — others<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

OWPs<\/span> — original writ petitioners<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

OMs<\/span> — Official Memorandums<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

PwDs<\/span> — Persons with Disabilities<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

r\/w<\/span> — read with<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

RTE Act<\/span> — Right to Education Act, 2009<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Rajasthan Rules<\/span> — Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

RJS Rules<\/span> — Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

RPwD<\/span> — Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

SoAP<\/span> — State of Andhra Pradesh<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

SOMP<\/span> — State of Madhya Pradesh<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

RJS<\/span> — Rajasthan Judicial Services<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

SLP<\/span> — special leave petition<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

SC<\/span> — Supreme Court<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

SEIAA<\/span> — State Environment Impact Assessment Authority<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Sec.<\/span> — Section<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

SL<\/span> — State Legislature<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

SB<\/span> — Single Bench<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

SoT<\/span>— State of Telangana<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

TC<\/span> — trial court<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

TET<\/span>— Teacher Eligibility Test<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

TP (Crl)<\/span> — Transfer Petition (Criminal)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

TP<\/span>— Transportation Pass<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

TLA<\/span> — Telangana Legislative Assembly<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

UOI<\/span> — Union of India<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

UAPA<\/span> — Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

u\/s<\/span> — under Section<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

UT<\/span> — Union Territory<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

UNCRPD<\/span> — United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

w.e.f.<\/span> — with effect from<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

w.r.t.<\/span> — with respect to<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

WP<\/span> — writ petition<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The judgments are as follows:<\/p>\n

(1) Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, In re<\/span><\/a><\/span>1<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 3-3-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan Authored by:<\/span> Justice R. Mahadevan<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court considered the question as to whether persons with benchmark disabilities, including those with visual impairments could lawfully be denied eligibility for appointment to the judicial services solely on account of their disabilities. The matter originated before the court through a suo motu<\/span> proceedings, writ petitions and civil appeals challenging the validity of the recruitment rules framed by the States of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. The proceedings also raised issues concerning the denial of reservation benefits and reasonable accommodation to Persons with Disabilities (for short<\/span>, ”PwDs”) as well as the larger concern of ensuring accessibility and equal participation within the judicial system. Whilst analysing the aforesaid the court considered the constitutional guarantee of equality under Articles 14<\/a>, 15<\/span><\/a>, 16<\/span><\/a> and 21<\/span><\/a>, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>”); India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (for short<\/span>, “UNCRPD”) and the evolving jurisprudence on substantive equality.<\/p>\n

Factual matrix of the case<\/p>\n

The suo motu<\/span> proceedings were initiated based on a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of India (for short<\/span>, ”CJI”) by the mother of a visually impaired candidate aspiring to join the judicial service. The letter questioned the validity of Rule 6-A, Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “MPJS Rules<\/span><\/a>”) on the ground that it disqualified candidates with visual impairment and low vision from appointment as Civil Judges while providing reservation only for certain specified categories of disabilities. Considering the importance of the issues raised, the Supreme Court treated the letter as a writ petition under Article 32<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> and registered it as a suo motu<\/span> proceeding.<\/p>\n

As the proceedings progressed, petitions from different States involving common questions of law relating to recruitment of PwDs in judicial services. One such proceeding also highlighted the alleged non-implementation of reservation for PwDs in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examination. The petitioner contended that although the Rajasthan Public Service Commission consistently notified vacancies reserved for PwDs in accordance with Rule 10, Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “<\/span>RJS Rules<\/a>”), the final select lists published by the Rajasthan High Court did not reflect effective implementation of such reservation. It was further contended that while the High Court justified the practice on the ground that reservation for PwDs is horizontal and therefore did not require separate cut-off marks, however, separate cut-offs were published for other horizontal categories such as women, widows and divorcees. Pointing out lack of transparency and denial of effective reservation to PwDs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Amongst the challenges, there was also a challenge concerning recruitment to the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service. The State had amended Rule 7, MPJS Rules<\/span><\/a> by introducing an eligibility condition requiring candidates either to possess three years practice at the Bar or in the alternative to have passed all examinations in the LLB course in the first attempt with a minimum 70 per cent aggregate. While certain relaxations were provided for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, no corresponding relaxation was extended to persons with benchmark disabilities<\/span>. Candidates suffering from disabilities such as thalassemia and low vision contended that the impugned eligibility criteria failed to account for the unique barriers faced by PwDs in pursuing legal education and legal practice and thereby rendered them ineligible for judicial service despite possessing the intellectual ability to discharge judicial functions.<\/p>\n

Another set of proceedings contended that the selection process for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) in State of Madhya Pradesh. Candidates with benchmark disabilities asserted that although vacancies reserved for PwDs remained unfilled, they were denied appointment for failing to secure the prescribed minimum interview marks. They contended that the authorities had ignored the mandate of Section 34<\/span><\/a>, RPwD Act<\/span><\/a> and the office memorandum issued by the Central Government requiring relaxation of standards of suitability where sufficient eligible candidates with benchmark disabilities were unavailable. Carrying forward reserved vacancies despite the availability of otherwise suitable disabled candidates defeated the very object of the reservation policy and frustrated the legislative intent underlying the RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>. They argued that recruitment authorities had adopted a formal equality approach by applying identical standards to able bodied candidates and PwDs without accounting for the structural disadvantages encountered by the latter.<\/p>\n

Thus, the petitions raised multiple questions regarding reservation, reasonable accommodation, accessibility and equal opportunity for PwDs seeking appointment to the judicial services.<\/p>\n

Issues before the court<\/p>\n

The principal issues for consideration and resolution before the court were:<\/p>\n

1. Whether visually impaired candidates can be said to be “not suitable” for judicial service.<\/p>\n

2. Whether the amendment made in Rule 6-A, MPJS Rules<\/span><\/a> falls foul of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

3. Whether proviso<\/span> to Rule 7, MPJS Rules<\/span><\/a> violates the equality doctrine and the principle of reasonable accommodation.<\/p>\n

4. Whether relaxation can be done in assessing the suitability of candidates when adequate PwD candidates are not available, after selection in their respective category.<\/p>\n

5. Whether a separate cut-off is to be maintained and selection conducted accordingly for visually impaired candidates.<\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

1. Constitutional and statutory framework<\/span><\/p>\n

The court commenced its analysis by observing that the Constitution does not permit exclusion of PwDs from public employment merely because they suffer from a disability. Equality under Articles 14<\/span><\/a> and 16<\/span><\/a> is not confined to formal equal treatment; it requires the State to create conditions in which persons who face structural disadvantages can effectively compete and participate.<\/p>\n

The RPwD Act<\/span><\/a> was enacted to give effect to India’s obligations under the UNCRPD and must therefore be interpreted in a manner that advances inclusion, autonomy and participation of PwDs.<\/p>\n

Relying on Sections 3(3)<\/span><\/a> and 20<\/span><\/a>, RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>, which prohibits discrimination and mandates reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities in public employment, the court noted that judicial services constitute public employment and therefore cannot be insulated from the statutory mandate unless a valid exemption is established in accordance with law.<\/p>\n

2. The social model of disability<\/span><\/p>\n

It was submitted by the respondent Madhya Pradesh High Court that the inclusion of Rule 6-A in the MPJS Rules<\/span><\/a> was in furtherance of an opinion sought from the Dean, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose Medical College and Hospital, Jabalpur, who opined that a person suffering from certain disabilities such as being blind or having low vision, deafness or hard of hearing, cerebral palsy, autism, intellectual disability, specific learning disability and mental illness cannot perform functions of a judicial officer. Accordingly, a significant portion of the judgment is devoted to the conceptual understanding of disability. The court rejected the traditional medical model, which treats disability as an individual deficiency and instead adopted the “social model of disability” under which disability arises from the interaction between an individual’s impairment and societal barriers.<\/p>\n

The court further observed that exclusion from judicial services often results not from the disability itself but from inaccessible infrastructure, inflexible recruitment procedures, absence of assistive technology and preconceived notions about the capabilities of PwDs.<\/p>\n

The court emphasised that society must abandon ableist and paternalistic assumptions to recognise the lived experiences of PwDs while assessing competence and suitability. The principle of “Nothing about us without us” was highlighted as an important dimension of participation of the PwDs in public life.<\/p>\n

3. Reservation in Rajasthan Judicial Services<\/span><\/p>\n

While dealing with Rajasthan Judicial Services, the court noted the grievance that although posts were for PwDs, the final selection lists allegedly failed to reflect effective implementation of that reservation. Horizontal reservation for PwDs cannot be rendered illusory by refusing to provide meaningful consideration during the final stage of selection. The fact that separate cut-offs were maintained for other horizontal categories while denying equivalent treatment to PwDs becomes an arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of the reservation policy.<\/p>\n

4. Reasonable accommodation as a constitutional requirement<\/span><\/p>\n

The court whilst relying on Jeeja Ghosh<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>2<\/sup><\/a> reiterated that reasonable accommodation is not a matter of charity or concession, but a statutory and constitutional obligation. Equality sometimes requires differential treatment so that persons facing particular disadvantages can enjoy equal opportunity in substance.<\/span><\/p>\n

Relying on earlier decisions, including Vikash Kumar<\/span> v. UPSC<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>3<\/sup><\/a>, the court reiterated that PwDs can effectively discharge professional and public functions when appropriate accommodations are provided. The State must therefore remove barriers rather than using them as a justification for exclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court also rejected the assumption that physical limitations necessarily imply inability to perform judicial functions. Judicial work primarily requires intellectual ability, legal reasoning, impartiality and decision-making capacity and the assessment of suitability must be based on these relevant factors rather than stereotypes associated with disability. The court held that Judges without disabilities also depend upon support staff in the ordinary course of discharging their judicial functions. Consequently, the requirement of additional human assistance by a Judge with a disability merely constitutes a form of reasonable accommodation and cannot be construed as resulting in any greater breach of confidentiality or impairment of judicial functioning.<\/p>\n

5. Challenge to the Madhya Pradesh Eligibility Rules<\/span><\/p>\n

In relation to the MPJS Rules<\/span><\/a>, the court examined the challenge to the requirement of either three years practice at the Bar or 70 aggregate score obtained in the first attempt.<\/p>\n

The petitioners argued that the rule failed to account for the unique barriers faced by PwDs in legal education and legal practice. The court highlighted the concern that many court complexes and public institutions continue to lack adequate accessibility, making prolonged legal practice significantly more difficult for several categories of disabled candidates.<\/p>\n

The court further considered the argument that applying identical eligibility standards to able-bodied candidates and PwDs without appropriate accommodation may amount to indirect discrimination. Consequently, eligibility criteria must be examined not merely from the standpoint of formal equality, but also from the perspective of substantive equality and non-discrimination.<\/p>\n

6. Reservation in judicial services<\/span><\/p>\n

A central aspect of the judgment is the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation that reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities in judicial services is not a matter of executive discretion but a statutory mandate flowing from the RPwD Act<\/span><\/a> read with the constitutional guarantees of equality and equal opportunity. Judicial service forms part of public employment and therefore, cannot be insulated from the legislative policy embodied under Sections 3(3), 20 and 34, RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>. The authorities conducting recruitment must ensure that reserved vacancies are actually filled by eligible candidates with benchmark disabilities and are not permitted to lapse or remain perpetually vacant due to rigid or exclusionary standards.<\/p>\n

The court further observed that horizontal reservation for PwDs has to be in consonance with the legislative intent behind the RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>. Recruitment authorities cannot defeat the reservation policy by adopting standards which disproportionately exclude PwDs from consideration.<\/p>\n

7. Recruitment rules and indirect discrimination<\/span><\/p>\n

The court observed that recruitment rules framed by constitutional authorities undoubtedly enjoy a presumption of validity. Nevertheless, such rules remain subject to constitutional scrutiny where they have the effect of excluding an entire class of otherwise competent candidates.<\/p>\n

The court then distinguished between eligibility conditions genuinely connected with the efficient discharge of judicial functions and conditions that merely perpetuate historical barriers faced by PwDs. Emphasis of capability must always remain upon the candidate’s capacity to discharge judicial functions rather than strictly enforcing eligibility requirements that ignore the unique challenges faced by PwDs.<\/p>\n

The court also considered the grievance that candidates with disabilities who narrowly missed prescribed interview benchmarks should not automatically be denied appointment, where reserved vacancies remained unfilled. Replying to its earlier decision passed in Navtej Singh Johar<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>4<\/sup><\/a> which explains that indirect discrimination occurs where a law, rule or practice appears facially neutral, but in its actual operation and impact disproportionately disadvantages a particular class or identity. The court observed that constitutional scrutiny must extend beyond the text of a provision to its practical consequences.<\/span><\/p>\n

8. Examples of persons with visual impairment in the legal field with exemplary achievement<\/span><\/p>\n

The petitioners also placed before the Supreme Court a list of legal experts featured on the<\/span> IDIA Disability Access Programme<\/span> IDAP interview series, who have achieved great heights in the legal profession surpassing the barrier of their disability. Some of them are as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n

(a<\/span>) Justice Zak Mohammed Ycoob — Despite being blind since infancy, Justice Yacoob successfully served on the South African Constitutional Court by using a legally trained assistant, Braille technology, talking computers and note-taking support.<\/p>\n

(b<\/span>) Justice David S. Tatel — Justice Tatel demonstrated that blindness is not an impediment to judicial office by effectively performing judicial functions with the assistance of law clerks, readers and Braille technology.<\/p>\n

(c<\/span>) Senior Advocate S.K. Rungta — The Court highlighted the distinguished legal career of Senior Advocate S.K. Rungta, whose advocacy significantly advanced disability rights in India.<\/p>\n

(d<\/span>) David Lepofsky — One of Canada’s leading appellate advocates suffering from visual impairment, Lepofsky has appeared in hundreds of appellate matters, including before the Supreme Court of Canada.<\/p>\n

9. Precedents discussed by the court<\/span><\/p>\n

In arriving at its conclusions, the court extensively relied upon and discussed several landmark decisions governing disability rights and public employment. Some of these judgments as referred herein below:<\/p>\n

(a<\/span>) Vikash Kumar case<\/a><\/span>5<\/sup><\/a>, wherein the Supreme Court recognised reasonable accommodation as an indispensable component of substantive equality and held that PwDs are entitled to appropriate modifications enabling them to participate effectively in competitive examinations.<\/p>\n

(b<\/span>) Union of India<\/span> v. National Federation of the Blind<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>6<\/sup><\/a>, wherein the Supreme Court recognised that employment opportunities play an instrumental role in empowering PwD.<\/span><\/p>\n

(c<\/span>) Kavita Kamboj<\/span> v. High Court of P&H<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>7<\/sup><\/a> and Abhimeet Sinha<\/span> v. High Court of Patna<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>8<\/sup><\/a>, wherein it was observed in relation to the role of viva voce examinations in entry-level judicial recruitment that they alone are not a holistic criteria to gauge eligibility.<\/span><\/p>\n

(d<\/span>) Indra Sawhney<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>9<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, wherein the Constitution Bench proposed for reservation of PwD candidates in public employment and for relaxation of lesser qualifying marks as amounting to affirmative action in their favour.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court reiterated that affirmative action is not confined to reservation alone, but also extends to measures such as relaxation of qualifying marks, age limits and other minimum eligibility requirements to enable disadvantaged classes to compete effectively in public employment. Such concessions function as ”temporary crutches<\/span>” intended to remove structural disadvantages and facilitate genuine equality of opportunity. Thus, relaxation of minimum qualifying or cut-off marks for PwDs is constitutionally permissible and is further reinforced by the office memorandum issued under the RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>. Accordingly, where the applicable rules confer a power of relaxation, recruiting authorities are competent to relax minimum qualifying standards to ensure that reservation for PwDs is implemented in a meaningful and effective manner, rather than remaining merely illusory. The court also referred to the precedents of Aryan Raj<\/span> v. State (UT of Chandigarh)<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>10<\/sup><\/a>, Sunanda Bhandare Foundation<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>11<\/sup><\/a> and Jacob M. Puthuparambil<\/span> v. Kerala Water Authority<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>12<\/sup><\/a> stating that ”a court should interpret an act so as to advance Article 41” which imposes a duty upon the State to make effective provisions for the upliftment of the PwDs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

Upon an exhaustive examination of the c<\/span>onstitutional framework, the statutory scheme under the RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>, and the judicial precedents governing reservation and public employment for PwDs, the court arrived at the following conclusions:<\/span><\/p>\n

1. Visually impaired and low vision candidates were declared eligible for recruitment to the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service and Rule 6-A, 1994 Rules was struck down to the extent it excluded such candidates.<\/p>\n

2. Rule 7, 1994 Rules was partially struck down insofar as it imposed the additional requirement of securing 70 per cent marks in the first attempt or possessing three years practice for PwDs. The court directed that PwD candidates be considered on the basis of the prescribed educational qualifications, subject to applicable relaxations.<\/p>\n

3. The petitioners who were not selected on account of securing less marks in interview as the relaxation as per the RPwD Act<\/span><\/a>, were directed to be reconsidered for appointment in terms of this decision in the next recruitment, if they so apply for the post.<\/p>\n

4. In relation to the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examination, candidates who were denied consideration due to the absence of a separate cut-off for PwDs were directed to be considered in the next recruitment by maintaining a distinct cut-off and merit list for PwD candidates<\/span>, along with the carry-forward of unfilled reserved vacancies.<\/p>\n

5. All High Courts and State authorities concerned were directed to complete the judicial service recruitment process in accordance with the judgment as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(2) K. Gopi<\/span> v. Sub-Registrar<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>13<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 7-4-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice Abhay S. Oka<\/p>\n

The appeal arose out of judgment passed by the Division Bench of High Court, which affirmed the decision of Sub-Registrar to register the sale deed.<\/p>\n

