{"id":344779,"date":"2025-03-31T14:00:51","date_gmt":"2025-03-31T08:30:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=344779"},"modified":"2025-03-31T13:37:33","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T08:07:33","slug":"supreme-court-roundup-march-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2025\/03\/31\/supreme-court-roundup-march-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme Court Roundup March 2025 | Stories on 2002 Gujarat Riots Case; Kashmir University VC murder; Rising student suicides; Tax officers’ arrest powers; and more"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Top Stories<\/p>\n

SC stays Allahabad HC decision which held that grabbing breasts & breaking minor’s pajama string is not attempt to rape<\/a><\/p>\n

CJI constitutes 3-member committee to inquire cash-in-house row; Justice Yashwant Varma signals conspiracy to frame and malign him<\/a><\/p>\n

Supreme Court allows YouTuber Ranveer Allahabadia to resume his show with decency and morality<\/a><\/p>\n

Did You Know?<\/span> According to National Judicial Data Grid, there are about 5,475 cases instituted before the Supreme Court in the last month.1<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

CRIMINAL LAW<\/p>\n

There must be a right balance between hearing appeals against conviction where accused are in prison & where accused are on bail: SC<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh against the impugned order the High Court whereby the Court let go of the respondents (accused persons) taking into account their old age; the 3-Judge Bench of Abhay S. Oka*, Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Agustine George Masih, JJ., opined that considering the pendency of very old criminal appeals, priority is usually given to the hearing of the appeals where the accused are in prison. The appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail take a backseat. However, a right balance must be struck by taking up for hearing even some of the old criminal appeals against conviction where accused are on bail. Therefore, it is desirable that certain categories of appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail should be given priority. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

‘Alleged offence was repeated thrice in the same manner, when woman willingly accompanied accused to hotel room’: SC quashes rape case against 22-year-old man<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against the Madras High Court’s decision rejecting the accused person’s application under Section 482<\/doclink> of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/doclink> (‘CrPC’) for allegations of having forceful sexual intercourse with the complainant on the pretext of marriage, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran*, JJ. held that the matter at hand was precisely a case where the High Court should have interfered in the exercise of its inherent and extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC and directed that the proceedings initiated at the instance of the complainant before the Sessions Judge (Mahila Court) be quashed. The Court held that the sexual relationship admitted by both parties was not without the consent of the complainant. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

‘Mere presence at the spot, or arrest therefrom, not sufficient to prove that they were part of unlawful assembly’; SC acquits 6 in 2002 Gujarat Riots Case<\/p>\n

In a set of two criminal appeals against the Gujarat High Court’s decision in State of Gujarat v. Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan, 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 8909<\/a>, whereby the acquittal of the present accused persons in the 2002 Gujarat riots was partly reversed and convicted them for offences punishable under Sections 143<\/doclink>, 147<\/doclink>, 153(A)<\/doclink>, 295<\/doclink>, 436<\/doclink> and 332<\/doclink> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/doclink> (IPC), the Division Bench of PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision. The Court considered that in the absence of any inculpatory role ascribed to the accused persons, their arrest on the spot where riots outbroke, was not conclusive that they were a part of the unlawful assembly, particularly when neither instrument of destruction nor any inflammatory material was seized from them. Besides that, the police resorted to firing causing people to run helter skelter. In that melee, even an innocent person may be mistaken for a miscreant. Hence, the mere presence of the accused persons at the spot, or their arrest therefrom, was not sufficient to prove that they were a part of the unlawful assembly comprising of more than a thousand people. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

1990 Kashmir University VC murder case | Supreme Court upholds acquittal of six accused due to procedural lapses in TADA confessions<\/p>\n

In two appeals filed under Section 19<\/doclink> of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987<\/doclink> (‘TADA Act’) by the State (CBI) assailing the judgment and order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu (‘Special Court’ ), wherein the Special Court acquitted the accused persons in CBI Case for the offences under Sections 118, 302, 368, 365 , 120B of the Ranbir Penal Code, 1932 (‘RPC’) and under Sections 3 and 4 of the TADA Act , the division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. upheld acquittal of all the six accused persons due to procedural lapses in the recording of confessions under the TADA Act (now repealed). Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

