{"id":386339,"date":"2026-06-06T12:00:30","date_gmt":"2026-06-06T06:30:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=386339"},"modified":"2026-06-06T12:17:54","modified_gmt":"2026-06-06T06:47:54","slug":"cases-that-made-law-minor-entering-into-binding-contract-mohori-bibee-dharmodas-ghose-explained","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/06\/06\/cases-that-made-law-minor-entering-into-binding-contract-mohori-bibee-dharmodas-ghose-explained\/","title":{"rendered":"Cases That Made Law| Can a Minor Enter into a Binding Contract? Understanding Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose [1903 SCC OnLine PC 4]"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Some legal questions appear simple on the surface but carry consequences that reshape entire branches of law. Can a minor enter into a binding contract? The answer, settled once and for all by the Privy Council in 1903, is no. Not merely unenforceable, not merely voidable, but void from the very beginning, as if no agreement had ever existed. This edition of Cases That Made Law<\/span>, a series by SCC Times, revisiting the judgments that built Indian law, examines Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, the foundational authority on a minor’s capacity to contract whose reasoning on estoppel, restitution, and the limits of equity continues to govern courts more than a century later.<\/p>\n

Background<\/h2>\n

On 20 July 1895, Dharmodas Ghose made a mortgage agreement with Brahmo Dutt, who was a moneylender working in Calcutta. Dharmodas promised to repay a loan of Rs 20,000 with 12% interest, and as security for this loan, he offered some of his houses. At that time, Dharmodas Ghose was still a minor. During the whole deal, Brahmo Dutt was not present in Calcutta. Instead, his representative Kedar Nath Mitter handled everything for him, and he was informed that Dharmodas was still a minor.<\/p>\n

On 10 September 1895, Dharmodas Ghose, still a minor, filed a case through his mother acting as his guardian. The petition stated that since Dharmodas was underage at the time of signing the mortgage, the agreement was invalid and should be cancelled. In response, Brahmo Dutt argued that Dharmodas was an adult when he executed the mortgage and that neither he nor his agent, Kedar Nath, knew about his minority. He further claimed that if Dharmodas was indeed a minor, then he had fraudulently misrepresented his age, so he should not be granted any relief. Additionally, Brahmo Dutt insisted that even if the agreement were cancelled, Dharmodas should be required to repay the money he had received. Brahmo Dutt also claimed that Dharmodas later confirmed the mortgage after becoming an adult, but this argument failed and was not considered further in the appeal.<\/p>\n

Analysis, Law, and Decision<\/h2>\n

1. Estoppel under Section 115<\/a> Evidence Act, 1872<\/a> (Evidence Act)<\/p>\n

It was contended that Dharmodas was estopped by Section 115<\/a> Evidence Act<\/a> from setting up that he was an infant when he executed the mortgage. However, the Privy Council agreed with the courts below that the said section did not apply to the present case. The Privy Council stated that there can be no estoppel where the truth of the matter is known to both parties. A false representation, made to a person who knows it to be false, is not such a fraud as to take away the privilege of infancy.<\/p>\n

The Privy Council observed that this idea is also supported by Section 19<\/a> of the Contract Act, 1872<\/a> (ICA), which states that if a false statement did not actually influence someone’s decision, then it does not affect the validity of the contract.<\/p>\n

2. Section 64<\/a> and Section 65<\/a> ICA<\/a><\/p>\n

Brahmo Dutt’s main argument was that the court should not have given relief to Dharmodas without ordering him to repay Rs. 10,500, which was said to have been given to him under the mortgage. The Privy Council observed that the lower courts had taken the view that agreements made by minors are only voidable<\/span> and not completely void. However, they also observed that ICA applies only to agreements made by persons who are competent to contract<\/span>, and minors are not included in that category.<\/p>\n

Although many earlier decisions in India treated minors’ agreements as voidable, there were strong objections to this view and even some contrary decisions. The Privy Council referred to Section 11<\/a> ICA<\/a>, which defines that only a person who has attained majority, is of sound mind, and is not disqualified by law is competent to contract. Thus, the Privy Council stated that ICA requires all parties to be competent to contract, and a person who is an infant is not included within this meaning.<\/p>\n

This is supported by other sections:<\/p>\n