The said refusal was issued on the ground that appellant vendor (executant of the sale deed) did not establish his title and ownership and thus by virtue of Rule 55-A, Tamil Nadu Registration Rules, 1949 (Registration Rules) enacted under the Registration Act, 1908<\/span><\/a> (1908 Act<\/a>)<\/span>, the Sub-Registrar was entitled to refuse the said registration. The Supreme Court in appeal allowed the appellant to amend the special leave petition for incorporating a challenge to the validity of Rule 55-A(i<\/span>), Registration Rules, on which aspect the judgment was principally passed.<\/p>\n

The primary contention of the petitioner whilst laying challenge to the Rule 55-A(i<\/span>) was that the Sub-Registrar, who is duty bound to register any document under the 1908 Act<\/span><\/a> is not empowered to go into the question of title of any person executing the document for transferring the property. Refusal therefore to register the sale deed cannot be issued in the event vendor fails to prove his title and thus Rule 55-A(i<\/span>) is ultra vires<\/span> the provisions of the 1908 Act<\/span><\/a>, being inherently unconstitutional.<\/p>\n

Consideration of constitutionality of Rule 55-A(1) by the court<\/p>\n

Examining Rule 55-A(i<\/span>), the court observed that it debars the registering officer from registering any instrument\/document\/deed, till the presentant produces the previous original deed by which the seller\/vendor\/executant acquired the right over the subject property and an encumbrance certificate obtained within 10 days of the date of presentation.<\/p>\n

The court also referred to Sections 22-A and 22-B, Registration Act, 2008 (as applicable in Tamil Nadu), wherein certain grounds were provided when any document can be refused to be registered, including the registration of forged documents and other documents prohibited by law. None of these sections permitted refusal on the ground of failure to produce documents of the title of the vendor, but other grounds were stipulated under these express provisions.<\/p>\n

Referring also to Section 69<\/span><\/a>, 1908 Act<\/span><\/a>, the court further held that no provision under the parent enactment confers power on any authority to refuse registration of a transferred document on the ground that title of the vendor has not been produced or proved. Therefore, if the original deed is lost, the document would never be registered, unless a non-traceable certificate is issued by the police document along with the advertisement published in the local newspaper giving notice of the loss of the previous original deed. Thus in a way, the registering officer is empowered to verify the title of the executant, a power alien to the scheme of<\/span> 1908 Act<\/span><\/a><\/span>. The parent Act does not vest any adjudicatory powers with the registering officer to adjudicate as to whether the executant has or had any title, nor is it the function of the Sub-Registrar to inquire whether the vendor had the title to the property which he is seeking to transfer. Once the registering authority is satisfied that the parties to the document are present before him are consensus ad idem<\/span> to execute the sale\/transfer deed; ready to make all procedural compliances, the document must be registered. If the executant has no right, title or interest in the property the registered document itself will not effect any transfer. The Rule 55-A(i<\/span>) therefore was held to be inconsistent with the provisions of the 1908 Act<\/span><\/a> and was thus declared ultra vires the rule making power conferred under Section 69<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the impugned judgment was quashed and set aside so passed by the High Court. The appellant was directed to lodge the sale deed for registration within a period of one month from the date of judgment and the registering officer was directed to register the sale deed if all compliances were being met.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(3) State of Rajasthan<\/span> v. Combined Traders<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>14<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 16-4-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice Abhay S. Oka<\/p>\n

The appeal arose out of the judgment of Rajasthan High Court, which declared sub-rule (20) of Rule 17, Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957 (for short<\/span>, “Rajasthan Rules”) as ultra vires<\/span> the provisions of the parent enactment, viz.<\/span> the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “CST Act<\/a>”). Vide the impugned provision of Rule 17(20), the assessing authority was authorised to cancel\/revoke such declaration forms or certificates, which were procured either by misrepresentation of fact or by fraud. The High Court took the view that the appellant State had no rule-making power to frame such a rule providing for the cancellation of validly issued declarations\/forms conferred anywhere by the parent enactment of the CST Act<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The respondents sold certain goods to one H.G. International and Saraswati Enterprises against form “C” so generated online. The places of business of H.G. International and Saraswati Enterprises were inspected by the Revenue Authorities, where it was found that no business activity was carried out at the places and that it was a completely bogus entity. Resultantly the declaration forms of H.G. International and Saraswati Enterprises were accordingly cancelled, which directly impacted the respondents as well.<\/p>\n

Consideration of the submissions by the court<\/p>\n

The court referred to Section 8<\/span><\/a>, CST Act<\/span><\/a>, whereunder the dealer selling the goods in the course of interstate trade or commerce is required to furnish to the prescribed authority a properly filled form containing the necessary particulars and details of the registered dealer to whom the goods are being sold. The details which are to be filled in the said form are prescribed by virtue of the rules by the Central Government under Section 13(1)<\/span><\/a>, CST Act<\/span><\/a>. The power is thus vested with the Central Government to prescribe the form of declaration and lay down particulars to be contained in any declaration to be provided by the dealer of the goods regarding the dealer to whom the goods are sold. Sections 13(3)<\/a> and (4)<\/a> obligated the State Government to make rules which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the parent CST Act<\/a> or the Rules made by the Central Government thereunder. The court found that the perusal of the Central Registration Rules shows that no power was conferred on any authority to cancel the declaration Form C. There is no prescription regarding cancellation of declaration on the ground that commercial activity is not found at the address mentioned in the declaration, when similar provisions were enacted in the rules providing for cancellation of the certificate of registration under Section 7. Therefore, the State Government exercising rule-making power could not have enacted a rule providing for cancellation of the declaration Form C, which trace their genesis to the Central Registration Rules. By providing a stipulation for cancellation in the State Rules, the rules under challenge thus became inconsistent with the Central Rules, which the State Government was clearly incompetent to frame.<\/p>\n

Referring to its earlier judgment in State of Madras<\/span> v. R. Nand Lal & Co.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>15<\/sup><\/a>, the court reiterated that the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 13(1)(d<\/span>)<\/span><\/a>, CST Act<\/span><\/a> prescribes the form of declaration and the particulars to be contained in the said declaration. The rules made by the State Government are not permitted to run contrary or at variance with that framed by the Central Government, in a way to dilute their impact and effect. Accordingly holding that the view of the High Court could not be faulted with insofar as validity of Rule 17(20), Rajasthan Rules is concerned, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(4) Revenue Intelligence Directorate<\/span> v. Raj Kumar Arora<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>16<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 17-4-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice J.B. Pardiwala<\/p>\n

The appeals before the Supreme Court arose out of the judgment of Delhi High Court and the trial court which concurrently recorded that no offences under Sections 8<\/span><\/a>, 22<\/span><\/a> and 29<\/span><\/a> under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “<\/span>NDPS Act<\/a>”) were made out since the psychotropic substance in question — ”Buprenorphine”<\/span> did not figure under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules, 1985. The trial court ultimately transferred the matter to the court of Metropolitan Magistrate (for short<\/span>, “MM”) for proceeding in accordance with the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “D&C Act<\/span><\/a>”).<\/span><\/p>\n

Necessary facts<\/p>\n

The office of the appellant, Department of Revenue Intelligence (for short<\/span>,”DRI”) on a tip off found that the accused persons were in possession of the drug ”Buprenorphine<\/span>”. The respondent accused persons were collectively involved in the illegal manufacturing, common storage, common transport, sale and purchase of the said Buprenorphine hydrochloride drug along with other accused persons. They were accordingly arrested for the commission of offences under Sections 22<\/span><\/a> and 29<\/a><\/span>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>. Criminal proceedings were instituted before the competent court, against which the matter travelled to the High Court. The High Court held that since the said drug is not included under Schedule I to the NDPS Rules, its manufacturing, position and transport would neither be prohibited nor regulated by the NDPS Rules and consequently by the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>. It was clearly “a prescription drug<\/span>” and therefore the offence would fall within the rigours of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a> and not the NDPS Act<\/a>. Accordingly, the High Court granted bail to the accused person.<\/p>\n

Thereafter, on an application moved under Section 216<\/a><\/span>, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a> (CrPC<\/a>)<\/span>, for amendment\/alteration of the charge (after the charges were framed by the Sessions Court), the trial court allowed the said application and held that no offence under the NDPS Act<\/a> was made out against that accused person. That is when the matter travelled to the Supreme Court of India. In the process, both the trial court as well as the High Court relied upon earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal<\/span> v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>17<\/sup><\/a>, which took the view that if any drug is not mentioned under Schedule I to the NDPS Rules, then provisions of Section 8<\/a><\/span>, NDPS Act<\/a> would not get attracted.<\/span><\/p>\n

Issues for determination<\/p>\n

In view of the questions arising before it in the batch of matters, the Supreme Court framed the following issues for its consideration:<\/p>\n

1. Whether the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consumption, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or transhipment of a psychotropic substance which is listed under the Schedule to the NDPS Act<\/a> but not mentioned under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules would constitute an offence under Section 8(c<\/span>)<\/a><\/span>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>?<\/p>\n

2. Whether the decision of this court in Union of India<\/span> v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>18<\/sup><\/a> must operate with prospective effect?<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Once the charge has been framed by a competent court under Section 228<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a>, can an accused thereafter seek for discharge\/deletion of a particular offence from the charge under Section 216<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a>?<\/p>\n

In re: Issue 1<\/span>: Whether an offence under Section<\/span> 8(c<\/span>)<\/span><\/a> is made out, when an accused deals with the psychotropic substance mentioned in the Schedule to the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, but not so specified under Schedule I to the NDPS Rules.<\/span><\/p>\n

Whilst answering this issue, the court made extensive reference to the Preamble, Aims and Objectives of the NDPS Act, 1985<\/span><\/a>, as also the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971. Observing that the NDPS Act<\/a> is a special enactment, comprising stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, Court referred to the three conventions, which form the background of enactment of the NDPS Act<\/a>; they were<\/span> —<\/span> the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Making extensive reference to all the three conventions, the court held that even these international instruments have categorised the substances mentioned in various schedules, subjecting them to differential treatment, use, composition, import, and sale amongst others. The drug in question, viz<\/span>. ”Buprenorphine hydrochloride<\/span>” is also listed under Schedule III, which is the category of the regulated drug. The manufacture, distribution, stalking and possession of this drug is limited to medical and scientific purposes, in addition to the limited purposes as provided under Article 4.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court then made extensive references to various provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> and its Rules, viz.<\/span> Section 2(xxiii<\/span>)<\/span><\/a>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, defining ”psychotropic substance<\/span>”; Section 8<\/span><\/a>, imposing the prohibition on every activity relating to Narcotic Drug or Psychotropic Substance, except for medical or scientific purposes. The Court observed that Section 8<\/span><\/a> describes a general prohibition on any kind of dealing with narcotic drugs unless it is proved that the drug or substance was being dealt with for medical or scientific purposes in terms of the manner and the extent provided under the NDPS Rules. Offence under Section 8(c<\/span>)<\/span><\/a> is made out the moment a person deals with a drug or a substance for a purpose other than medical or scientific purposes. Referring to Sections 9<\/span><\/a> and 76<\/span><\/a>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, the court further observed that the NDPS Rules cannot be understood as laying down standards different from or inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> especially Section 8<\/span><\/a> and the Schedule to the NDPS Act<\/a>. The court on analysis of various provisions of the NDPS Rules found that the substances mentioned under Schedule I to the NDPS Rules are more strictly regulated or restricted in comparison to the larger list of psychotropic substances mentioned in the Schedule to the NDPS Act<\/a>. Any person dealing in the psychotropic substances or drugs must strictly do so in accordance with the NDPS Rules and only for the purposes as enumerated under Chapter VII-A insofar as the scheduled drugs to Schedule I of the Rules is concerned. The substances not finding a mention under Schedule I of the Rules, but listed in the Schedule to the Act must also meet with the same requirement cast upon by the NDPS Rules. The objective of providing two different schedules i.e. one under the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> and the other one under the NDPS Rules is to stipulate different levels of restrictions.<\/p>\n

Referring to the judgment of Ouseph<\/span> v. State of Kerala<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>19<\/sup><\/a>, Ravindran<\/span> v. Supdt. of Customs<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>20<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court took the view consistently that Sections 8<\/span><\/a> and 22(c<\/span>)<\/span><\/a>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> would stand attracted even if the substance was though listed under Schedule I to the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, but is absent from Schedule I of the NDPS Rules. However, the digression from the consistent view happened in the case of Rajesh Kumar Gupta<\/span><\/a>21<\/sup><\/a>, wherein, the court took a view that once the drugs are found to be used for medicinal purposes and beyond the pale of the rules occurring under Chapters VI and VII of the NDPS Rules, the exception contained under Section 8<\/span><\/a> would kick in and no offence could be said to be made out. The exception being usage of the contraband for medical or scientific purposes which is excluded from being treated as an offence under Section 8(c<\/span>)<\/span><\/a>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The aforesaid digression in Rajesh Kumar Gupta case<\/a><\/span>, was rectified by the Supreme Court in the subsequent judgment in Sanjay Kumar Kedia<\/span> v. Narcotics Control Bureau<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>22<\/sup><\/a>, wherein the court held that mere fact that dealing in drugs is relatable to medical or scientific purpose will not by itself lift the embargo applicable under Section 8(c<\/span>)<\/span><\/a> till and until such a dealing is in the manner and extent provided by the other provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, Rules or Orders made thereunder. The view taken earlier in the case ofRajesh Kumar Gupta<\/a><\/span><\/span> was therefore overruled by the Supreme Court in this judgment, holding that just because a drug is not included under Schedule I to the Rules will not cease to attract the rigours of Section 8<\/span><\/a>. The source of prohibition lies under Section 8<\/span><\/a> and not under Rules 53 or Rule 64 of the NDPS Rules, for determining whether dealing with a drug or a substance falls within the prohibited territory or not. This would render an entire Schedule to the NDPS Act nugatory, which could have never been the intention of the legislature. Referring to Section 80<\/span><\/a>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, the court held that application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a> or the Rules made thereunder is always in addition to and not in derogation of the NDPS provisions. The provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> cannot in any way be understood to have to take away the scope of offence being so made out under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a>. The accused can also be charged or prosecuted for an offence under the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, even when an offence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a> is made out. A particular conduct of any accused may fall both under the ambit of NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> as well as the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a> and this overlap would not imply that the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940<\/span><\/a> would cease to apply or vice versa<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Accordingly, the court held that whenever the accused takes a plea, that his dealing with the drug or substance does not constitute any offence under Section 8<\/span><\/a>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>, it must be proved that the drug was being dealt with:<\/p>\n

1. for medical or scientific purposes and;<\/p>\n

2. in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> or the NDPS Rules or the orders made thereunder and;<\/p>\n

3. in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence, permit or authorisation, if any required under the provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> or the NDPS Rules or the orders made thereunder.<\/p>\n

The court accordingly concluded that the substances under Schedule I to the NDPS Rules are therefore more strictly restricted, while the remaining psychotropic substances under Schedule to the NDPS Act<\/a> are leniently restricted. The view of the Supreme Court in the case ofRajesh Kumar Gupta<\/span><\/a>23<\/sup><\/a> was rightly overruled and overruled in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case<\/a><\/span>24<\/sup><\/a>. Therefore, the view that if any drug or a substance is not included under Schedule I to the NDPS Rules, will not attract commission of offences under the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> is clearly erroneous and unacceptable.<\/p>\n

In re: Issue 2:<\/span> Whether the decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande<\/span> case<\/a> should operate prospectively or retrospectively<\/span><\/p>\n

The court then dealt into the 2nd issue as to whether the judgment of Supreme Court in the case ofSanjeev V. Deshpande<\/span><\/a>, overruling earlier dictum of Rajesh Kumar Gupta<\/a><\/span> case<\/span>, must operate retrospectively or prospectively. Discussing the general principle that declaration of statute dealing with substantive rights is generally considered to be prospective, unless expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. However, when a decision overrules any earlier opinion, a particular interpretation of any penal provision, then it is by default retrospective. This is because of the settled law that views taken by the court in subsequent benches, overruling the earlier view is retrospective and normally assumed to be the law from the inception. Irrespective of the stage of pendency before different forums of all the cases on any principle of law, the declaration or interpretation of any proposition of law by the Supreme Court is deemed to have existed from the inception of the concerned statute or provision. Referring to the judgment of Sarwan Kumar<\/span> v. Madan Lal Aggarwal<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>25<\/sup><\/a> and CIT<\/span> v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>26<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that declaration of principle of law relates back to the law itself and it is deemed that law was never otherwise. Reiterating the Blackstonian theory<\/span>, the Supreme Court observed that it is not the function of the court to pronounce a new rule, but to maintain and expound the old one. This is based on the fundamental conception that Judges do not make the law, they only discover or find the correct law. If the subsequent decision alters the earlier one, the later decision does not make a new law, but only discovers the correct principle of law, which has to be applied retrospectively.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court then discussed when and how the doctrine of ”prospective overruling<\/span>” is made applicable. Holding the doctrine of “prospective overruling<\/span>” is an exception to the normal rule that a judgment or decision applies to retrospectively, the court (especially the Supreme Court) can always contemplate, giving<\/span> prospective application to a law declared by it. The intention to attribute prospectivity to any decision must be<\/span> clear, unambiguous, and explicit.<\/span> The law declared by a court ordinarily operates retrospectively unless it is expressly stated to have prospective application . Referring to the judgments of Golak Nath<\/span> v. State of Punjab<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>27<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that this<\/span> doctrine has originated from American jurisprudence and it is necessitated when the object is to avoid the reopening of settled issues to prevent the multiplicity of proceedings, to curb uncertainty law and thwart avoidable litigation. Referring to the judgment of Baburam<\/span> v. C.C. Jacob<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>28<\/sup><\/a> and Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd.<\/span> v. State of U.P<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/span>29<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that the doctrine of prospective overruling is generally invoked in larger public interest and it is only a recognition of the principles that court moulds the relief claim to meet the justice of the case — justice, not in its logical, but in its equitable sense. “Prospective overruling<\/span>” is a practice adopted by the courts to prevent the chaotic and scrambling of actions done in the past, reaching a middle ground by postponing the decision declaring the invalidity of a particular date whilst keeping in mind the larger interest of doing complete justice. However, at the same time, the prospective overruling is to be adopted, only when the hardship is so great, that retrospective operation would breed injustice. Referring to the judgment of Union of India<\/span> v. I.P. Awasthi<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>30<\/sup><\/a>, the court observed that it is not condign to apply the doctrine of ”prospective overruling<\/span>”, when a large number of parties are not affected, but the same must be resorted to only when substantial actions have been undertaken under the invalid laws in a way that going back to the original position would be next to impossible.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