‘If intention was to kill, there was no reason not to use sharp side of axe’; SC converts nephew’s conviction from under S. 302 to S. 304 Part I of IPC in uncle’s killing<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against the Bombay High Court’s decision, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the present accused and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision convicting the accused for offence under Sections 302, 324 read with Section 34<\/doclink> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/doclink> (‘IPC’), the Division Bench of BR Gavai* and Augustine George Masih, JJ. partly allowed the appeal and converted the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC to Part I of Section 304 of the IPC, considering that there was no premeditation of killing the deceased. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

S. 304 Part II IPC | ‘Purely accidental’; SC allows discharge of two in death by electrocution case of workers while working on sign board<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against the Bombay High Court’s decision, whereby the accused persons’ revision application against the Trial Court’s order dismissing their discharge applications for death of the deceased-employees, ultimately for the offence under Sections 304 Part II read with Section 34<\/doclink> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/doclink> (‘IPC’), the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision for absence of the basic ingredients of commission of offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The Court added that nothing was discernible from the record of the case that the accused persons had the knowledge that by asking the two employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their death. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Supreme Courts acquits convict in 1995 murder case for glaring omissions in evidence of deceased’s parents<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against Delhi High Court’s decision, whereby, the accused person’s conviction by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 302<\/doclink> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/doclink> (‘the IPC’) was affirmed, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. allowed the appeal upon founding significant improvements and omissions in the evidence of deceased’s parents. The omissions were so relevant that they become contradictions in view of the Explanation to Section 162<\/doclink> of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/doclink> (CrPC). Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Supreme Court acquits murder convicts due to lack of credible evidence; Sets aside High Court’s conviction order in 36-year-old case<\/p>\n

In an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the Rajasthan High Court whereby the High Court has upheld the judgment and order dated 10-03-2003 passed by the Trial Court convicting the convicts under Sections 302<\/doclink> read with 148<\/doclink> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/doclink> (‘IPC’), with the modification that the conviction was under Sections 302 read 149 IPC, the division bench of Pankaj Mithal and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court, stating that there is a complete lack of credible evidence to connect the convicts to the deceased’s homicidal death. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

STUDENT SUICIDES<\/p>\n

SC takes note of disturbing pattern of student suicides; Constitutes National Task Force to prevent commission of suicides in higher educational institutions<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal against decision of Delhi High Court declining to issue a writ of mandamus to the Police for the purpose of registration of F.I.R. in connection with the commission of suicide by two students while they were studying at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Delhi; the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.*, taking note of the grim situation of rising numbers of student suicides, deemed it fit to constitute a National Task Force to address the mental health concerns of students and prevent the commission of suicides in higher educational institutions. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

POCSO<\/p>\n

‘Accused and victim now happily married, continuing prosecution would cause unnecessary harassment to them and their children’; SC quashes POCSO proceedings<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal filed against the order passed by the Allahabad High Court wherein, the Court had stated that an application for dropping the criminal proceedings based on compromise to be moved before the Trial Court, the division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. said that the High Court overlooked the fact that the Trial Court could not have recorded the settlement, and this was a suitable case for the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482<\/doclink> of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/doclink> (‘CrPC’) to quash the proceedings. As a result, the parties were unnecessarily compelled to approach the Court. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside. The First Information Report (‘FIR’) and the proceedings of Sessions Trial pending before the Special Judge were quashed. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

BAIL<\/p>\n

Read why SC refused bail to retired IAS Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma in illegal land allotment case<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against the Gujarat High Court’s decision, whereby, the retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer\/ accused person’s criminal revision application against the Trial Court’s decision rejecting his discharge application for offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002<\/doclink> (‘PMLA’), the Division Bench of Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. held that the offence alleged against him constituted a ‘continuing offence’ under the PMLA and the quantum of proceeds of crime involved exceeded the statutory threshold and required proper investigation and judicial scrutiny. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Supreme Court sets aside preventive detention order for ignoring bail conditions imposed by Magistrate for the same offence<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal, filed by the wife of the detenu detained under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974<\/doclink> (‘COFEPOSA Act’), challenging the order of detention, the division bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. while noting that the detaining authority had failed to consider whether the conditions imposed by the Magistrate, when granting bail for the same offence, were adequate to restrain the detenu from engaging in further smuggling activities, allowed the appeal and set aside the detention order. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Supreme Court grants interim bail to MLA Abbas Ansari in UP Gangsters Act case<\/p>\n

