{"id":376529,"date":"2026-02-24T09:30:56","date_gmt":"2026-02-24T04:00:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=376529"},"modified":"2026-02-25T15:06:02","modified_gmt":"2026-02-25T09:36:02","slug":"del-hc-territorial-jurisdiction-in-trademark-cases","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/02\/24\/del-hc-territorial-jurisdiction-in-trademark-cases\/","title":{"rendered":"Trademark registration, Marketing agreement execution & e-commerce availability confers Territorial Jurisdiction in infringement suit: Delhi HC"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Disclaimer:<\/span> This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports so as to give an accurate report to our readers.<\/p>\n

Delhi High Court:<\/span> In an appeal challenging Single Judge Bench’s order allowing an application under Order VII Rule 10<\/a>, Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a> (CPC), whereby the plaint in a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction against infringement and passing off, was directed to be returned for presentation before the appropriate court, a Division Bench of C. Hari Shankar*<\/span> and Om Prakash Shukla, JJ., set aside the impugned judgment and held that the suit was maintainable before the Delhi High Court. The Court held that in a trademark infringement suit —<\/p>\n

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  1. \n

    Registration of the mark within the territorial jurisdiction confers a statutory right whose violation forms part of the cause of action.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Where the plea of infringement is founded on use beyond a permitted-use agreement, the execution of that agreement is a material fact constituting part of the cause of action.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    In the context of e-commerce, the availability of infringing goods for purchase on platforms accessible in the forum state gives rise to jurisdiction, irrespective of who uploaded the listing.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Factual Matrix<\/h3>\n

    In the instant matter, the appellant is engaged in the business of developing, producing and marketing cotton hybrid seeds and is the registered proprietor of the trademarks “TADAAKHA” and “SADANAND” in Class 31, besides claiming common law rights in the mark “BASANT”. The appellant had, over the years, acquired substantial goodwill and reputation in respect of these marks in the agricultural seed market.<\/p>\n

    On 03-03-2014, the appellant entered into a non-exclusive co-marketing arrangement with the respondent, permitting the respondent to market and distribute specified cotton hybrid seeds manufactured by the appellant under the aforesaid trademarks. This arrangement was renewed from time to time, the last renewal being the Marketing Agreement dated 01-01-2022, valid till 31-12-2022. Under the agreement, the respondent expressly acknowledged the appellant’s ownership of the trademarks and undertook not to use them beyond the limited scope permitted thereunder.<\/p>\n

    In September—October 2022, the appellant decided not to renew the Marketing Agreement and communicated the same to the respondent and its distributors. Thereafter, the appellant came to know that the respondent was promoting and accepting advance bookings for cotton hybrid seeds for the ensuing Kharif season under the marks “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG II”, allegedly in respect of hybrids not produced by the appellant. According to the appellant, such use was outside the scope of the Marketing Agreement and amounted to infringement of its registered trademarks and passing off.<\/p>\n

    Consequently, the appellant instituted a commercial suit before the Delhi High Court seeking permanent injunction against infringement and passing off. The respondent contested the maintainability of the suit by filing an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC and contended that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court.<\/p>\n

    The appellant pleaded that the cause of action arose in October 2022 when it learnt of the respondent’s infringing activities; the appellant’s registered office was situated in New Delhi and it ordinarily carried on business there; the asserted trade marks were registered with the Delhi Trade Marks Registry; and the infringing products were available on e-commerce platforms accessible in Delhi.<\/p>\n

    Single Judge’s impugned order<\/h3>\n

    The Single Judge had held that the suit was not maintainable before the High Court on the following grounds —<\/p>\n

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    1. \n

      In view of Dhodha House<\/span> v. S.K. Maingi<\/span>, (2006) 9 SCC 41<\/a>, registration of the trademarks in Delhi did not confer jurisdiction to the High Court.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    2. \n

      Marketing Agreement was not part of the cause of action for filing the suit.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    3. \n

      Listing on e-commerce platforms such as IndiaMart did not confer jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    4. \n

      Since the plaintiff (appellant herein) had subordinate offices where the cause of action arose, Delhi could not be invoked in view of Indian Performing Rights Society (IPRS)<\/span> v. Sanjay Dalia<\/span>, (2015) 10 SCC 161<\/a> and as explained in Ultra Home Construction<\/span> v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey<\/span>, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Accepting the respondent’s objection, the Single Judge directed return of the plaint, leading to the present appeal before the Division Bench.<\/p>\n

      Moot Points<\/h3>\n
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      1. \n

        Whether registration of the appellant’s trade marks in Delhi could, by itself, confer territorial jurisdiction?<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      2. \n

        Whether the Marketing Agreement, executed in Delhi, constituted part of the cause of action for instituting the suit?<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      3. \n

        Whether listing of the respondent’s products on IndiaMart or similar platforms gave rise to a cause of action within Delhi?<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      4. \n

        Whether the appellant could invoke jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court solely on the basis of its principal office being located in Delhi, notwithstanding that the cause of action arose elsewhere?<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

      5. \n

        Whether the Single Judge was correct in holding that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and, thereby, in allowing the respondent’s application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC?<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        Court’s Analysis<\/h3>\n

        The Court reiterated that an application under Order VII Rule 10 is required to be decided “solely on the basis of the averments in the plaint, read with the documents filed therewith”, and no reliance can be placed on disputed facts or matters dehors the pleadings.<\/p>\n