The court then answered the question as to whether another Bench can subsequently declare a past decision to be prospectively applicable. Referring to the judgment of Jarnail Singh<\/span> v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>31<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that it is not an absolute rule that prospective overruling or prospective operation of any decision must be declared only by the Bench which rendered a decision in question. Subsequent\/later Bench can also take such a view, if it is necessary to avoid chaos or confusion likely to arise from the retrospective operation.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court then discussed the principles pertaining to applicability\/non-applicability of doctrine of ”prospective overruling<\/span>” in criminal matters. Referring to the judgment of State of Kerala<\/span> v. Alasserry Mohammed<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>32<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that interference with the orders of acquittal should not be made whenever any earlier view is overruled by any later Bench. In matters pertaining to procedural laws, retrospective operation of later view is permissible, where it relates to decision about proper forum where the trial should proceed. However, where the trial is at advanced stages and any change of forum will lead to unnecessary and avoidable hardship to the accused, then even the change in interpretation about the procedural law will not affect the pending trials. The court in view of the foregoing discussion, however took the view that decision taken in latter view of the Supreme Court in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case<\/a><\/span>33<\/sup><\/a> cannot be declared to be prospectively applicable as there existed no overwhelming reason to apply the doctrine of prospective overruling qua<\/span> such a view. Therefore, pending cases, if any, which were instituted before the decision of the Supreme Court, in the Sanjeev V. Deshpande case<\/a><\/span> overruling the earlier view of Rajesh Kumar Gupta<\/span><\/a> case<\/span>34<\/sup><\/a>, would also be governed by the law as clarified by the Supreme Court subsequently.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court then answered the contention that Article 20(1) consideration shall not come in the way of retrospective applicability of the later judgment of Sanjeev V. Deshpande<\/span><\/a> case<\/span>. Observing that Judges do not make the law, but only find the right one, the court held that retrospective overruling of any judgment cannot attract the violation of Article 20. When the very legal interpretation given to Section 8<\/a><\/span>, NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> by the earlier judgment of Rajesh Kumar Gupta<\/span><\/a> case<\/span> was flawed, wrong and misplaced and overruled in a subsequent decision, the persons accused of committing offences under Section 8<\/span><\/a> could rightly not be allowed to take any advantage on the considerations of Article 20. Referring to a host of judgments, the court held that there would arise no adverse implications as regards Article 20(1) rights by the application of principle propounded in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case<\/a><\/span>. Overruling of a decision cannot be equated to creation of a new law, which attracts the wrath of Article 20(1). This is more so when the later view in the case of Sanjeev V. Deshpande<\/span><\/a> was in sync with the provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a>. However, the Supreme Court held that in cases where trial has already concluded on the basis of overruled law\/principle of Rajesh Kumar Gupta<\/span><\/a> case<\/span>, having attained finality, the same would not be disturbed. In all the pending matters where trial is yet to progress, the said would be adjudged on the basis of correct interpretation of law as declared subsequently in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case<\/a><\/span>. The Supreme Court observed that the overruling of any decision cannot be equated as equivalent to enactment of any ex post facto<\/span> law, especially when interpretation given to the statute of the provision in the overruling decision is not a normal and unreasonably expensive interpretation of the provision in question in a way that it was completely unforeseeable.<\/p>\n

In re: Issue 3:<\/span> Legality of exercise of powers under Section 216<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a> or altering\/amending the charge relating to commission of offence under the NDPS Act<\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The court then examined whether an order passed by the Sessions Court dropping the charge under the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> by resorting to Section 216<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a> was proper or not. Interpreting Section 216<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a>, the Supreme Court held that the power to alter, add or amend any charge can be exercised at any time before the judgment is pronounced. However, the power can be exercised only after charges are framed under Section 228<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a> and the accused is not discharged under Section 227. Referring to the judgment of Gian Devi Anand<\/span> v. Jeevan Kumar<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>35<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that “the meaning of the expression altar<\/span>” under Section 216<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a> means to make a change to modify in a way that broad subject-matter continues to be the same. Section 216<\/span><\/a> therefore nowhere authorises the court to delete or drop any charge altogether, howsoever expansive and wide-ranging power is read into provision. Referring to the judgments of K. Ravi<\/span> v. State of T.N.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>36<\/sup><\/a>, Dev Narain<\/span> v. State of U.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>37<\/sup><\/a>, the court observed that by resorting to Section 216<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a> no accused cannot be discharged or exonerated altogether, a power which is available only for alteration or addition of the charge. Accordingly the Supreme Court observed that the trial court erroneously exercised powers under Section 216<\/span><\/a> CrPC<\/span><\/a> and discharged both accused persons illegally. The power to drop or delete the charge of the various provisions under the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> was clearly not available to be exercised and the order therefore suffered from gross error of jurisdiction.<\/span><\/p>\n

Accordingly, setting aside the views of both the High Court as well as the trial court, the accused persons were directed to be tried under the applicable provisions of the NDPS Act<\/span><\/a> and the Rules. The appeals were accordingly allowed by the Supreme Court and trial court was directed to conclude the trial against the respondent accused persons.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(5) Naresh Kumar Gupta<\/span> v. State of Punjab<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>38<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 1-5-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice B.V. Nagarathna<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court while deciding a batch of civil appeals examined the constitutional validity of the retrospective amendment made to Section 29<\/span><\/a>, Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, ”PVAT Act<\/span><\/a>”), which extended the period of limitation for completing assessment of tax.<\/p>\n

Factual matrix of the case<\/p>\n

The appeals before the Supreme Court arose from a series of orders of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, all of which had followed the decision in Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd.<\/span> v. State of Punjab<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>39<\/sup><\/a>. The principal controversy related to the constitutional validity of the amendments made to Section 29<\/a><\/span>, PVAT Act<\/span>,<\/a> by the Punjab Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, 2013. The appellants had challenged the amendments before the High Court on the grounds that they were prospective; and if not, then, they reverse\/overrule several judgments of the High Court, violated Articles 14<\/span><\/a> and 19<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> offended the PNJ; impermissibly extended the period of reassessment even after the original limitation had expired; and that the proviso<\/span> to the amended Section 29(4)<\/a> was contrary to the main section.<\/span><\/p>\n

By its judgment dated 7 August 2015 the High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the amendments to Section 29<\/span><\/a>, PVAT Act<\/span><\/a>. It held that the opening part of the amended Section 29(4)<\/a> operated retrospectively. The High Court further held that Section 29(10-A)<\/a> when read together with the rest of Section 29<\/span><\/a>, it merely removed the defect in the implementation of the proviso<\/span> to the unamended Section 29(4)<\/a>. It also held that Explanation<\/span> 2 did not declare the earlier judicial decisions to be erroneous but merely removed the statutory basis on which those decisions had been rendered. Aggrieved by the High Court’s upholding of the c<\/span>onstitutional validity of the amendments and its findings regarding their retrospective operation, the appellants preferred the present appeals before the Supreme Court.<\/span><\/p>\n

Issue before the court<\/p>\n

The principal issue before the Supreme Court was: Whether the amendment to Section 29<\/a><\/span>, Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005<\/span><\/a> by the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2013 is constitutionally valid or not.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The court affirmed the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the validity of the retrospective amendment. It observed that the legislature possesses plenary power to enact laws with retrospective operation, particularly in matters relating to taxation. Such power includes the authority to cure defects or remove the statutory basis on which judicial decisions have been rendered, provided the legislature does not merely declare judicial pronouncements to be incorrect.<\/p>\n

The court observed that the insertion of Section 29(10-A)<\/a> along with Explanation 2 did not constitute an attempt by the legislature to override or nullify judicial pronouncements. Instead, the amendments were intended to eliminate the statutory deficiency identified by the High Court through a substantive modification of the legislative framework. By curing the legal defect underlying the earlier decisions, the validating enactment was held to be a legitimate exercise of legislative power.<\/p>\n

In addressing the issue of limitation, the court placed considerable reliance on its earlier ruling in Commr. (Legal)<\/span> v. Jyoti Traders<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>40<\/sup><\/a>. In that decision, it had recognised the legislature’s authority to retrospectively extend the prescribed limitation period governing assessment proceedings, including situations where the original limitation period had already expired prior to the enactment of the amendment. Relying upon this precedent the court held that the retrospective enlargement of the limitation period under the PVAT Act<\/span><\/a> was a valid exercise of legislative competence and, therefore, legally enforceable.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court thereafter considered the arguments concerning the applicability of its earlier decision in State of Punjab<\/span> v. Nokia India (P) Ltd<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/span>41<\/sup><\/a>. It was contended by the assessees that Nokia India (P) Ltd<\/a>.<\/span> judgment should not govern disputes arising under Value-Added Tax (VAT) enactments of other States, particularly where the statutory provisions materially differed. The court found merit in this submission to a limited extent.<\/span><\/p>\n

Having regard to the substantial tax demands involved and the fact that the disputes concerning Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh related only to specified assessment years, the court declined to reopen the correctness of the decision in the Nokia India (P) Ltd<\/a>. case<\/span>. Nevertheless, it expressly clarified that the judgment in Nokia India (P) Ltd<\/a>. case<\/span> was being confined to the statutory provisions applicable to the State of Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The court observed that the decision should not automatically be treated as a binding precedent for VAT enactments of other States particularly where the legislative provisions are different. However, liberty was granted to parties in other States to contend that Nokia India (P) Ltd<\/a>. case<\/span> was distinguishable on facts as well as on the statutory scheme.<\/p>\n

In relation to the transferred cases arising from the State of Andhra Pradesh, the court noted that the provisions under the Andhra Pradesh VAT legislation differed from those governing Punjab. Consequently, it restored the transferred matters to the Andhra Pradesh High Court with liberty to the parties to raise all available legal contentions, including reliance upon the judgments of the Allahabad High Court in Samsung (India) Electronics (P) Ltd.<\/span> v. CCT<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>42<\/sup><\/a> and the Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka<\/span> v. Intex Technologies India Ltd<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/span>43<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Considering the prolonged pendency of litigation and the peculiar facts of the Punjab matters, the court granted equitable relief by directing that the assessees would be required to pay only the principal amount of tax dues without interest or penalty within the time stipulated by the court.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the retrospective amendment made to Section 29<\/a><\/span>, PVAT Act, 2005<\/span><\/a> holding that the legislature was competent to enact validating legislation with retrospective effect and to remove the statutory basis of earlier judicial decisions. The court further granted liberty to the assesses\/appellants to avail the appellate remedy within a period of 3 months. The State and the appellate authorities were directed to not raise the issue of limitation if such remedy is availed.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(6) Vanashakti<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>44<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 16-5-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice Abhay S. Oka<\/p>\n

In the batch of writ petitions preferred before the Supreme Court, challenge was laid to various official memorandums (for short<\/span>, “OMs”) and notifications through which the Environment Impact Assessment (for short<\/span>, ”EIA”) notification of 2006 was modified. An arrangement for ex post facto<\/span> environmental clearances was introduced, thereby regularising all those projects which had been commenced or commissioned without obtaining prior environmental clearance, otherwise mandatory under the EIA notifications prior to their commencement. Challenge in this regard was laid to the<\/span> Notification of 14 March 2017<\/a> issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (for short<\/span>, “MoEFCC”) and that of 7 July 2021, both of which permitted the grant of ex post facto<\/span> environmental clearances (for short<\/span>, “EC”).<\/span><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court referring to Part IV-A of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> along with Article 51-A introduced through the 42nd Amendment in 1977, reiterated that the right to live in a pollution-free atmosphere is a part of a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. The various environmental enactments were enacted in pursuance of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment held at Stockholm in June 1972. In view of Section 3<\/span><\/a>, Environment (Protection) Act, 1986<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “<\/span>EP Act<\/a>”), specifically Sections 3(1) and (2)(v<\/span>) read with Rule 5(3)(d<\/span>) issued the EIA Notification in 2006, whereunder prior EC was mandated from the regulatory authority concerned as specified under the EIA Notification prior to the commencement of any operation, work or activity by the said projects.<\/span><\/p>\n

Through the impugned notification of March 2017, made applicable to all the projects or activities that started the work on-site or expanded their production beyond the permitted capacity without obtaining prior EC, it was stipulated that EC can be granted if they apply for such ex post facto<\/span> EC within a period of 6 months from 14 March 2017. The timeline of 6 months was extended by the MoEFCC on the directions of the Madras High Court later till 13 April 2018. The Madras High Court later on in August 2024 quashed the 2021 OM, observing however that its order will operate only prospectively and applications under consideration will remain unaffected.<\/p>\n

Consideration of validity of OMS and notification by the Supreme Court<\/p>\n

Referring to Sections 3<\/span><\/a> and 5<\/span><\/a>, Environment (Protection) Act, 1986<\/span><\/a>, the court held that the Central Government is empowered to impose complete prohibition or restriction on the location or carrying on of any process or operation of any industry or project in light of which the EIA notification came to be issued. Referring to the judgment of Common Cause<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>45<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that the concept of ex post facto<\/span> or retrospective EC is completely alien to environmental jurisprudence including the EIA Notification. However, despite this judgment of Common Cause case<\/a><\/span> delivered by the Supreme Court, the Central Government did not withdraw the 2017 Notification. Referring again to the judgment of Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd.<\/span> v. Rohit Prajapati<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>46<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that the words ”shall not be undertaken<\/span>” read in conjunction with the expression ”unless<\/span>” occurring under the EIA Notification of 1994 can have only one meaning, viz.<\/span> before undertaking a new project or expanding or modernising an existing one an EC must be obtained. The administrative circular therefore issued by the MoEFCC runs contrary to the spirit of the EIA Notification and thus not a measure protected by Section 3. The reason why retrospective EC or an ex post facto<\/span> clearance is alien to environmental jurisprudence is because prior to the issuance of any EC statutory notification, EIA Notification warrants a careful application of mind, besides a study into the likely consequences of a proposed activity on the environment. Any EC can be issued only after various stages of the decision-making process have been completed which encompasses multiple steps like public hearing, screening, scoping and appraisal as components of the decision-making process. Allowing any ex post facto<\/span> clearance therefore essentially condones the operation of any industrial activity having been initiated illegally without a prior EC. Ex post facto<\/span> EC is also detrimental to the environment and could lead to its irreparable degradation.<\/span><\/p>\n

Holding that therefore both the 2017 Notification as well as the 2021 OM were in flagrant violations of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Common Cause<\/span><\/a> and Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd.<\/span><\/a>, the court held that even a one-time measure or one-time relaxation was illegal. It encourages the entities who contributed to pollution by not obtaining prior EC or following conditions attached to them at the time of commencement of their activities or operations. Such measures at the behest of authorities therefore infringe the right to live in a pollution-free environment guaranteed by Article 21, making the 2017 Notification completely unconstitutional.<\/p>\n

The court further observed that there was no equity in favour of all those who committed gross illegality of not obtaining prior EC for a period of 11 years from 2006 to 2017. The entities or the persons owning these entities were all literate and educated sections of the society who acted deliberately without obtaining prior EC. The Central Government was therefore restrained from coming out with any modified or new version of the 2017 Notification permitting the grant of ex post facto<\/span> EC in any manner.<\/p>\n

The court then referred to the<\/span> Standard Operating Procedure of guiding principles provided under the 2021 OM. Reading the various clauses in between the lines of the said 2021 OM, the court held that if without obtaining prior EC, construction is in progress the same is allowed to continue. If the construction is complete and operations in processes on the said construction are going on, the same are allowed to continue after the grant of ex post facto<\/span> EC. Thus, in effect, the EC granted under the 2021 OM regularises something which was inherently illegal with retrospective effect and such a regularisation is nothing but a disguised form of reintroducing what was set aside by the Supreme Court whilst quashing the earlier Notification of 2017. The impact and effect of the 2021 OM is something which was already prohibited and shunned by the Supreme Court earlier in the judgments of Common Cause<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd.<\/span><\/a>. The court further held that those who violate the law by not obtaining prior EC act against the society at large, which must be dealt with heavy hands. Issuance of OMs like the 2021 OM is therefore not only violative of the fundamental rights of all persons and citizens guaranteed under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, but also infringes their right to health and to live in a pollution-free environment.<\/span><\/p>\n

Accordingly, in view of the foregoing analysis the Supreme Court declared the 2017 Notification as well as the 2021 OM along with all related circulars\/orders\/OMs\/notifications giving effect to them directly or indirectly as illegal and struck down the same. The Supreme Court also allowing the writ petitions restrained the Central Government from issuing any further circulars\/orders\/OMs\/notifications of a similar nature in future granting ex post facto EC in any form or manner for regularising activities<\/span> or operations done in contravention of the earlier EIA Notification earlier. The writ petitions were accordingly allowed.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(7) High Court Judges Pension Refixation Considering Service Period in District Judiciary & High Court, In re<\/span><\/a><\/span>47<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 19-5-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> three-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ, A.G. Masih and K.V. Chandran<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Chief Justice B.R. Gavai<\/p>\n

The batch of matters concerned various issues with regard to pension payable to retired Judges of the High Courts including the payment of gratuity, provident fund and other terminal benefits. On the basis of issues raised in various petitions. The court framed the 6 issues to be dealt with head wise as follows:<\/p>\n

1. Non-grant of full pension to the petitioners who retired as High Court Judges (for short<\/span>, “HCJs”), without taking into consideration the services rendered by them as District Judges (for short<\/span>, “DJs”).<\/p>\n

