{"id":371977,"date":"2026-01-07T18:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-01-07T12:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=371977"},"modified":"2026-01-08T17:40:17","modified_gmt":"2026-01-08T12:10:17","slug":"judicial-officers-removal-for-wrong-bail-order","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/01\/07\/judicial-officers-removal-for-wrong-bail-order\/","title":{"rendered":"‘Can’t label a judge dishonest on a hunch’; SC sets aside Judicial Officer’s removal over 4 bail orders missing statutory reference"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Supreme Court:<\/span> While considering this appeal filed by a judicial officer challenging his removal after 27 years of unblemished service on account of 4 judicial orders that did not expressly refer to Section 59-A<\/a> of the MP Excise Act<\/a> and by which he enlarged certain parties on bail, the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala**<\/span> and K.V. Viswanathan*<\/span>, JJ., allowed the appeal reasoning that it will be a dangerous proposition to hold that judgments and orders which do not refer expressly to statutory provisions are per se dishonest judgments.<\/p>\n

In his supplementary opinion, Pardiwala, J.<\/span>, added that a mere wrong order or wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself without anything more, cannot be a ground to initiate departmental proceedings. To dunk an officer into the puddle of “doubtful integrity” it is not enough that the doubt fringes on a mere hunch.<\/span> That doubt should be of such a nature as would reasonably and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material. Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There must be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man to entertain doubt regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification to ram an officer with the label ‘doubtful integrity’.<\/p>\n

Background:<\/h3>\n

The appellant joined service on 31-10-1987 as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service. The appellant scaled the ladder up and in 2003 was promoted as Additional District Judge and in September 2008 was confirmed in the said post. On 16-05-2011, he was transferred to Khargone, District Mandaleshwar (MP), where he joined as First Additional District & Sessions Judge. In the course of discharge of his duties, he dealt with several matters, including bail applications under the Excise Act.<\/p>\n

A resident of Jaitapur, Khargone, lodged a complaint with the Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur, alleging that the appellant was taking bribe through his steno, namely for grant of bail in cases under the Excise Act in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk liters or more; that due to such corrupt employee, the judiciary was getting defamed; that even in 1995-96, serious complaints of bribery were made against the said employee on which no action was taken; that the said employee has been posted in Khargone for more than 25 years and is earning money through illegal means and that an inquiry is essential.<\/p>\n

A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the District Judge (I & V), Indore Zone, against the appellant and on 06-10-2012, the Principal Registrar (I & V) put up a note based on which it was decided to initiate departmental proceedings against the appellant. In the preliminary inquiry certain orders passed by the appellant in bail proceedings seem to have been examined and few orders pulled out. Two charges were framed against the appellant of which the second charge admittedly was held not proved by the inquiry officer.<\/p>\n

The appellant was charged for corrupt motive or that for some extraneous consideration, bail applications were allowed contrary to Section 59-A<\/a> of the MP Excise Act<\/a>. It was found in the enquiry that in the 4 orders, Section 59-A<\/a> of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915<\/a> was not referred to. A contrast was made with 14 other bail orders, where the appellant had rejected bail.<\/p>\n

Madhya Pradesh High Court had opined that in the 14 other orders the appellant’s reference to the said Section implied thereby that he was conscious of the existence of the said Section on the statute. Section 59-A<\/a> of the MP Excise Act<\/a> prescribes the “twin conditions” for grant of bail.<\/p>\n

Court’s Assessment:<\/h3>\n

Perusing the matter, the Court had to consider whether the authorities were justified in removing the appellant from service?<\/p>\n

Pointing out that the present case is that of a Disciplinary Inquiry against the senior Judicial Officer, the Court observed that a Judicial Officer is tasked with the onerous duty of deciding cases. Invariably one party to the case would lose and go back unhappy. Disgruntled elements amongst them, wanting to settle scores may raise frivolous allegations. The Trial Judiciary also has tremendous work pressure and works under trying working conditions. Large number of cases are listed in a day and most of the judicial officers give their very best while discharging their duties. Equally, if the complaint of misconduct against the judicial officer is prima facie found to be true, prompt action to initiate disciplinary proceeding should be taken and no leniency should be shown if the charges are established. Not only this, in appropriate cases where criminal prosecution is warranted against a judicial officer, the High Court should not hesitate to have the same initiated.<\/p>\n

The Court observed that due care and caution must be exercised by the High Court in initiating such proceedings. It should be ensured that only because an order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without anything more, a judicial officer is not put through the ordeal of a disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution.<\/p>\n

Relying on relevant precedents, the Court stated that inference of misconduct or about extraneous considerations having actuated, the decision cannot be drawn merely from a hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. It has been held that a wrong decision can yet be a bona fide error of judgment and inadvertence is consistent with an honest error of judgment. “Ultimately, it is not the correctness of the verdict but the conduct of the Officer in question which is determinative<\/span>”.<\/p>\n

Perusing the relevant precedents on High Court’s approach dealing with such cases, the Court then applied the principles onto the facts of the present case and pointed out that the appellant has been held guilty of misconduct only based on certain judicial orders granting bail without anything more. The Court gave the following reasons:<\/p>\n