The Division Bench of Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh, JJ. granted interim bail to Uttar Pradesh MLA Abbas Ansari in Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 case. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Road Accident | SC grants interim bail to accused due to his father’s compassionate endeavour towards victim’s orphaned minors<\/p>\n

While considering the instant petition seeking bail for the offences registered under Sections 201<\/doclink>, 279<\/doclink>, 304<\/doclink>, 304(2)<\/doclink>, 338<\/doclink>, 353<\/doclink>, 504<\/doclink> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/doclink> read with Sections 134(A)<\/doclink>, 134(B)<\/doclink> and 184<\/doclink> of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988<\/doclink>; the Division Bench of J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar, JJ., granted interim bail to the accused for period of 3 months after taking note of the peculiar facts of the case and the endeavour of the accused person’s father for taking steps towards restorative justice, by which he has shown his concern to maintain the minor children after the demise of their parents on account of the road traffic accident caused by his son. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

TAX OFFICERS’ ARREST POWERS<\/p>\n

Justice Bela M Trivedi explains jurisdictionary powers of judicial review under Arts. 32<\/doclink> and 226<\/doclink> of Constitution<\/doclink> when arrest is challenged<\/p>\n

In a matter concerning the power to arrest under the Customs Act, 1962<\/doclink> and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017<\/doclink> (‘CGST Act’), the three Judge Bench of Sanjiv Khanna*, CJI, MM. Sundresh and Bela M. Trivedi**, JJ. upheld the constitutional validity of “power to arrest” provisions under Customs and GST Acts while elucidating the pre-conditions and when and how the power of arrest is to be exercised. However, Justice Bela M. Trivedi wrote a separate but concurrent judgment. While completely agreeing with the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice, on when and how the power of arrest should be exercised by the authorized officers, she elaborated on the jurisdictionary powers of judicial review under Article 32<\/doclink> and Article 226<\/doclink> of the Constitution of India<\/doclink>, when the arrest of a person is challenged. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Explained | Supreme Court’s verdict on constitutional validity of “power to arrest” provisions under Customs and GST Acts<\/p>\n

In a matter concerning the power to arrest under the Customs Act, 1962<\/doclink> and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017<\/doclink> (‘CGST Act’), the three Judge Bench of Sanjiv Khanna*, CJI, MM. Sundresh and Bela M. Trivedi**, JJ. rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity as also the right of the authorised officers under the Customs Act and the GST Acts to arrest with elucidation and clarification on the pre-conditions and when and how the power of arrest is to be exercised. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

COMPENSATION<\/p>\n

Supreme Court orders Uttarakhand Govt. to pay Rs. 1 crore to family of doctor killed on duty after 9 years of legal battle<\/p>\n

In a matter concerning the non-compliance of the proposal to pay Rs 50 lakhs compensation to the family of a government doctor, who was tragically shot dead while working at a Community Health Centre in April 2016, the division bench comprising Justices JK Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar held that, in light of the gravity of the incident, the sanction for compensation must be honored, and the amount should be paid along with interest. The total amount, including interest for approximately nine years, was quantified at Rs. 1 crore. Out of this, Rs. 11 lakhs had already been paid. The Court directed that the remaining Rs. 89 lakhs be paid within six weeks, and compliance with this order must be reported to the Registry on affidavit by the next date of listing. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

ARBITRATION<\/p>\n

‘No agreement on choice of appointing authority’; SC directs parties to approach Secretary General of Permanent Court of Arbitration<\/p>\n

While considering the instant arbitration petition, the 3-Judge Bench of Sanjiv Khanna, CJ., Sanjay Kumar and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ., pointed out that there was there was no agreement on the choice of the appointing authority after the petitioner, Tata Communications Limited, issued notice dated 28-01-2021. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

RIGHTS OF PERSON’S WITH DISABILITIES<\/p>\n

Visually impaired candidates eligible to participate in judicial service examination: Supreme Court<\/p>\n

In a suo motu cognizance of a letter petitions by the visually impaired candidates, challenging the legality of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 (‘Rules, 1994’), as amended on 23-06-2023, and Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 (‘Rules 2010’) the two judge Bench of JB Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan*, JJ. held that visually impaired candidates are eligible to participate in selection for the posts under the judicial service. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