2. Denial of full pension on the grounds of break-in service for a period between the date on which the person concerned retired as a District Judge and the date on which he\/she assumed the charge as a High Court Judge.<\/p>\n

3. Whether the petitioner who retired as a High Court Judge, but entered into the State judiciary after the new pension scheme (for short<\/span>, “NPS”) came into effect, would be entitled to pension as well the High Court Judges Salaries and Conditional Service Act, 1954 (for short<\/span>, “HCJ Act”).<\/p>\n

4. Whether a Judge who is retired as an Additional Judge of the High Court would be entitled to full pension or not.<\/p>\n

5. Whether the petitioner who is the widow of an Additional Judge of the High Court would be entitled to gratuity and family pension or not, when the person concerned died as an Additional Judge of the High Court.<\/p>\n

6. Whether denial of provident fund as payable under Section 20, HCJ Act is permissible on the ground that certain Judges were appointed after the NPS came into effect.<\/p>\n

Consideration and resolution of various issues by the court<\/p>\n

Referring to Article 221<\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> and various provisions of the HCJ Act specifically Section 2(g<\/span>) and (gg<\/span>), defining ”Judge<\/span>” and ”Pension<\/span>”, respectively, the Supreme Court observed that salary, allowances and pension is payable to any High Court Judge as per the law made by Parliament. It is paid in accordance with the specifications made in the Second Schedule to the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, which cannot be varied to his disadvantage after this appointment. The definition clause of ”Judge<\/span>” is wide enough to include in its ambit all the categories of Judges including the Additional Judge, as well as acting Judge of the High Court. Likewise, “pension<\/span>” includes any and every kind of due payable in respect of a Judge, including gratuity and all other sums so payable. A Judge on his retirement in light of Sections 13-A and 14, HCJ Act is entitled to be paid pension in accordance with the scale and provisions of Part I of the First Schedule to the Act. There is a requirement of 12 years of minimum service for being held eligible and entitled for grant of pension. By virtue of Section 17-A, the family of a Judge is entitled to a family pension on his death either before or after retirement. Referring to the judgments of M.L. Jain<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>48<\/sup><\/a>, M.L. Jain<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>49<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court observed that the entire service as a Judge of any person has to be reckoned for the purposes of calculating his pension. Referring further to the judgments of Kuldip Singh<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>50<\/sup><\/a> and P. Ramakrishnam Raju<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>51<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that Judges appointed from the Bar are entitled to extra years of service for the purposes of computation of their pension. Earlier there was a discrepancy between the Judges appointed from the Bar vis-à-vis<\/span> the Judges who came from the lower judiciary as they did not receive equal pension. On the directions of the Supreme Court, therefore Section 13-A was introduced through which a period of 10 years was added to the service of a Judge appointed from the Bar for the computation of the pension paper by him relying upon the resolution passed in the Chief Justice’s conference of April 2013 held that 10 years practice as an advocate be added as qualifying service for Judges elevated from the Bar. It further held that irrespective of the sources from which the Judges are drawn, they are entitled to be paid the same pension, just as they have been paid the same salary, allowances and perks as serving Judges. If the period of service of a judicial officer is counted for the purposes of fixation or pension, there is no valid reason as to why experience at the Bar cannot be treated as equivalent for the same purpose. Any discrimination on this score is violative of Article 14<\/span><\/a> and the classification itself is unreasonable without any legally acceptable nexus with objects ought to be achieved. One rank, one pension<\/span>, must be the norm in respect of a constitutional office and thus the Supreme Court held that the payment of mention must be reckoned from 1 April 2004, the date on which Section 13-A was inserted by Parliament by amending the provisions of the HCJ Act. In light thereof, then Section 14-A was again added with effect from April 2016 with the amendment of HCJ Act, wherein the benefit of additional 10 years of service was deemed to have been available from April 2004 for the purposes of computation of pension.<\/span><\/p>\n

Referring further to the judgments of Union of India<\/span> v. Raj Rahul Garg<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>52<\/sup><\/a> the court answered the issue relating to break-in service due to the prolonged process of consideration of the proposal for appointment as a High Court Judge on the pension of the High Court Judge concerned. There was a break-in service of the judicial officer concerned, when she retired as a District Judge in July 2014 and after a break of 2 months was appointed to the High Court as High Court Judge. The pension was calculated by the Union of India on the basis of the date of retirement as a District Judge, owing to the break-in service. The Supreme Court held that such erroneous computation of pension results in discrimination between a member of the Bar who becomes a Judge of the High Court and member of the district judiciary was appointed albeit<\/span> after a break. Similar yardsticks and similar principles must be applied for computing the pension of any member of the district judiciary appointed to the High Court as applicable to the member of a Bar. Likewise, referring to the judgment of Jagdish Chandra Gupta<\/span> v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd.<\/span><\/a>, 53<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that for any person appointed as a Judge of the High Court and having spent some time at the Bar, the advantage of 10 years of service as well as 10 years of practice at the Bar, both must be extended for computing the pension. The maximum basic pension however would not exceed as prescribed under the Act of Rs 13.50 lakhs per annum. Referring to the judgment of Shailendra Singh<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>54<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court observed that payment of salaries and extension of post-retirement benefits cannot be left to the vagaries or determination of individual States funds. Since the same is charged to the consolidated fund of every State in terms of Article 202(3)(d<\/span>)<\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, the payment of pension is drawn from and charged from the consolidated fund of India under Article 112(d<\/span>)(3). Therefore, all Judges of the High Court partake the character of holders of constitutional offices in equal measure, who constitute one homogeneous class of constitutional office holders. Therefore, payment of retirement benefits must be at par to all of them falling in the same homogeneous class, their birthmarks stand obliterated on assumption of the said constitutional analysis.<\/span><\/p>\n

In view of the above, therefore the Supreme Court answered the various issues framed by it earlier as follows:<\/p>\n

1. Any discrimination on the ground of source of entry as a High Court Judge has been frowned upon. Irrespective of the channel of entry from which they enter the higher judiciary, they are entitled to a maximum pension of Rs 13.50 lakhs per annum. Therefore, Para 2 of Part III of the First Schedule to the HCJ Act, which results in reducing the pension vis-à-vis<\/span> the one provided under Para 2 of both Parts I and III of the First Schedule is patently discriminatory and violative of Article 14<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. The basic pension of Rs 13.50 lakhs per annum must apply to all the retired Judges of all the High Courts.<\/p>\n

2. Likewise full pension cannot be denied to any Judge of the High Court on the ground or break-in service between the date of retirement as a DJ and data of assuming office as High Court Judge.<\/p>\n

3. When all the Judges are entitled to the same salary, perks and benefits as a sitting Judge, then there cannot be any discrimination on any ground after the retirement for retiral benefits. Different States cannot be permitted to have different retiral benefits as it leads to discrimination. Therefore, irrespective of the date on which they were appointed, retired Judges would be entitled to receive the food pension as specified under Paragraph 2 of Parts I and III of the First Schedule.<\/p>\n

4. Likewise, since the definition of Judge under Section 2(g<\/span>), HCJ Act includes within itself an additional as well as an acting Judge, therefore no discrimination can be made between the stature of Additional Judge and Permanent Judge. They are entitled for the same amount of basic pension, same amount at par with other Judges.<\/p>\n

5. Likewise on the same rationale, the widow\/family members of Additional Judges would also be entitled to family pension in accordance with Section 17-A, HCJ Act. Gratuity payable on the death, the public retirement of a Judge will have to be calculated after adding the period of 10 years to the period as provided under Section 17-A(3)(i<\/span>) of the Act.<\/p>\n

6. The Union of India is bound to follow the principle of One Rank, One Pension<\/span> with respect to all the retired Judges of the High Courts, irrespective of the number of years they have served either as a District Judge or a High Court Judge and all of them are entitled to be paid full pension as aforesaid.<\/p>\n

In view of the aforesaid directions the Supreme Court disposed of all the applications and writ petitions instituted before it.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(8) United Spirits Ltd.<\/span> v. State of M.P<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/span>55<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 14-7-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan
Authored by:<\/span> Justice K.V. Viswanathan<\/p>\n

The issue before the Supreme Court was “whether the appellants are liable for payment of entry tax under Section 3, Madhya Pradesh Entry Tax Act, 1976 (for short<\/span>, ‘MPET Act’)”.<\/span> The High Court repelled the challenge of the appellants, against which they preferred appeals before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n

Necessary facts of the case<\/p>\n

The appellants were involved in the bottling and supplying of beer and Indian Made Foreign Liquor (for short<\/span>, “IMFL”) as holders of licensees under the MP Excise Act, 1915for manufacturing, supplying beer and IMFL. They supplied the said goods after obtaining a no-objection certificate from the officer-in-charge posted at the factory. The sales were made through a procedure, wherein goods manufactured by the appellants were transported to the State Government warehouse, followed by the issuance of a transportation pass (for short<\/span>, “TP”). Thereafter, the sales were effected by the warehouse in-charge to the authorised retailers who are also licence holders for the retail sale of IMFL and beer. The contention of the appellants was that since the sale is made by the government warehouse to the retailers and the bills are also issued by the government warehouses in favour of the retailers, therefore the transaction happens between the government warehouses and the retailers and not between the appellants as the manufacturer and the retailers. The State to the contrary contended that it is just engaging as an agent for effecting sale between the appellants and the retailers providing a level playing platform for ensuring that there is no loss of revenue to the State.<\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The court then examined the various provisions of the MPET Act, viz.<\/span> Sections 3-A, 3-B, 14, etc. Referring to Explanation II to the definition of “dealer<\/span>” under Section 2(i<\/span>), which stated that wherever the Central or the State Government or any of their departments or offices engage in to the buying, selling, supply or distribution of goods, they shall be deemed to be a dealer for the purposes of this Act. Examining the model adopted by the State for the procurement and sale of liquor, the court found that the sale involving the State as the canalising agent\/intermediary cannot be said to be inseverable. Referring to the judgment of K. Gopinathan Nair<\/span> v. State of Kerala<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>56<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that if the transaction in substance is such that the canalising agency\/intermediary through which the transaction is effected for enabling the goods to reach the ultimate local user appears only as a mere name lender, then obviously such a transaction of sale or purchase is one inseverable purchase. However, if the transaction through the independent canalising agency disrupts the direct linkage or causal connection between the exporter and the importer rendering it as a two independent transactions; one between the canalising agency\/intermediary and the foreign exporter and the other between the importer and the canalising agency\/intermediary. Reference was also made by the Supreme Court to the judgments of Hyderabad Industries Ltd.<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>57<\/sup><\/a>, Kerala State Warehousing Corpn.<\/span> v. State of Kerala<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>58<\/sup><\/a> and State of Karnataka<\/span> v. Azad Coach Builders (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>59<\/sup><\/a>. Applying the aforesaid test, the Supreme Court held that in the case at hand, there were two independent transactions, one between the appellant-manufacturers and the State warehouse and the other between the State warehouse and the retailers. Thus, the role of the State could not be treated as merely supervisory and it could not be accepted that warehouses did not purchase beer and IMFL from the manufacturer<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, though the first argument was decided in favour of the appellants, on the other leg of submission, it was decided against them. Falling back upon Section 3, MPET Act, the court held that the incidence of taxation is on the entry into each local area for consumption, use or sale therein in the course of business of a dealer of goods specified in Schedule II. The expression used by the legislature “has effected entry of goods<\/span>” shall be construed as “caused to be effected entry of goods<\/span>”. Referring to the judgment of Azad Coach Builders (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/a> case<\/span>60<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that reading of Section 3(1) read with Section 2(1)(a<\/span>) and (b<\/span>), MPET Act, makes it clear that the appellants by the sale to the warehouse “caused to be effected<\/span>” the entry of goods and occasioned its sale into the local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Therefore, the levy of entry tax on them became perfectly justifiable in law.<\/p>\n

The contention of the appellants that no notification was issued under Section 3-B, MPET Act and thus no levy of ET would have taken place was also not accepted by the Supreme Court. Rejecting the said contention, the court held that Section 3-B is only a machinery provision and in the face of Section 14, it cannot be contended that merely because a notification is not issued under Section 3-B, there cannot be any assessment or collection of entry tax. Referring to the judgment of A.G. Varadarajulu<\/span> v. State of T.N.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>61<\/sup><\/a> and Union of India<\/span> v. G.M. Kokil<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>62<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that Section 3-B cannot override the substantive provisions of Section 14. Accordingly, negating the contentions of the appellants on the leviability of entry tax on them, the court dismissed all the civil appeals finding no grounds to interfere with the impugned order.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(9) Ram Charan<\/span> v. Sukhram<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>63<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 17-7-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Joymalya Bagchi<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice Sanjay Karol<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court considered an important question qua<\/span> the inheritance rights of women belonging to Scheduled Tribes in situations where neither any particular law of a community nor any established tribal custom governs succession. The court examined whether female heirs could be denied succession merely because no affirmative custom recognising their right to inherit had been proved.<\/p>\n

Factual matrix of the case<\/p>\n

The dispute arose out of a suit for partition instituted by the legal heirs of Dhaiya, viz.<\/span> the daughter of the original owner of the suit property. The parties belonged to a Scheduled Tribe community to which the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “<\/span>HSA, 1956<\/a>”) were admittedly inapplicable by virtue of Section 2(2)<\/span><\/a>, HSA, 1956<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Following the death of Dhaiya’s father, the property devolved upon the male members of the family. The plaintiffs\/appellants contended that Dhaiya being a daughter of the deceased, was equally entitled to succeed to her father’s estate and consequently her legal heirs were entitled to claim her share in the property.<\/p>\n

The defendants opposed the claim by asserting that under the prevailing tribal customs daughters were not entitled to inherit ancestral property. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiffs\/appellants had failed to establish any custom entitling women to inherit property. The first appellate court affirmed the dismissal, and the High Court also upheld the concurrent findings. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiffs\/appellants approached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition.<\/p>\n

Issue before the court<\/p>\n

The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether a tribal woman (or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property or not.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court observed that the courts below had proceeded on an erroneous assumption by requiring the plaintiffs\/appellants to establish a custom recognising women’s right to inherit. The proper approach ought not to presume exclusion of female heirs in the absence of proof. Rather, if the defendants sought to exclude women from succession, it was incumbent upon them to establish a valid and binding exclusionary custom.<\/p>\n

The court noted that Section 2(2)<\/span><\/a>, HSA, 1956<\/a> was admittedly inapplicable to the parties since they belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. Equally, neither party had succeeded in proving any established tribal custom governing inheritance. Consequently, there existed a legal vacuum requiring judicial intervention.<\/p>\n

The court referred to Section 6<\/span><\/a>, Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875<\/span><\/a>, (<\/span>1875 Act<\/a>), which directs courts to decide matters not governed by any existing law according to the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. Although the 1875 Act<\/a> had subsequently been repealed, the court held that the saving clause contained in the Repealing and Amending Act, 2018 preserved rights that had already accrued before its repeal. Since the right of succession had crystallised long before the repeal, the statutory principle continued to govern the dispute.<\/span><\/p>\n

Explaining the doctrine of justice, equity and good conscience, the court relied upon several earlier decisions, including Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd.<\/span> v. State of Punjab<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>64<\/sup><\/a>, State of W.B.<\/span> v. Corpn. of Calcutta<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>65<\/sup><\/a>, M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.)<\/span> v. Suresh Das<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>66<\/sup><\/a> and Tirith Kumar<\/span> v. Daduram<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>67<\/sup><\/a>, to reiterate that the doctrine operates where statutory law or personal law is silent and enables the courts to render complete justice by filling legal gaps.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court further observed that customs cannot remain frozen in time and cannot be employed to perpetuate discrimination. Where no custom excluding women from succession is proved, the courts cannot infer such exclusion merely from historical patriarchal practices.<\/p>\n

The court also placed considerable emphasis upon the constitutional mandate of equality. Referring to Articles 14<\/span><\/a>, 15<\/span><\/a>, 38<\/span><\/a> and 46<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, the court held that there existed no rational basis for excluding women from inheritance solely on the ground of gender. The court also relied upon leading constitutional precedents including Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd.<\/span> v. State of U.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>68<\/sup><\/a>, Air India<\/span> v. Nergesh Meerza<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>69<\/sup><\/a>, Maneka Gandhi<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>70<\/sup><\/a>, Vijay Lakshmi<\/span> v. Punjab University<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>71<\/sup><\/a> and Shayara Bano<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>72<\/sup><\/a>, reiterating that arbitrary gender based discrimination violates the equality clause guaranteed under Article 14<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Referring to the legislative object underlying the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005<\/span><\/a>, observing that although the amendment did not directly apply to Scheduled Tribes, it reflected the constitutional commitment towards eliminating gender discrimination in matters of succession.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court. It held that the legal heirs of Dhaiya were entitled to succeed to her share in her father’s property.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(10) Padi Kaushik Reddy<\/span> v. State of Telangana<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>73<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 31-7-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ, and Augustine George Masih<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Chief Justice B.R. Gavai<\/p>\n

The appeal arose out of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of the State of Telangana, which set aside the judgment and final order of the Single Bench of the High Court.<\/p>\n

Necessary facts of the case<\/p>\n

After the conduct of elections in the State of Telangana, the 3 MLAs who had contested and successfully won the election from their respective constituencies from the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (for short<\/span>, ”BRS”) political party joined the competing political party of the Indian National Congress (for short, ”<\/span>INC”). It is then that the appellants, who are also MLAs of BRS, filed separate petitions under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule read with Article 191(2)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> read with Rule 6(1) and (2), Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986, before the Telangana State Legislative Assembly in March 2024. The common prayer in all the 3 petitions was for a declaration from the Speaker of the Telangana Legislative Assembly (for short<\/span>, “TLA”) that the defecting MLAs who joined the INC from BRS be declared as disqualified from continuing as members of the TLA.<\/p>\n

Thereafter owing to the delay\/inaction on the part of the Speaker in deciding the disqualification petitions, writ petitions came to be filed before the High Court seeking a direction to the Speaker through the Secretary, TLA, for deciding the said petitions for disqualification in a time-bound period by fixing a schedule of hearing. The Single Bench of the High Court directed the Secretary, TLA, on the said petition for fixing a schedule of hearing within a period of 4 weeks, failing which the matter would be reopened, and appropriate orders would be passed.<\/p>\n

Against the aforesaid order of the learned Single Bench, the Division Bench of the High Court in appeal set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, against which the original writ petitioners (for short<\/span>, “OWPs”) filed appeals before the Supreme Court, seeking a direction to the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions in a time-bound manner, preferably within an outer limit of 4 weeks.<\/p>\n

Issue under consideration<\/p>\n

The issue under consideration before the court was ”whether the High Court could have issued a direction to the Speaker in the nature of a quia timet action for deciding the pending petitions for disqualification within a time bound period and the scope of writ jurisdiction in such matters”.<\/span><\/p>\n

Analysis and consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The respondents primarily contended that issue as to “whether a writ court can issue a direction to the Speaker to decide the disqualification proceedings in a time-bound manner cannot be decided in the present proceedings, but needs to be referred to a larger Bench of five Judges<\/span>”. This contention was made because earlier in S.A. Sampath Kumar<\/span> v. Kale Yadaiah<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>74<\/sup><\/a>, the court had referred the question in regard to the issuance of directions by constitutional courts to the Speaker to a Bench of five Judges.<\/span><\/p>\n

The petitioners however contended that in the subsequent case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh<\/span> v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>75<\/sup><\/a>, a Bench of three learned Judges despite the reference order being brought to its notice issued a direction to the Speaker for deciding the pending proceedings in a time-bound manner. In the judgment of Keisham Meghachandra Singh<\/span><\/a> case<\/span>, the Speaker of the Manipur Assembly was directed to decide the pending petitions within a period of 3 months from the date of the order after referring to all the earlier judgments of the court, including the judgment of Keisham Meghachandra Singh<\/a><\/span> case<\/span><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court further held that the issue is no more res integra<\/span> because as per the law laid down in Kihoto Hollohan<\/span> v. Zachillhu<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>76<\/sup><\/a>, the decision under Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution<\/span><\/a> was not the decision of the House, nor subject to approval of the House and operated independently of the same. Thus, the decision of the Speaker\/Chairman exercising powers under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution<\/span><\/a> does not enjoy any immunity from judicial scrutiny under Articles 122<\/span><\/a> and 212<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. It was thus within the scope of judicial review under Articles 136<\/span><\/a>, 226<\/span><\/a>, and 227<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, wherein the Constitutional Courts would be entitled to judicially review the proceedings and the orders passed by the Speaker\/Chairman.<\/span><\/p>\n

Though the Constitution Bench held that judicial review would not be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker\/Chairman at the interlocutory stage, however where interim orders of a grave nature with immediate and irreversible consequences were passed by the Speaker\/Chairman like disqualification or suspension, then an exception would exist permitting a quia timet<\/span> action in the said regard. The Supreme Court, however, held that the Constitution Bench had not anticipated that a situation may arise where high constitutional functionaries like the Speaker\/Chairman would deliberately keep the proceedings pending for years together and permit them to die a natural death by delaying and procrastinating them.<\/p>\n

Referring to the judgment and the glaring facts arising in Rajendra Singh Rana<\/span> v. Swami Prasad Maurya<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>77<\/sup><\/a>, followed subsequently by Subhash Desai<\/span> v. State of Maharashtra<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>78<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court observed that for the protection of the c<\/span><\/span>onstitutional scheme and constitutional values an expeditious decision by the court was warranted. The Speaker has been expected to act with fairness, independently and impartially while adjudicating the disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The judgment of Kihoto Hollohan<\/span><\/a> case<\/span> never in any manner interdicted the possibility of judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. Rather the Speaker acting as a tribunal was bound to decide the disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.<\/p>\n

Applying the principles as laid down in the aforesaid judgments by the Supreme Court from time to time to the fact situation at hand, the court held that for 7 months not even notices were issued by the speaker in the pending petitions for disqualification preferred by the petitioner appellants. It was only when the Supreme Court listed the petition for hearing before it that the Speaker found it necessary to even issue notice. Thus, without the interference by the Supreme Court, the Speaker would not have even bothered to entertain or fix the proceedings for hearing. The court observed that when Parliament has entrusted the important task of adjudicating disqualification petitions to the Speaker or the Chairman, whether he is not duty-bound to act in an expeditious manner. Not hearing the proceedings or not issuing notices for 7 months or more than seven months reflects failure on the part of the Speaker in deciding the proceedings in an expeditious manner. Thus, non-issuance of any direction to the Speaker would frustrate the very purpose for which Tenth Schedule remedy had been introduced in the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. It will perpetuate and permit the Speaker to repeat the widely criticized situation of “operation successful, patient dead”.<\/span> Thus, the Division Bench was found to have grossly erred in setting aside the view taken by the learned Single Judge, who had simply required the Speaker to fix the schedule for hearing.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, in the ultimate analysis, the Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, whilst directing the Speaker to decide the pending disqualification proceedings as expeditiously as possible within a maximum period of three months from the date of the judgment. The appeals were accordingly allowed.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(11) Vanashakti<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>79<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 5-8-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai CJ, and K. Vinod Chandran<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Chief Justice B.R. Gavai<\/p>\n

Challenge was laid to the Notification dated 29 January 2025 issued by the MoEFCC and the OM dated 30 January 2025 issued in connection thereto.<\/p>\n

Challenge to both the notification and the OM was laid on the ground that the Union of India has been making consistent efforts to dilute the provisions contained in the original EIA Notification of 2006. The General Conditions (for short, ”<\/span>GC”) that were applicable to projects covered under Entry 8(a<\/span>) and (b<\/span>) were dispensed with subsequently, despite being contained in the original notification of 2006. The relief was opposed by various developers on the ground that from the inception GC were not applicable for Entry 8(a<\/span>) and (b<\/span>) and in fact on a case-to-case basis the approvals are considered at the State level by the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (for short<\/span>, ‘”SEIAA”).<\/p>\n

The court considered the original EIA Notification of 2006 as also all the subsequently issued notifications up to the year 2025 and found that GC had never been provided or attached with Entry 8(a<\/span>) and (b<\/span>) right from its inception from the year 2006. The contention of the petitioner therefore was declined.<\/p>\n

Referring to the judgments of Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>80<\/sup><\/a>, S. Jagannath<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>81<\/sup><\/a>, Consumer Education & Research Society<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>82<\/sup><\/a>, Intellectuals Forum<\/span> v. State of A.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>83<\/sup><\/a>, Tata Housing Development Co. Ltd.<\/span> v. Aalok Jagga<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>84<\/sup><\/a> and State of U.P.<\/span> v. Uday Education & Welfare Trust<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>85<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that the principle of “sustainable development<\/span>” must be adopted. Striking of a balance between environmental protection and sustainable development is necessary. One principle cannot be applied in isolation of the other and proper balance is always necessary to be struck between the two. Holding that SEIAA is a body of experts constituted and appointed by the Union of India itself, it is better equipped to undertake study qua<\/span> environmental impact of proposed projects in the respective State\/Union Territory. Therefore, SEIAA cannot be restrained from considering proposals pertaining to respective States\/UTs on a case-to-case basis. In appropriate cases, mitigation and compensatory measures can be prescribed so as to compensate the loss so caused to the environment and ecology on account of damage that would be caused by the developmental activities. Observing that the 2025 Notification had been necessitated for clarifying the confusion relating to the expression “built up area<\/span>”, which has been specifically defined therein. After this notification it is defined as the built-up area or covered area on all the floors put together including the basement and other service areas, which are proposed in the building or construction project.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the Supreme Court partly accepted the plea of the petitioners that exemptions under Entry 8(a<\/span>) to particular category of projects or activities for industrial shed, school, college and hospital and hostel for educational institutions does not appear to be in tune with the purpose for which the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986<\/span><\/a> has been enacted. Holding that there is neither any rational nexus with the object to be achieved by excluding such buildings from the rigors of the notification, the court observed that other buildings cannot be discriminated when the nature of construction is identical to those constructed for industrial or educational purposes. Education is no more exclusively a service-oriented activity, but has in fact become a flourishing and thriving industry. Therefore, granting exemption of 2006 Notification to industrial or educational buildings by way of a Note I is clearly unconstitutional.<\/p>\n

In the result, the writ petition was partly allowed by the Supreme Court whilst upholding the impugned notification of January 2025. However, Note I to Entry 8(a<\/span>) was held to be arbitrary and liable to be quashed.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(12) N. Peddi Raju, In re<\/span><\/a><\/span>86<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 11-8-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> three-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ, K. Vinod Chandran and A.S. Chandurkar<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Chief Justice B.R. Gavai<\/p>\n

The suo motu<\/span> proceedings originated from a transfer petition (criminal) filed seeking transfer of criminal petition from the Telangana High Court to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench. The primary ground of transfer was that the conduct of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Telangana, hearing the matter gave rise to serious apprehension of partiality and procedural discrimination in as much as arguments of the counsel for the petitioner were summarily curtailed. He was given very less time to argue.<\/p>\n

The transfer petition was dismissed originally by the Supreme Court, but however in view of the scandalous and scurrilous remarks made against the learned Judge of the High Court. However, contempt notices were issued to the litigant as well as the Advocate-on-Record, along with other advocates involved in the drafting and drawing of the transfer petition.<\/p>\n

Referring to the judgment of M.Y. Shareef<\/span> v. High Court of Nagpur<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>87<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that counsels who sign applications or pleadings containing matters scandalising the court or without reasonably satisfying themselves about the prima facie<\/span> existence of adequate grounds are also equally guilty of contempt of court. It is the duty of the lawyer to advise his client for refraining from making allegations of a scandalous nature on the court in any application or pleading filed through him. Whenever there is a conflict between a lawyer’s duty to the court and duty to the client, the duty towards the court prevails over the duty to the client. Referring further to the judgment of<\/span> <\/span>T.V. Choudhary, In re<\/span><\/a>88<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that counsel must never mislead the court, nor lend his name in casting aspersions on the other party or witnesses. Quoting Lord Denning, M.R.<\/span> in the judgment of Rondel<\/span> v. Worsley<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>89<\/sup><\/a>, the court observed that it is a mistake to suppose that a lawyer is the mouthpiece of his client to say whatever he wants. A lawyer must disregard the most specific instructions of his client, lest he is offending against the rules of the profession and also going against the discipline.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

The court further held that merely because a political figure is involved in a case and a High Court Judge being a high constitutional office holder would not act independently is a conception which scandalises the very institution of administration of justice. The same cannot constitute a ground to transfer the proceedings from one High Court of a State to the High Court of another State.<\/p>\n

In view of the nature of the allegations, and the fact that scandalous allegations were made against the learned Judge of the High Court also, the contemnors were required to tender an apology to the learned Judge of the High Court by approaching the same and filing an appropriate application in the said regard. Referring further to the judgment of N. Eswaranathan<\/span> v. State<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>90<\/sup><\/a>, the court reiterated that the majesty of law lies not in punishing someone, but always in forgiving who acknowledges their mistake. With this observation, the Supreme Court accepted the apology tendered by the lawyers.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(13) Dharam Singh<\/span> v. State of U.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>91<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 19-8-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice Vikram Nath<\/p>\n

The court examined the constitutional obligations of the State as a model employer and considered whether employees who had rendered decades of uninterrupted service could be denied regularisation merely because their initial appointments were temporary or made without following the prescribed recruitment procedure.<\/p>\n

Factual matrix of the case<\/p>\n

The appellants were engaged between 1989 and 1992 as daily wage Class III and Class IV employees, viz.<\/span> Drivers, Peons & Attendants in the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (for short<\/span>, ”Commission”). Although appointed on a temporary basis, they continuously performed regular ministerial, administrative and support duties essential to the functioning of the commission. Recognising the permanent nature of these functions, the commission repeatedly recommended the creation of sanctioned posts and sought approval from the State Government.<\/p>\n

Despite these recommendations, the State Government rejected the proposals of regularisation on the ground of financial constraints. Aggrieved by the refusal, the appellants preferred a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the State’s decision; creation of permanent posts; and regularisation of their services. During the pendency of the proceedings, the High Court directed the commission to submit a fresh proposal for sanction of posts and required the State Government to take a fresh decision. Pursuant to these directions, the Commission again submitted its proposal; however, the State Government by its order dated 25 November 2003 once again refused to sanction the posts on the ground of financial constraints and the prevailing policy being bereft of any such provision qua<\/span> creation of new posts.<\/p>\n

Subsequently, the learned Single Bench relying on State of Karnataka<\/span> v. Umadevi (3)<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>92<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, dismissed the writ petition holding that no rules for regularisation in the commission had been shown. This decision was assailed before the Division Bench by way of a special appeal. However, the Division Bench also affirmed the decision of the learned Single Bench on the same grounds. Challenging these findings the appellants approached the Supreme Court.<\/span><\/p>\n

Issue before the court<\/p>\n

The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in failing to adjudicate the appellants principal challenge to the State’s refusals to sanction posts and treating the matter as a mere plea for regularisation and, if so, given the appellants long and undisputed service, what appropriate relief ought to follow from this court.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The court observed that the present case did not concern casual or sporadic employment, but involved employees who had served the State continuously for several decades while performing duties of a permanent and recurring nature. Such prolonged engagement demonstrated that the work performed by the appellants was neither seasonal nor temporary but formed an integral part of the regular establishment.<\/p>\n

The court reiterated that the State occupies a unique constitutional position as a model employer and is therefore expected to adhere to standards of fairness, transparency and equality in public employment. It cannot indefinitely continue to engage employees on temporary or daily wage basis while simultaneously benefiting from their regular services. Such conduct, according to the court, undermined the constitutional guarantees under Articles 14<\/span><\/a>, 16<\/span><\/a> and 21<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

While examining the Constitution Bench decision in Umadevi (3)<\/span><\/a> case<\/span>, the court clarified that the judgment was intended to prevent illegal and backdoor appointments from being regularised as a matter of course. However, Umadevi (3)<\/span><\/a> case<\/span> was never intended to become an instrument for legitimising the continuous exploitation of employees who had served the State for decades in permanent and sanctioned work. The court emphasised that constitutional principles cannot be interpreted in a manner that enables the State to avoid its obligations towards workers by perpetually retaining them under temporary labels.<\/p>\n

Rejecting the State’s plea of financial constraints, the court held that budgetary limitations cannot justify denial of constitutional rights. The court further observed that a non-speaking rejection on a generic plea of ”financial constraints”, ignoring functional necessity and the employer’s own longstanding reliance on daily wagers to discharge regular duties, does not meet the standard of reasonableness expected of a model public institution. The State cannot balance its finances at the expense of employees who continuously perform essential governmental functions.<\/p>\n

The court further criticised the prevalence of “ad hocism<\/span>” within public administration, observing that arbitrary continuation of temporary appointments fosters administrative opacity and enables exploitation of workers. It emphasised that government departments must maintain accurate establishment records, explain the necessity of temporary engagements and justify any departure from regular recruitment where perennial work exists. Judicial directions concerning regularisation are often frustrated through repeated reconsiderations and administrative delay. To prevent such injustice the court held that effective constitutional remedies require clear directions, definite timelines and mechanisms for ensuring compliance rather than merely remanding matters for fresh consideration.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court thus set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the regularisation of all the appellants with effect from 24 April 2002, being the date on which the High Court had earlier directed the State to reconsider their cases. The court directed the State Government and the Commission to create supernumerary posts wherever necessary, for accommodating the appellants without imposing any further conditions.<\/p>\n

The court further directed payment of arrears representing the difference between the wages actually paid and the minimum regular pay scale from the effective date of regularisation. Retired employees were held entitled to revised pension, gratuity and other terminal dues, while the legal representatives of deceased employees were directed to receive all consequential monetary benefits. The court also directed the competent authority to file a compliance affidavit within 4 months.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(14) State of Telangana<\/span> v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>93<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 1-9-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ, and K. Vinod Chandran<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice K. Vinod Chandran<\/p>\n

The issue before the Supreme Court was “whether the wisdom of the State Legislature in defining a ‘local candidate’ entitled to the advantage of ‘State quota seats’ through a subordinate legislation in terms of the Presidential Order issued under Article 371-D<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> can be interfered with and expanded by the High Court under Article 226<\/span>”.<\/p>\n

The petition laying challenge at the behest of the State of Telangana contended that the High Court could not have expanded the definition on its own, which frustrates the special constitutional provision of Article 371-D, conferring benefit on local candidates\/residents of the State. The original writ petitioners (for short<\/span>, “OWPs”) — students however contended before the High Court that the definition of a “local candidate<\/span>” itself is gross and fails to reckon the vagaries of life and employment of the parents, which takes the children away from the State, but their roots remaining within the State.<\/p>\n

Necessary facts<\/p>\n

Two separate rules containing almost similar definitions, viz.<\/span> Telangana Medical and Dental College Admission (Admission into MBBS & BDS Courses) Rules, 2017 and the definition of ”local candidates<\/span>” as defined vide<\/span> OM dated 19 July 2024. Both were held to be discriminatory and definitions expanded by the High Court determining the eligibility of candidates participating in the admission and selection process to the medical and dental courses of the State.<\/p>\n

Article 371-D empowered the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh and post-division, the State of Telangana for providing equitable opportunities and facilities to the people belonging to the State in the matters of public employment and education as enabled by the Presidential Order. The Presidential Order in turn provided for who shall be the “local candidate<\/span>” in relation to any local area, viz.<\/span> those who have studied for a particular period or have resided within the local area for the said period. By virtue of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014<\/span><\/a>, the benefit available under the said Article 371-D continued for 10 years in the newly formed States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.<\/p>\n

In a challenge so laid to the aforesaid Admission Rules of 2017 and the OM. before the Division Bench it held broadly that the said provisions were not framed exercising the powers conferred under the Presidential Order or under Article 371-D. The source of power to the contrary for enacting the Admission Act, 1983 as well as the Rules of 2017 was traceable to Entry 25 of List III and thus was not protected by the same.<\/p>\n