JURISDICTION<\/p>\n

‘Adjudication beyond jurisdiction is void’; Supreme Court sets aside Calcutta HC order for lack of jurisdiction; Stalls appointments pending disposal of WP<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed against the judgment and order of the division bench of Calcutta High Court, which, while deciding an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, allowed the respondents’ writ petition, and directed the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited (‘GRSE Ltd’), to appoint 48 out of the 51 writ petitioners on compassionate grounds, the division bench of Dipankar Datta and Rajesh Bindal, JJ. concluded that any adjudication beyond the allocated jurisdiction is void and must be treated as a nullity. It emphasized that the Chief Justice of the High Court, as primus inter pares, holds the exclusive authority to set the roster, and such roster is final and binding on all Companion Justices of the court. Therefore, the Court held that both the order dated 11-03-2024, and the impugned order were passed without jurisdiction and could not be sustained in law. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Order passed by High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would relate back to the order of the Trial Court: SC<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal wherein the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ., had to consider whether Allahabad High Court was right in exercising its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of setting aside the order of the Trial Court rejecting the second application preferred by the Respondent 2 under section 319 of the CrPC. The Court upheld the approach of the High Court and stated that once a superior court deems fit to interfere with an order passed by a subordinate court, then any rectifications to such order passed in exercise of revisional powers under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the CrPC must be treated on the same footing as rectifications made by an appellate court and as a result would relate back to the time the original order was passed. The Court stated that an order passed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would relate back to the order of the Trial Court. Furthermore, by virtue of relating back of the order passed by the High Court in a revision petition, the summoning order passed by the Trial Court in compliance with the order of the High Court would also relate back to the initial order rejecting the second application under Section 319, and therefore could be said to have been passed before the conclusion of the trial. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

FACTORIES ACT, 1948<\/p>\n

Supreme Court rules washing, cleaning, and dry-cleaning as ‘Manufacturing Process’ under Factories Act, 1948<\/doclink><\/p>\n

In an appeal concerning the question that whether the process of ‘Dry cleaning of clothes’ constitutes ‘manufacturing process’ as defined under the Factories Act, 1948<\/doclink> (‘Act of 1948’), the division bench of BR Gavai and KV Viswanathan*, JJ. held that washing, cleaning, and dry-cleaning activities fall within the definition of ‘manufacturing process’ under the Factories Act, 1948<\/doclink>, even if these processes do not result in the creation of a new tangible product. The Court further clarified that the laundry business qualifies as a ‘factory’ under Section 2(m) of the Act, 1948, provided that it employs 10 or more workers, and the laundry work is carried out with the aid of power-operated machines. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

ADVOCATES’ APPEARANCES<\/p>\n

Only arguing counsel appearing physically and assisting counsel will be recorded in appearance; Senior Advocate shall not appear without AOR: Supreme Court<\/p>\n

In a set of two miscellaneous applications filed jointly by the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) and the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) seeking clarification\/ modification of the directions in para 42 of Bhagwan Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2599<\/a>, wherein it was directed that the Advocates-on-Record may mark the appearances of only those Advocates who are authorized to appear and argue the case on the particular day of hearing, the Division Bench of Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. gave a slew of directions to regulate practice and procedure on the following issues:<\/p>\n

1) whether the Advocates have an indefeasible right to appear for a party or to get their appearances marked for a party, though not duly authorised to appear in the court proceedings; and<\/p>\n

2) whether the impugned directions given by the court impinge or affect any of the legal, fundamental or statutory rights of the Advocates. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS<\/p>\n

Can Section 138 NI Act proceedings be quashed against former director of company, suspended from his position on appointment of IRP? SC answers<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision, whereby the accused person’s application under Section 482<\/doclink> of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/doclink> (‘CrPC’) for quashing of proceedings initiated under Section 138<\/doclink> of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881<\/doclink> (‘NI Act’) was dismissed, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision opining that the High Court erred in denying the relief to the accused- former director of the corporate debtor by placing reliance upon P. Mohan Raj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258<\/a>. The Court explained that cause of action under Section 138 of the NI Act arose after the commencement of the insolvency process. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Can a complaint under S. 138 of N.I. Act be transferred from one Court to other for lack of territorial jurisdiction of Court? SC answers<\/p>\n