Consideration by the Supreme Court<\/p>\n

Referring to Section 3(2), Admission Act, 1983, which specifically referred to the A.P. Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission) Order, 1974, the court stated that the said parent enactment enabled rules to be brought not only with respect to the constitutional reservations but also for other categories of students in terms of the Presidential Order. Referring to the judgments of the State of A.P.<\/span> v. NTPC<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>94<\/sup><\/a> and other judgments, the Supreme Court reiterated that the source of power to legislate for the State or Parliament has to be traced to Article 245 read with Article 246. The entries in the 3 lists under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> are merely fields of legislation. In the present case however, the State’s power is also traceable to the Presidential Order authorising framing of special provisions for equitable opportunities and facilities in the matter of education for local candidates. The definition of local candidates is more or less on the same lines as specified thereunder. Referring to the judgment of C. Surekha<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>95<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that Article 371-D does not militate against the basic structure of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. The view taken by the High Court by expanding the definition of ”local candidate<\/span>” would result in an anomalous situation making the reservation unworkable and open to a series of litigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

Referring also to the judgments of D.P. Joshi<\/span> v. State of Madhya Bharat<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>96<\/sup><\/a> and N. Vasundara<\/span> v. State of Mysore<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>97<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that the object of classification of residents of State for encouraging education of the indigenous people by giving them special treatment cannot be faulted. This is more so when the State spends money for the upkeep and running of the educational institutions especially medical colleges, a departure from the principle of selection-based on merit is justified on the considerations of the State’s interests as well as the region’s claim of backwardness whose candidates are to be promoted.<\/span><\/p>\n

Referring further to the judgment of Municipal Corpn., Ahmedabad<\/span> v. Nilaybhai R. Thakore<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>98<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court observed that rules providing reservation to local students within the municipal limits and the limits of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Area were held to be constitutional. This was so because the medical colleges established in the Ahmedabad Municipality were so established for catering to the needs of the students residing in Ahmedabad city.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consideration by the Supreme Court<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court also took note of further amendments proposed to Rule 3, Admission Rules, widening the net and the definition of ”local candidates<\/span>” to include — Children of employees of the Telangana State Government; defence personnel or paramilitary force employees who had declared the State of Telangana as their hometown at the time of joining their service; children of the employees of a corporation\/agency\/instrumentality under State of Telangana, liable to be transferred anywhere in the country. The court further observed that the proposed amendments take care of the concerns of a large number of genuinely deserving candidates who may not be able to reside in Telangana due to the service conditions of their parents.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, allowing the appeals of the State as well as the University, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments passed by the High Court. Only those candidates were to be treated eligible, who were covered by the initially stipulated definition as well as those proposed before the court by amending Rule 3.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(15) Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust<\/span> v. State of Maharashtra<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>99<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 1-9-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice Dipankar Datta<\/p>\n

The batch of appeals before the Supreme Court raised questions essentially regarding the applicability of the Teacher Eligibility Test (for short<\/span>, “TET”) to Minority Educational Institutions (for short<\/span>, “MEIs”). Whether qualifying in the TET is a mandatory prerequisite for recruitment of teachers as well as promotion of teachers already in service were issues that arose for consideration before the Supreme Court. In respect there of Supreme Court framed the following two core issues for its consideration:<\/p>\n

1. Whether the State can insist that a teacher seeking appointment in a minority educational institution must qualify the TET? If so, whether providing such a qualification would affect any of the rights of the minority institutions guaranteed under the Constitution<\/span><\/a>?<\/p>\n

2. Whether teachers appointed much prior to issuance of Notification No. 61-1\/2011\/NCTE (N&S) dated 29 July 2011 by the National Council for Teacher Education under sub-section (1) of Section 23, Right to Education Act (for short<\/span>, “RTE Act”) read with the newly inserted proviso (second proviso) in Section 23(2) and having years of teaching experience (say, 25 to 30 years) are required to qualify in the TET for being considered eligible for promotion?<\/p>\n

The Bombay High Court and the Madras High Court through their respective judgments took differing views. The Bombay High Court held TET to be mandatory even for MEIs, whereas the Madras High Court though held TET to be mandatory for non-MEIs, but for MEIs held it to be inapplicable in view of the judgment of the<\/span> Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>100<\/sup><\/a>. The Madras High Court further held that TET does not bind MEIs and even their promotion would remain unaffected by such a requirement.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

Previous decisions concerning the RTE Act of the Supreme Court<\/p>\n

Referring to the judgment of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>101<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that the majority opinion in the said judgment held that the RTE Act was not applicable to the unaided MEIs, but was applicable to aided MEIs as well as non-MEIs.<\/span><\/p>\n

This view of the Supreme Court was modified thereafter by the Constitution Bench in the Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust case<\/a><\/span>. Whilst considering the validity of the<\/span> Constitution (93rd Amendment) Act, 2005 inserting Clause (5) under Article 15<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> and the Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, 2002<\/span><\/a> inserting Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> in Part III as an additional independent fundamental right, the Constitution Bench in the Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/span><\/a> case<\/span> held that the RTE Act shall not apply to both unaided as well as aided MEIs. It will apply to non-MEIs in its entirety, but however Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> obligating the State to provide free and compulsory education to the children of the age of 6 to 14 years cannot be treated to be abrogating the right of MEIs guaranteed under Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. Insofar as the provisions of the RTE Act applied to MEIs, they were therefore ultra vires<\/span> Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

In light of Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, the RTE Act was introduced and the National Council for Teacher Education Act (for short<\/span>, ”NCTE”) also came to be amended to include the regulation of qualifications of school teachers. Section 23 of the RTE Act empowered the Central Government to lay down the qualifications for appointment, terms and conditions of service of teachers. In view thereof the NCTE issued a series of notifications, the first one being of August 2010 making TET mandatory for teachers being appointed in any educational institution\/school. Through subsequent amendments, even the TET was made mandatory for existing teachers and those currently under employment by providing them a window of opportunity to attain the said qualification.<\/p>\n

From a promise to right: Constitutional journey of Article 21-A up to the RTE Act<\/p>\n

The court then traced the history of Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> as to how it attained the stature of a fundamental right under Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> from being recognised originally and initially as a DPSP under Article 45<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. Referring to the judgments of Mohini Jain<\/span> v. State of Karnataka<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>102<\/sup><\/a> and Unni Krishnan, J.P.<\/span> v. State of A.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>103<\/sup><\/a>, the court stated that the earlier Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court expanded the right to elementary education of every child up to the age of 14 years as a fundamental right. These judgments led to the 86th Amendment to the Constitution<\/span><\/a> in 2002 introducing Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>. Thus viewed holistically, RTE Act does not impose any onerous or excessive regulatory burden, rather lays down the bare minimum core obligations and standards that all schools must follow to ensure that the constitutional promise envisioned by Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> is followed in letter and spirit. These include the requirement of trained teachers, student-teacher ratio, adequate infrastructure and other such indispensable aspects for delivering quality elementary education. Thus, Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> is a living expression of a long-deferred promise.<\/span><\/p>\n

Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act and the MEIs<\/p>\n

The court then discussed how Section 12(1)(c<\/span>) had been misinterpreted from time to time to be interfering with the rights of MEIs, when it was simply a step towards the achievement of a larger goal of a learning process for all the children up to the age of 14 years. The Constitution Bench judgment of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust case<\/a><\/span>104<\/sup><\/a> in fact deepened the very tensions it sought to resolve. The said judgment was based solely on the interpretation of Section 12(1), RTE Act, through which reservation of 25 per cent seats at the entry level for children from weaker sections and disadvantageous groups was made. An omnibus conclusion that RTE Act conflicts with Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> was drawn by the Constitution Bench merely on the basis of Section 12(1), without examining how individually other provisions of the RTE Act could be treated as conflicting or abrogating exercise of Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> of the MEIs. The sweeping conclusion that the entire RTE Act was inapplicable to MEIs, aided or unaided, fails to draw any reasoning by scrutiny of any other provision of the RTE Act except Section 12(1)(c<\/span>). Thus, the reasoning of the Constitution Bench appears legally suspect and questionable apart from being disproportionate.<\/p>\n

The court also found that subsequent to the judgment of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/a><\/span> case<\/span>, there was a sharp rise and mushrooming of schools applying for minority status. Thus the minority status was claimed not to preserve identity, but to avoid compliance with inclusionary obligations under the RTE Act and in turn many of such institutions (MEIs) remained insulated from broader constitutional goals of equality and inclusion as envisaged by Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. The entitlements which are ensured under the RTE Act to all the children remained elusive to the MEIs, who were not bound to provide these facilities. The MEIs being absolved of the obligation to admit disadvantaged students even remain insulated from broader constitutional goals of equality and inclusion. In the wake of the judgment of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/a><\/span> case<\/span>, therefore minority status has overwhelmingly become a vehicle for circumventing the mandate of the RTE Act. It has also opened the doors for potential misuse, especially when even the aided MEIs have been exempted from the framework of the RTE Act. This has rather distorted the spirit of Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> which was never intended to create enclaves of privilege at the cost of national developmental goals.<\/p>\n

Claim for blanket immunity under Article 30(1) from all forms of regulation by MEIs<\/p>\n

The court then referred to Articles 29<\/a> and 30<\/a> to analyse as to whether a blanket immunity from any and every form of regulation can be claimed under Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation<\/span> v. State of Karnataka<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>105<\/sup><\/a>, the court reiterated that while the autonomy of MEIs must be protected, it can never be put beyond the pale of reasonable regulation in the interest of maintaining educational standards and achieving constitutional goals. Basic requirements relating to infrastructure, teacher qualifications and inclusive access especially at the elementary level under Article 21-A<\/span><\/a> cannot be treated to be interfering with the minority character of any MEI. Interpreting Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> as a blanket shield shall erode the delicate balance between autonomy and public interest, whilst undermining the constitutional vision of inclusive, equitable education for all. The court also referred to the Constituent Assembly Debates for reflecting upon the concern of constitution makers whilst engrafting the two articles in the Constitution<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Concern of constitution makers whilst engrafting the two articles was that aided MEIs receiving State aid should not be able to discriminate against any candidate or deny admission to any citizen on the grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Referring further to the Constitution Bench judgment of Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re<\/span><\/a><\/span>106<\/sup><\/a>, the court observed that the real import of Articles 29(2)<\/span><\/a> and 30(1)<\/span><\/a> is that both of them contemplate a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted into them. It has never been construed as conferring blanket immunity on MEIs from all forms of regulation.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Court then discussed the necessity of applicability of regulatory framework under the RTE Act as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. Referring to the judgment of T.M.A. Pai Foundation case<\/span><\/a>, which overruled the earlier view of the Constitution Bench in Sidhrajbhai Sabhai<\/span> v. State of Gujarat<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>107<\/sup><\/a>, the court observed that RTE Act is the legislative expression of a fundamental right under Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>. The regulatory measures imposed thereunder are not only necessary, but also imperative and proportionate, in furtherance of the larger constitutional goal and the vision of Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>. The right under Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> cannot be stretched to override the national interest or to prevent the government from framing regulations in that regard which are relatable to maintaining educational standards and achieving constitutional goals.<\/span><\/p>\n

Teachers role in imparting quality education vis-à-vis shared constitutional responsibility of MEIs<\/p>\n

The court then doubted the view taken in the Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/a><\/span> case<\/span>, which held that MEIs cannot be burdened with the States responsibility of the vision of implementation of fundamental right under Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>. Holding that realisation of such a right as a constitutional mandate is a shared constitutional responsibility, where MEIs cannot claim to be operating in a vacuum. Once they receive recognition, affiliation or any kind of aid from the State, they are also expected to be contributors to building an inclusive and educated society.<\/p>\n

Referring to the judgments of N.M. Nageshwaramma<\/span> v. State of A.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>108<\/sup><\/a> and Andhra Kesari Educational Society<\/span> v. Director of School Education<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>109<\/sup><\/a>, the court reiterated that it is the State’s obligation to maintain a certain standard of teaching and appointment of qualified teachers is the bare minimum to be achieved in any educational institution. Teachers play the central role in shaping individuals, future citizens and builders of the nation. Therefore compromising on the quality of a teacher would necessarily compromise the quality of education and direct threat to the right of children to quality education, necessary concomitant of the right guaranteed by Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>. Quality of education is therefore inherent in the right to education under Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>. Viewed in light of the above, therefore TET is not only a mandatory eligibility requirement but also a constitutional necessity flowing from the right to quality education under Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore applying the RTE Act to MEIs aligns with the purposive interpretation of Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> by enabling them to effectively exercise their rights as MEIs.<\/p>\n

The court thus held that the view taken in the Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/span><\/a> case<\/span>, that entirety of the RTE Act was inapplicable to MEIs was erroneous and offensive to Article 21-A<\/span><\/a>. The students studying in such institutions are affected and denied of various statutory entitlements and benefits as provided under the RTE Act. It does not alter the minority character of institutions, rather results additionally in violation of Article 14<\/span><\/a> as differential eligibility criteria based on religious or linguistic character becomes an impermissible classification.<\/p>\n

Requirement of minimum qualification of TET vis-à-vis in-service teachers<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court then dealt with the contention that Section 23 employs the word “appointment<\/span>” and therefore it would be applicable at the initial stage of entry of teachers in the schools, not to the stage of promotion. It will not be applicable to “appointment by promotion<\/span>” and thus TET cannot be treated as mandatory for the existing in-service teachers.<\/p>\n

Rejecting the aforesaid contention and referring to the judgments of M. Ramachandran<\/span> v. Govind Ballabh<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>110<\/sup><\/a> and K. Narayanan<\/span> v. State of Karnataka<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>111<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that the term “appointment<\/span>” is referable not only to initial appointment, but also covers appointment by promotion. Appointment\/recruitment to any service can be made from different sources, i.e. by direct appointment, by promotion or by absorption\/transfer. It will even include appointment by transfer as well and therefore appointment and recruitment may be two distinct, but not unrelated concepts. If the contention of the in-service teachers is being accepted, then proviso to Section 23(1) would be rendered nugatory. Ergo, the Supreme Court held that in-service teachers in the absence of procurement of TET qualification within the stipulated time-bound period shall cease to have any right to continue in the service.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court thereafter held that TET is in the form of a “qualification<\/span>”, necessary to be held by a person seeking appointment as a teacher in any school. Referring to the judgment of Arvind Kumar Shukla<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>112<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that it can also be treated as an eligibility qualification to participate in the selection process, which however does not vest any right to be appointed to any post. Eligibility qualification is different from selection for employment and merely because a person has secured admission in a course, which makes him eligible to participate in the selection process cannot lead to the conclusion that he is otherwise eligible to pursue the course and not required to attain the essential qualification of TET.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reference of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust judgment<\/span> for consideration by a larger Bench<\/p>\n

In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court above, it expressed its doubt as to whether the judgment of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/span><\/a>113<\/sup><\/a><\/span> exempting the application of RTE Act to MEIs in its entirety has been correctly decided or not. Referring to the reference already made by another coordinate Bench of the Supreme Court in Ashwini Thanappan<\/span> v. Director of Education<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>114<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that the Supreme Court has already taken note of the inconsistency between the judgment of P.A. Inamdar<\/span> v. State of Maharashtra<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>115<\/sup><\/a> and the judgment of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/span><\/a>. Accordingly framing various questions for reference, the Supreme Court urged the Chief Justice of India to get the issues resolved through a larger Bench. The issues so framed<\/span> for consideration by a larger Bench as referred to the Chief Justice of India by the Supreme Court read as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n

1. Whether the judgment in the Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/span><\/a> case<\/span> exempting minority educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, falling under Clause (1) of Article 30<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, from the purview of the entirety of the RTE Act does require reconsideration for the reasons assigned by us?<\/p>\n

2. Whether the RTE Act infringes the rights of minorities, religious or linguistic, guaranteed under Article 30(1)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>? And, assuming that Section 12(1)(c<\/span>) of the RTE Act suffers from the vice of encroaching upon minority rights protected by Article 30<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, whether Section 12(1)(c<\/span>) should have been read down to include children of the particular minority community who also belong to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups in the neighbourhood, to save it from being declared ultra vires such minority rights?<\/p>\n

3. What is the effect of non-consideration of Article 29(2)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> in the context of the declaration made in the Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/span><\/a> case<\/span> that the RTE Act would not be applicable to aided minority educational institutions?<\/p>\n

4. Whether, in the absence of any discussion in the Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust<\/a><\/span> case<\/span> regarding unconstitutionality of the other provisions of the RTE Act, except Section 12(1)(c<\/span>), the entirety of the enactment should have been declared ultra vires<\/span> minority rights protected by Article 30<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>?<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(16) Vinishma Technologies (P) Ltd.<\/span> v. State of Chhattisgarh<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>116<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Delivered on 6-10-2025<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice Alok Aradhe<\/p>\n

The petitioner challenged the final orders passed by the Chhattisgarh High Court, which repelled the challenge to tender conditions contained in various NITs issued for the supply of sports kits to the government schools in the State of Chhattisgarh.<\/p>\n

Necessary facts of the case<\/p>\n

The appellant as a registered company claimed experience of supplying sports kits to various departments of multiple States. Towards the implementation of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (for short<\/span>, “ICDS”) in the State of Chhattisgarh, the Central Government sponsors a package of services for the holistic development of children studying in government schools. In pursuance thereof Notice Inviting Tenders (for short<\/span>, “NITs”) were issued for the supply of sports kits in all the government schools, with tender values of Rs 15.24 crores, Rs 13.08 crores and Rs 11.49 crores. The writ petition was filed challenging various clauses of the NIT, however the bone of contention eventually zeroed down to Condition 4, which read thus:<\/p>\n

“(4) Past Performance Restriction : Bidders must have supplied sports goods worth at least Rs. 6.00 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh<\/span> in the last three financial years (2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24 or 2022-23, 2023-24, 2024-25)<\/span>.”<\/p>\n

The High Court repelled the challenge to the aforesaid eligibility condition holding the same to be in sync with that affirmed earlier by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Assn. of Registration Plates<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>117<\/sup><\/a>. The High Court further held that the State is entitled to prescribe the condition in the NITs issued by it for the selection of the most capable and reliable bidder for executing the public project of a significant scale and thus the tender condition under challenge was neither violative of Article 14<\/span><\/a> or Article<\/span><\/span> 19(1)(g<\/span>)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. It was towards ensuring technical competence, financial strength, operational capacity as well as the long-term reliability of the successful bidder.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The court framed a solitary issue for its consideration “whether the aforesaid impugned tender condition meets the test of reasonableness and fairness and or whether the same constitutes an arbitrary criteria which excludes the other eligible bidders from participation thereby violating the mandate contained in Articles 14<\/span><\/a> and 19(1)(g)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution of India<\/span><\/a><\/span>”.<\/p>\n

Answering the aforesaid issue and relying extensively on the judgment of Ramana Dayaram Shetty<\/span> v. International Airport Authority of India<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>118<\/sup><\/a>, the court reiterated that the government cannot give or withhold largesse in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will. It also without any adequate reason exclude any person from dealing with it or take away largesse arbitrarily. Article 21<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a> refers to the “right to life<\/span>” which includes “opportunity<\/span>” as well, which has to be read in conjunction with Article 14<\/span><\/a>. The petitioner company being entitled to the protection of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g<\/span>)<\/span><\/a>, is also entitled to invoke the doctrine of “Level Playing Field”<\/span> (for short<\/span>, “LPF”). This doctrine of level playing field provides an equal space where similarly placed competitors are allowed to bid so as to subserve the larger public interest. Level playing field requires that eligibility criteria mentioned in the NITs must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and be framed in a manner which encourages wider participation and secures the best price for the State, which in turn safeguards the public exchequer. Referring further to the judgment of Union of India<\/span> v. Bharat Forge Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>119<\/sup><\/a>, the court observed that the doctrine of level playing field also restrains the State from skewing the market in favour of a few by erecting artificial barriers and from excluding bidders who are otherwise financially sound and technically competent. Applying the aforesaid principles of law to the case at hand, the Supreme Court found that the supply of good quality sports kits to students of government schools had the primary objective of being supplied economically at the best price to the State. The Condition 4 by linking the eligibility criteria with past local supplies created an artificial barrier against suppliers who had no past dealing with the State of Chhattisgarh. The petitioner in the present case, to the contrary had sufficient experience of supplying similar products to other States and by making him ineligible to participate in the tenders of the State of Chhattisgarh, his fundamental rights were clearly curtailed.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court further held that confining the eligibility in any NIT by stipulating requirement of previous supplies within one State is not only irrational, but also disproportionate to the goal of ensuring effective delivery of sports kits. It fails to serve as a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(6)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. The impugned Condition 4 excludes competent and experienced suppliers who may have executed contracts of far greater magnitude in other States (other than Chhattisgarh) or even with the Central Government Departments. It thus had the inevitable impact of promoting cartelisation by closing doors to outsiders and therefore violative of Articles 14<\/span><\/a> and 19(1)(g<\/span>)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

In conclusion accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court by declaring the aforesaid Condition 4 of the NITs as unconstitutional and quashed all the NITs so issued by the Department of School Education, State of Chhattisgarh.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(17) Rahul Agarwal<\/span> v. State of W.B.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>120<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 13-10-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ, and K. Vinod Chandran<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court considered whether a Judicial Magistrate has the legal authority to direct an individual, including a witness to furnish a voice sample during the course of a criminal investigation. The primary issue before the Court was whether compelling a person to provide a voice sample constitutes testimonial compulsion, thereby infringing the guarantee against self-incrimination under Article 20(3)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Factual matrix of the case<\/p>\n

The case arose from the death of a 25-year-old married woman which led to allegations that she had been subjected to harassment and cruelty at her matrimonial home. In response, members of her husband’s family alleged that the deceased and her parents had misappropriated cash and jewellery belonging to them. Consequently, a complaint was lodged by a cousin of the husband of the deceased against her parents, following which a criminal investigation was initiated.<\/p>\n

During the investigation, the police received information that the second respondent had acted on behalf of the deceased’s father and had communicated threats to a witness who claimed to have knowledge of the alleged extortion demands made by the deceased’s father. On the basis of these allegations, the investigating agency considered the second respondent’s voice to be material evidence for the purpose of verifying the authenticity of the alleged telephonic communications.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, in order to verify the authenticity of the alleged telephonic conversation, the investigating officer moved an application before the Judicial Magistrate seeking a direction requiring the second respondent to provide a voice sample for forensic comparison. The Magistrate allowed the application and directed the second respondent to furnish the voice sample.<\/p>\n

Aggrieved by the Magistrate’s order the second respondent approached the Calcutta High Court. The High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order on the ground that the question regarding the power of a Magistrate to direct a witness to furnish a voice sample had been referred to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court and therefore, such a direction ought not to have been issued. The appellant challenged the judgment of the High Court before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had erred in declining to follow the law laid down by the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha<\/span> v. State of U.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>121<\/sup><\/a> It held that although the question of law had earlier been referred to a larger Bench, the reference was subsequently closed without any contrary decision being rendered. In the absence of any overruling or modification, the decision in Ritesh Sinha case<\/a><\/span> continued to constitute binding precedent under Article 141<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. Accordingly, the High Court was bound to apply the ratio laid down in the Ritesh Sinha<\/a> case<\/span><\/span> and its failure to do so amounted to a legal error.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court reaffirmed that in Ritesh Sinha<\/a> case<\/span><\/span>, the Supreme Court had acknowledged the power of a Judicial Magistrate to direct the collection of a voice sample for investigative purposes, notwithstanding the absence of any specific provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, “CrPC<\/span><\/a>”). It noted that this position has now received explicit legislative recognition through Section 349<\/span><\/a>, Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, ”<\/span>BNSS<\/a>”), which expressly empowers a Magistrate to order the furnishing of voice samples. Consequently, the court held that whether the investigation was conducted under the CrPC<\/span><\/a> or the BNSS<\/a>, the Magistrate was legally competent to authorise the collection of a voice sample.<\/span><\/p>\n

While considering the challenge based on Article 20(3)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>, the court relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in State of Bombay<\/span> v. Kathi Kalu Oghad<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>122<\/sup><\/a>. It reiterated that specimen handwriting, signatures and fingerprints constitute physical evidence rather than testimonial evidence. Such materials are obtained solely to facilitate comparison with incriminating material collected during the course of investigation and by themselves do not constitute testimony. Consequently, their collection does not amount to compelling an accused to be a witness against himself within the meaning of Article 20(3)<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Applying the same principle, the court noted that a voice sample is likewise a form of physical evidence. The mere act of furnishing a voice sample does not communicate any personal knowledge or admission of guilt. It only provides material for forensic comparison with evidences already obtained during investigation. Any incriminating inference arises not from the sample itself but from its comparison with other evidence collected by the investigating agency during the course of investigation.<\/p>\n

The court also rejected the contention that a distinction should be drawn between an accused person and a witness for the purposes of issuing directions by a magistrate qua<\/span> collection of voice samples. It observed that the constitutional protection against self-incrimination extends equally to all persons who may potentially incriminate themselves. However, since furnishing a voice sample does not amount to testimonial compulsion, the constitutional protection under Article 20(3)<\/span><\/a> is not attracted irrespective of whether the person directed to provide the sample is an accused or a witness.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the judgment of the High Court and restored the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate directing the second respondent to provide a voice sample for forensic analysis. In doing so, the court reaffirmed that a Judicial Magistrate is empowered to order the collection of voice samples during the course of a criminal investigation.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(18) Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases & Related Issues, In re<\/span><\/a><\/span>123<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 31-10-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> three-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, CJ, and K. Vinod Chandran and N.V. Anjaria<\/p>\n

Authored by:<\/span> Justice K. Vinod Chandran<\/p>\n

The judgement arose out of a reference made by a Bench of two-Judges of the Supreme Court in a special leave petition filed challenging the notice issued against an advocate under Section 179<\/span><\/a> BNSS<\/a>. The aforesaid advocate was issued notice directing his appearance by the investigating officer (for short<\/span>, “IO”) for procuring “know true details of the facts and circumstances after making your inquiry<\/span>” in relation to an accused here represented before the Sessions Court at Ahmedabad. The Gujarat High Court repealed the challenge on the ground that petitioner was duty-bound to respond to the summons and cooperate with the investigation, failure to do so which stalled the investigation. The High Court further held that no violation of fundamental rights took place and therefore no relief can be granted in the writ petition.<\/p>\n

In the special leave petition which was preferred before the Supreme Court against the aforesaid dismissal by the High Court, following important questions were framed as part of the reference order:<\/p>\n

(i<\/span>) When an individual has the association with a case only as a lawyer advising the party could the investigating agency\/prosecuting agency\/police directly summon the lawyer for questioning?<\/p>\n

(ii<\/span>) Assuming that the investigating agency\/prosecuting agency\/police has a case that the role of the individual is not merely as a lawyer but something more, even then should they be directly permitted to summon or should judicial oversight be prescribed for those exceptional criteria of cases?<\/p>\n

The reference was made by the Bench of two Judges as it felt that efficacy of the administration of Justice itself was found to be at stake as since the notice amounted to interference with the capacity of the lawyers to conscientiously and fearlessly discharge their professional duties which in turn directly impinged upon the administration of justice.<\/p>\n

Consideration and analysis by the Supreme Court: Role of an advocate<\/p>\n

The court then undertook discussion about the importance and sanctity of the role of an advocate and the duties discharged by him in protection of the rights of the client. Referring to the judgment of Bar Council of Maharashtra<\/span> v. M.V. Dabholkar<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>124<\/sup><\/a>, the court observed that “the central function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice<\/span>”. Section 126 under the Evidence Act<\/span><\/a> earlier and followed by Section 132<\/span><\/a> under the Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a> protecting the communications between a lawyer and a client as sacrosanct is an affirmation of the belief that role of lawyers in society in establishing rights or defending against infringements cannot at all be discounted. Referring to the famous celebrated quote of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in the judgment of Bar Council of Maharashtra<\/span><\/a>125<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, the court mentioned that:<\/span><\/p>\n

52. Bar is not a private guild, like that of “barbers, butchers and candlestick-makers”, but, … a public institution committed to public justice and pro bono public service.<\/p>\n

Protection to the privileged communications between lawyer and the client is therefore aimed at ensuring that those involved in the task of administration of justice are not victimised or bullied into making disclosures of their communications with their clients merely for the reason of having represented a client of questionable conduct facing serious acquisitions or having in repute or distribute.<\/p>\n

Referring further to Rule 11 of Section 20 of Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 titled as “Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette<\/span>”, the court observed that it is a codified obligation of the lawyer to maintain absolute confidentiality regarding the communications made by him with his client.<\/p>\n

Guidelines whether necessary relating to the questions under reference<\/p>\n

The court then dealt with the contention that guidelines must be laid down by the Supreme Court about the conduct of investigating authorities in summoning advocates and lawyers for having represented their clients on the same lines as was laid down in Jacob Mathew<\/span> v. State of Punjab<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>126<\/sup><\/a> with respect to doctors. Discussing the facts and the law laid down in the case of Jacob Mathew<\/span><\/a>, as also the judgment of Vishaka<\/span> v. State of Rajasthan<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>127<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court observed that guidelines and directions were issued in the aforesaid judgment since there was a vacuum which necessitated intervention by the exercise of its plenary powers. To bring in safeguards by a mechanism, in the absence of legislative measures, guidelines and norms were framed, which were directed to be observed scrupulously by all the stakeholders. There was thus a clear absence of legislation<\/span>, which prompted the guidelines to be introduced by the Supreme Court for the protection of fundamental rights of the subject-matter of the respective judgments.<\/span><\/p>\n

Holding that the case at hand is not similar or identical as Jacob Mathew<\/span> case<\/a><\/span> and Vishaka<\/a><\/span> case<\/span>, wherein no statutory protection is available to the advocates. Further the case at hand is also not concerned with any aspect of professional negligence or professional misconduct. Therefore, in view of the fact that already a statutory provision in the form of Section 132<\/span><\/a> stands incorporated under Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a> (pari materia<\/span> with earlier provision of Section 126, Evidence Act, 1872<\/span><\/a>), therefore enough protection was available to the advocates already.<\/p>\n

Therefore, there was no necessity felt by the Supreme Court to lay down any guidelines. The court then referred to various provisions, viz.<\/span> Sections 132<\/span><\/a>, 133<\/span><\/a> and 134<\/span><\/a>, Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a>, laying down provisions with respect to advocate-client privilege. It observed that thus, there is no absence or lacuna of legislation in protection of the lawyers, obligation or non-disclosure, which is statutorily prescribed. An advocate cannot reveal any information with respect to the client he represents or causes. He is engaged to prosecute or defend which would run foul of Section 132<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Advocate-client privilege across the globe in other jurisdictions<\/p>\n

The court then referred to the statutory recognition accorded to advocate-client privilege and immunity to advocates in other jurisdictions across the world. Referring to the celebrated judgment of Greenough<\/span> v Gaskell<\/span> <\/span>128<\/sup><\/a> from the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court reiterated that the privilege arising from advocate-client communication may arise from any kind of legal status, which may even be solitary, sporadic or otherwise. If this privilege is deprived to the advocate, no man would consult any skilful person or would dare to tell his counsellor his full case. Referring further to the judgment of US<\/span> v. Upjohn & Co.<\/span><\/span>129<\/sup><\/a> from the United States, the Supreme Court observed that an advocate unless fully apprised of the facts by his client cannot effectively put forth the case and assists the court properly for a thorough functioning of the adjudicatory system. If the attorney-client privilege is penetrable, with the client’s statements being discovered by simply subpoenaing the attorney, the client would thus have walked into his attorney’s office unquestionably shielded with the Fifth Amendment’s protection and walked out with something much lesser. The court also referred to the solicitor-client privilege, as it is prevalent in Canada.<\/span><\/p>\n

Advocate-client privilege in the Indian context<\/p>\n

The investigating officer summoning a lawyer cannot be presumed to be oblivious of the legal position, especially the provisions of Section 132<\/span><\/a>. It is an extension of the client’s constitutional right against self-incrimination as found under Article 20(3)<\/span><\/a> of the Constitution<\/span><\/a>. When a person is constitutionally protected from incriminating himself, he cannot be prejudiced or incriminated by the statement of his advocate, only on the basis of the professional communications he had with his counsel in confidence. For this reason only, the US Courts held that a person cannot walk out of his Council’s office with a defaced privilege or an impaired fundamental right, which he had intact when he walked into it.<\/p>\n

The court further co-related the advocate-client privilege to “<\/span>the right to legal representation”. Referring to the judgments of M.H. Hoskot<\/span> v. State of Maharashtra<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>130<\/sup><\/a>, Rakesh<\/span> v. State of M.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>131<\/sup><\/a> and Sk. Mukthar<\/span> v. State of A.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>132<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that rights under Articles 14<\/span><\/a> and 21<\/span><\/a> encompass within them the right to a legal practitioner defending his interests. Article 22(1) read with Article 39-A of the DPSP, makes mandatory the provision of the right to consult and to be defended by a lawyer of a man’s choice whenever he is arrested. Therefore, the said fundamental right cannot be jeopardised by permitting summoning of a lawyer as a witness in any case in which he is defending his client.<\/span><\/p>\n

Privilege vis-à-vis the procedure under BNSS<\/p>\n

A police officer issuing summons to any advocate is always cautioned by the provisions of Section 132<\/span><\/a> and not expecting any disclosure of a privileged communication made by the advocate with his client. The court then proceeded to deal with the summons issued in the case at hand as challenged in the special leave petition under reference. The summon notices were absolutely vague, which simply mentioned the details of the crime committed, the FIR registered and elicited other details from the advocate, who represented the accused. The Supreme Court held it to be imperative from the investigating officer to mention how the summons have been issued to any advocate and how they fall within the exceptions to Section 132<\/span><\/a>. This whole exercise shall be amenable to judicial review. Referring to the judgments of Sakiri Vasu<\/span> v. State of U.P.<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>133<\/sup><\/a> and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya<\/span> v. State of Gujarat<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>134<\/sup><\/a>, the court held that the only remedy available to any person challenging the summons issue to him and for interfering in the powers confronted on the police in Section 528<\/span><\/a> BNSS<\/span><\/a>. The Court returned, a finding that summons issued in the instant case were patently illegal and against the provisions of Section 132<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span>, Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a>. Criticising the approach adopted by the High Court in dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner advocate, the Supreme Court observed that the same amounted to abdication of the inherent powers conferred on the High Court. The court thus held that police cannot directly summon any advocate for eliciting the details of the case in which he is engaged, unless and until it specifically mentions in the summons the exceptional situation under Section 132<\/span><\/a> which has warranted his appearance before the police.<\/span><\/p>\n

Referring to the celebrated observation of Justice O.W. Holmes, in Panhandle Oil Co.<\/span> v. State of Mississippi Knox<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>135<\/sup><\/a>, stating “the power to tax is the power to destroy<\/span>”, the Supreme Court, drawing an analogy held that before issuing any summons, the provisions Section 132<\/a><\/span>, Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a> must be looked into. It is a duty of the<\/span> <\/span>Constitutional Courts to protect the advocate from being summoned in case it arises out of his relationship with the client. The immunity under Section 132<\/span><\/a> attaches even to legal advice taken as a solitary incidence and therefore the confidentiality has to be maintained at all stages.<\/span><\/p>\n

Production of documents and digital devices before the investigating authorities<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court then examined an ancillary issue regarding the legality of seizure of documents and digital devices\/equipments from the advocates<\/span> when such materials pertain to their clients’ cases and are in the advocates’ possession. Section 126, Evidence Act, 1872<\/span><\/a> or Section 132<\/a><\/span>, Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a>, is not referable to production of documents in the custody of a legal advisor, but prohibits only disclosure about the contents of the document. Therefore, production of the documents if in possession of the advocate will not attract any immunity from disclosure. Likewise, the court shall refer to only that portion of the document being produced before, which is relatable to the details pertaining to the client.<\/span><\/p>\n

Immunity available to the in-house counsels and employees of companies<\/p>\n

The court then examined another ancillary issue as to whether in-house counsels in the employment of a corporate entity would be entitled to privilege offered by Section 132<\/a><\/span>, Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a>. Referring to the provisions of Rule 49 of Chapter 2, Part VI of the BCI Rules, the court held that there are restrictions imposed on persons from practising as an advocate who are in regular employment. Referring to the judgment of Rejanish K.V.<\/span> v. K. Deepa<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>136<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court observed that as a part of his employment, an in-house counsel advises his employer on legal affairs as a fully salaried employee and thus would not fall within the definition of an advocate, entitled to privilege under Section 126. Referring further to the judgments of BCI<\/span> v. A.K. Balaji<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>137<\/sup><\/a> and Lawyers Collective<\/span> v. BCI<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>138<\/sup><\/a>, the Supreme Court reiterated that foreign law firms are not entitled to carry on litigious, non litigious practice in India. This is because foreign law firms or lawyers associated with them arrive in the country for a temporary period on a “fly-in<\/span>” and “fly-out<\/span>” basis and therefore, a casual visit for giving advice may not be covered by the definition of practice. An in-house counsel, even though engaged in the job of advising his employer on questions of law, would on occasions more than one, be it influenced by the commercial and business strategies persuaded by the employer and would be bound to beholden to him and obliged to protect their interest. Therefore, an in-house counsel cannot be equated on the same pedestal with a lawyer.<\/span><\/p>\n

The court then proceeded to issue directions to a limited extent for protecting the interests of lawyers as part of the client-advocate privilege and for screening them from undue harassment at the hands of overzealous police officers. These directions were broadly as follows:<\/p>\n

1. The investigating officer shall not issue any summons to an advocate representing the accused, unless covered by exceptions thereunder. The investigating officer must explicitly specify the facts on which exception is sought and should not be issued without the prior approval of a superior officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police.<\/p>\n

2. Summons so issued shall always be subject to judicial review under Section 528<\/span><\/a> BNSS<\/span><\/a>. However, in-house counsels would not be entitled to the privilege under Section 132<\/span><\/a>. However, they would be entitled to any protection under Section 134 insofar as any communication made to the legal advisor of his entity.<\/p>\n

3. Production of documents and digital devices in the possession of the advocate or the client will not be covered under the privilege conferred by Section 132<\/span><\/a>. However, on production of such a document it shall be upon the court to designate any objection filed with respect to the order to produce an admissibility of the document after hearing the advocate and the party whom the advocate represents. If the objections are overruled by the court as aforementioned, then the digital device shall be opened only in the presence of the party and the advocate. However, at the same time it shall be obligatory for the court, to not impair the confidentiality with respect to other clients of the advocate and the discovery shall be confined to that sought for by the IO, if so permitted by the court.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, with the aforesaid directions, the Supreme Court disposed of the suo motu<\/span> proceedings, setting aside the summons constituting the subject-matter of the special leave petition referred to for consideration by the three Judges. The investigating officers were cautioned to be extremely circumspect in summoning advocates in relation to the legal advice given by them, which could result in violating the statutory provision, as also the fundamental rights guaranteed to the client whom the advocate represents. The special leave petition was accordingly disposed of.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

(19) State of M.P.<\/span> v. Kusum Sahu<\/span><\/span>139<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(Delivered on 3-11-2025)<\/p>\n

Coram:<\/span> two-Judge Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Rajesh Bindal
Authored by:<\/span> Justice Rajesh Bindal<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court examined the correctness of the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed in a habeas corpus petition, whereby the High Court directed the release of an accused from judicial custody notwithstanding remand order and the dismissal of several bail applications.<\/p>\n

Factual matrix of the case<\/p>\n

The father of the respondent before the Supreme Court, viz.<\/span> Jibrakhan Lal Sahu, was arrested in connection with a criminal case registered for offences under Sections 420<\/span><\/a> and 409<\/span><\/a>, Penal Code, 1860<\/span><\/a> (for short<\/span>, ”IPC<\/a>”). Following his arrest, he was remanded to judicial custody by the jurisdictional Magistrate in accordance with law.<\/p>\n

Subsequently, the accused had preferred four successive applications for bail before the High Court, all of which were dismissed after consideration on merits. Thereafter, instead of filing an appeal before the Supreme Court the daughter of the accused instituted a writ petition seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus<\/span>.<\/span><\/span> Entertaining the petition<\/span>, the High Court undertook an examination of the merits of the criminal case, concluded that the accused’s continued detention was unlawful and directed his immediate release from judicial custody<\/span>.<\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

Aggrieved by the order directing release of the accused notwithstanding the repeated rejection of his bail applications the State of Madhya Pradesh preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n

Consideration by the court<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction in a manner contrary to the well-established principles governing the writ of habeas corpus. Reiterating the limited scope of this extraordinary constitutional remedy, the court observed that the purpose of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a person’s detention. Where an individual is held in custody pursuant to valid remand orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, such detention cannot ordinarily be regarded as unlawful merely because another court in habeas corpus petition forms a different opinion on the merits of the criminal case.<\/p>\n

The court noted that the accused had been arrested in accordance with law. Thereafter, he had unsuccessfully pursued four bail applications before the High Court, each of which had been dismissed on merits. In such circumstances, the legality of his custody could not be questioned indirectly through a habeas corpus petition.<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court emphasised that while deciding the writ petition, the High Court virtually conducted an examination of the merits of the criminal case as though it was hearing an appeal against the orders rejecting bail. The Court further observed that if such a course was permitted, every accused whose bail application had been rejected could bypass the established criminal procedure by filing a habeas corpus petition seeking reconsideration of the same issues under the guise of challenging illegal detention.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court. The court held that habeas corpus petition cannot be preferred as a substitute for bail proceedings or as a means to circumvent judicial orders refusing bail and clarified that any future application for bail filed by the accused shall be considered independently on its own merits by the competent court in accordance with law.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n

*Practising Advocate, Supreme Court of India and an expert in constitutional, civil and commercial laws.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

**Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Associate, SVS Attorneys.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

2.<\/a> (2016) 7 SCC 761<\/span><\/a> : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 551.<\/p>\n

3.<\/a> (2021) 5 SCC 370<\/span><\/a> : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 1.<\/p>\n

4.<\/a> (2018) 10 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 1.<\/p>\n

5.<\/a> (2021) 5 SCC 370<\/a> : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 1.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

6.<\/a> (2013) 10 SCC 772<\/span><\/a> : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 257.<\/p>\n

7.<\/a> (2024) 7 SCC 103<\/span><\/a> : (2024) 2 SCC (L&S) 47.<\/p>\n

8.<\/a> (2024) 7 SCC 262<\/span><\/a> : (2024) 2 SCC (L&S) 1.<\/p>\n

9.<\/a> 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217<\/span><\/a> : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 : (1992) 22 ATC 385.<\/p>\n

10.<\/a> (2021) 19 SCC 813<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

11.<\/a> (2014) 14 SCC 383<\/span><\/a> : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 470.<\/p>\n

12.<\/a> (1991) 1 SCC 28<\/span><\/a> : 1991 SCC (L&S) 25.<\/p>\n

13.<\/a> (2026) 2 SCC 696<\/span><\/a> : (2026) 1 SCC (Civ) 221.<\/p>\n

14.<\/a> (2025) 141 GSTR 1<\/a> : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 786.<\/p>\n

15.<\/a> 1968 SCC OnLine SC 142<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

16.<\/a> (2026) 2 SCC 401<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

17.<\/a> (2007) 1 SCC 355<\/span><\/a> : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 356.<\/p>\n

18.<\/a> (2014) 13 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 496.<\/p>\n

19.<\/a> (2004) 4 SCC 446<\/span><\/a> : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1303.<\/p>\n

20.<\/a> (2007) 6 SCC 410<\/span><\/a> : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 189.<\/p>\n

21.<\/a> (2007) 1 SCC 355<\/span><\/a> : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 356.<\/span><\/p>\n

22.<\/a> (2008) 2 SCC 294<\/span><\/a> : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 530 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 346.<\/p>\n

23.<\/a> (2007) 1 SCC 355<\/span><\/a> : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 356.<\/span><\/p>\n

24.<\/a> (2014) 13 SCC 1<\/a> :<\/span> (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 496.<\/span><\/p>\n

25.<\/a> (2003) 4 SCC 147<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

26.<\/a> (2008) 14 SCC 171<\/span><\/a> : (2008) 305 ITR 227.<\/p>\n

27.<\/a> 1967 SCC OnLine SC 14<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

28.<\/a> (1999) 3 SCC 362<\/span><\/a> : 1999 SCC (Cri) 433 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 682.<\/p>\n

29.<\/a> (2001) 5 SCC 519<\/span><\/a> : (2001) 251 ITR 20 : (2001) 123 STC 623.<\/p>\n

30.<\/a> (2015) 17 SCC 340<\/span><\/a> : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 743.<\/p>\n

31.<\/a> (2022) 10 SCC 595<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

32.<\/a> (1978) 2 SCC 386<\/span><\/a> : 1978 SCC (Cri) 198.<\/p>\n

33.<\/a> (2014) 13 SCC 1<\/span><\/a>: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 496.<\/span><\/p>\n

34.<\/a> (2007) 1 SCC 355<\/a> :<\/span> (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 356.<\/span><\/p>\n

35.<\/a> (1985) 2 SCC 683<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

36.<\/a> 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2283<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

37.<\/a> 2023 SCC OnLine All 3216<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

38.<\/a> (2025) 144 GSTR 419<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

39.<\/a> (2016) 88 VST 372<\/a> : 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 13715.<\/span><\/p>\n

40.<\/a> (1999) 2 SCC 77<\/span><\/a> : (1999) 112 STC 277.<\/p>\n

41.<\/a> (2014) 16 SCC 410<\/span><\/a> : (2015) 77 VST 427.<\/p>\n

42.<\/a> (2018) 51 GSTR 1<\/a> : 2018 SCC OnLine All 5982.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

43.<\/a> (2023) 111 GSTR 185<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

44.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1139<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

45.<\/a> (2017) 9 SCC 499<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

46.<\/a> (2020) 17 SCC 157<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

47.<\/a> (2025) 7 SCC 674<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

48.<\/a> (1985) 2 SCC 355<\/span><\/a> : 1985 SCC (L&S) 441.<\/p>\n

49.<\/a> (1991) 1 SCC 644<\/span><\/a> : 1991 SCC (L&S) 694.<\/p>\n

50.<\/a> (2010) 15 SCC 583<\/span><\/a> : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 661.<\/p>\n

51.<\/a> (2014) 12 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 636.<\/p>\n

52.<\/a> (2024) 13 SCC 96<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

53.<\/a> 1964 SCC OnLine SC 50<\/a><\/p>\n

54.<\/a> (2024) 16 SCC 517<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

55.<\/a> (2025) 144 GSTR 396<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

56.<\/a> (1997) 10 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : (1997) 105 STC 580.<\/p>\n

57.<\/a> (2000) 1 SCC 718<\/span><\/a> : (2000) 118 STC 293.<\/p>\n

58.<\/a> (2005) 10 SCC 142<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

59.<\/a> (2010) 9 SCC 524<\/span><\/a> : (2010) 36 VST 1.<\/p>\n

60.<\/a> (2010) 9 SCC 524<\/a><\/span> : (2010) 36 VST 1.<\/span><\/p>\n

61.<\/a> (1998) 4 SCC 231<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

62.<\/a> 1984 Supp SCC 196<\/span><\/a> : 1984 SCC (L&S) 631.<\/p>\n

63.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1465<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

64.<\/a> (1957) 1 SCC 5<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

65.<\/a> 1966 SCC OnLine SC 42<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

66.<\/a> (2020) 1 SCC 1<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

67.<\/a> 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3810<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

68.<\/a> (1969) 1 SCC 817<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

69.<\/a> (1981) 4 SCC 335<\/span><\/a> : 1981 SCC (L&S) 599.<\/p>\n

70.<\/a> (1978) 1 SCC 248<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

71.<\/a> (2003) 8 SCC 440<\/span><\/a> : 2004 SCC (L&S) 38.<\/p>\n

72.<\/a> (2017) 9 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 277.<\/p>\n

73.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1576<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

74.<\/a> (2021) 16 SCC 528<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

75.<\/a> (2021) 16 SCC 503<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

76.<\/a> 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

77.<\/a> (2007) 4 SCC 270<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

78.<\/a> (2024) 2 SCC 719<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

79.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1703<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

80.<\/a> (1996) 5 SCC 647<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

81.<\/a> (1997) 2 SCC 87<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

82.<\/a> (2000) 2 SCC 599<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

83.<\/a> (2006) 3 SCC 549<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

84.<\/a> (2020) 15 SCC 784<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

85.<\/a> (2024) 16 SCC 781<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

86.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1694<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

87.<\/a> (1954) 2 SCC 444<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

88.<\/a> (1987) 3 SCC 258<\/span><\/a> : 1987 SCC (L&S) 217.<\/p>\n

89.<\/a> (1967) 1 QB 443<\/a> : (1966) 3 WLR 950 : (1966) 3 All ER 657, 665.<\/p>\n

90.<\/a> (2025) 10 SCC 188<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

91.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

92.<\/a> (2006) 4 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753.<\/p>\n

93.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1880<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

94.<\/a> (2002) 5 SCC 203<\/span><\/a> : (2002) 127 STC 280.<\/p>\n

95.<\/a> (1988) 4 SCC 526<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

96.<\/a> (1955) 1 SCC 58<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

97.<\/a> (1971) 2 SCC 22<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

98.<\/a> (1999) 8 SCC 139<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

99.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1912<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

100.<\/a> (2014) 8 SCC 1<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

101.<\/a> (2012) 6 SCC 1<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

102.<\/a> (1992) 3 SCC 666<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

103.<\/a> (1993) 1 SCC 645<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

104.<\/a> (2014) 8 SCC 1<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

105.<\/a> (2002) 8 SCC 481<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

106.<\/a> 1958 SCC OnLine SC 8<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

107.<\/a> 1962 SCC OnLine SC 150<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

108.<\/a> 1986 Supp SCC 166<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

109.<\/a> (1989) 1 SCC 392<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

110.<\/a> (1999) 8 SCC 592<\/span><\/a> : 2000 SCC (L&S) 88.<\/p>\n

111.<\/a> 1994 Supp (1) SCC 44<\/span><\/a> : 1994 SCC (L&S) 392 : (1994) 26 ATC 724.<\/p>\n

112.<\/a> 2018 SCC OnLine All 1665<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

113.<\/a> (2014) 8 SCC 1<\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

114.<\/a> (2014) 8 SCC 272<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

115.<\/a> (2005) 6 SCC 537<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

116.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2119<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

117.<\/a> (2005) 1 SCC 679<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

118.<\/a> (1979) 3 SCC 489<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

119.<\/a> (2022) 17 SCC 188<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

120.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2219<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

121.<\/a> (2019) 8 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 252.<\/p>\n

122.<\/a> 1961 SCC OnLine SC 74<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

123.<\/a> (2026) 2 SCC 233<\/span><\/a> : (2026) 1 SCC (Cri) 423.<\/p>\n

124.<\/a> (1975) 2 SCC 702<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

125.<\/a> (1975) 2 SCC 702<\/a>, 718.<\/span><\/p>\n

126.<\/a> (2005) 6 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1369.<\/p>\n

127.<\/a> (1997) 6 SCC 241<\/span><\/a> : 1997 SCC (Cri) 932.<\/p>\n

128.<\/a> 39 ER 618 (1833).<\/p>\n

129.<\/a> 600 F 2d 1223 (6th Cir 1979).<\/p>\n

130.<\/a> (1978) 3 SCC 544<\/span><\/a> : 1978 SCC (Cri) 468.<\/p>\n

131.<\/a> (2011) 12 SCC 513<\/span><\/a> : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 613.<\/p>\n

132.<\/a> (2020) 19 SCC 178<\/span><\/a> : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 795.<\/p>\n

133.<\/a> (2008) 2 SCC 409<\/span><\/a> : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440.<\/p>\n

134.<\/a> (2019) 17 SCC 1<\/span><\/a> : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 228.<\/p>\n

135.<\/a> 1928 SCC OnLine US SC 105<\/a> : 72 L Ed 857 : 277 US 218 (1928).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

136.<\/a> (2026) 4 SCC 513<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

137.<\/a> (2018) 5 SCC 379<\/span><\/a> : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 734 : (2018) 2 SCC (L&S) 35 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 30.<\/p>\n

138.<\/a> 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2028<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

139.<\/a> Criminal Appeal No. 4710 of 2025, Order dated 3-11-2025<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by Siddharth R. Gupta* and Shantanu Sharma**<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":67011,"featured_media":391611,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[20271,45813],"tags":[110943,110953,110951,110956,110946,110949,110948,110954,110945,110952,110957,110955,110950,110947,110944],"class_list":["post-391598","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-experts_corner","category-siddharth-r-gupta","tag-75-landmark-constitutional-law-judgments-2025","tag-constitution-bench-judgments-2025","tag-constitutional-jurisprudence-india","tag-constitutional-law-analysis-india","tag-constitutional-law-judgments-part-ii","tag-constitutional-law-updates-india","tag-indian-constitution-case-law-2025","tag-indian-constitutional-law-roundup","tag-landmark-constitutional-cases-2025","tag-landmark-supreme-court-judgments-part-ii","tag-scc-times-constitutional-judgments","tag-supreme-court-case-summaries-2025","tag-supreme-court-constitutional-decisions","tag-supreme-court-landmark-rulings-2025","tag-supreme-court-of-india-constitutional-judgments-2025"],"yoast_head":"\n75 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