In a batch of transfer petitions under Section 406<\/doclink> of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/doclink> (‘CrPC’) to transfer the criminal case under Section 138<\/doclink> of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881<\/doclink> (‘N.I. Act) pending before the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh (UT) to the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, essentially on the ground that there was no cause of action for the bank to lodge the complaint in Chandigarh, the Division Bench of JB Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ. dismissed the petitions holding that the petitioners’ assertation that no part of the cause of action arose within Chandigarh, was of no avail to them, as the law itself allows the institution of a complaint in Chandigarh. The enactment of sub-section (2)(a) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act and the Explanation thereto allows the complainant to file a complaint before the Courts within whose jurisdiction the collection branch of the bank falls. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

ENVIRONMENT LAW<\/p>\n

Supreme Court sets aside NGT’s order curbing Auroville township expansion due to environmental harm<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed by Auroville Foundation against the judgment of the National Green Tribunal (‘NGT’), wherein the NGT prohibited the Foundation from proceeding with the construction of two roads in its township on the grounds of environmental harm., the division bench of Bela M. Trivedi* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ., held that no substantial question relating to the environment had arisen, nor was there any alleged violation of the enactments specified in Schedule I of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010<\/doclink> (‘NGT Act’). Consequently, the Tribunal had committed a gross error in assuming jurisdiction and issuing directions that were legally untenable. Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned order. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Did You Know?<\/span> According to National Judicial Data Grid, there are about 6,347 cases disposed of by the Supreme Court in the last month.2<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

AUROVLLE FOUNDATION ACT<\/p>\n

Auroville Foundation Act and Rules do not grant residents the right to join committees or councils formed by Governing Board: Supreme Court<\/p>\n

In a civil appeal filed by Auroville Foundation against the Judgment passed by the Madras High Court, setting aside the Notification dated 01-06-2022 containing the Standing Order issued by Auroville, the division bench of Bela M. Trivedi* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. held that neither the Auroville Foundation Act (‘AF Act’) nor the Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997 (‘Rules’) confer any right upon the Residents’ Assembly, nor upon an individual resident of Auroville, to be part of any committee or council constituted by the Governing Board for the efficient discharge of its duties and functions under the Act. The functions of the Residents’ Assembly are limited solely to advising the Governing Board on matters related to the residents of Auroville and making recommendations as specified in Section 19 of the AF Act, without extending beyond those bounds. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

MOTOR VEHICLE ACT<\/p>\n

Motor Vehicle Accident | SC gives wider interpretation to ‘legal representative’, includes financially dependent father & younger sister while enhancing compensation<\/p>\n

In a batch of civil appeals by the dependents of the deceased against the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision, seeking enhanced amount of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988<\/doclink> on account of death of 24-year-old deceased, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. allowed the appeal and modified the amount from Rs.9,77,200\/- to Rs. 17,52,500\/-. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

LEASE<\/p>\n

‘Funds available in liquidation proceedings cannot be directed for payment of unearned income due to large number of claims’; SC dismisses DDA’s plea in lease matter<\/p>\n

In a civil appeal by the Delhi Development Authority (‘DDA’) against Delhi High Court’s Division Bench decision, wherein it refused to direct the funds available in liquidation proceedings for payment of unearned income on large number of claims, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. dismissed the appeal and refused to interfere with the impugned decision. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

BUILDER BANKS<\/p>\n

Explained | SC verdict slamming ‘builder-banks’ nexus in Delhi NCR and proposing CBI probe<\/p>\n

In a batch of petitions relating to disbursement of funds by banks to builders-cum-developers through subvention schemes for various housing development projects in Noida, Greater Noida, Gurugram, and other nearby areas, the Division Bench of Surya Kant and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. stated that there was blatant disregard and ignorance of the Court’s directions by the banks and builders, which hinted towards a possible collusion between the builders-cum-developers and the banks\/financial institutions. Hence, the Court directed the Standing Counsel for the Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’) to remain present before the Court on the next date of hearing to constitute a SIT and sought explanation as to why the CBI should not register a case and then proceed to investigate the nexus between the banks and the builders. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

SERVICE LAW<\/p>\n

“ ‘Degree’ includes bachelor’s, master’s, and doctorate”; Supreme Court sets aside Jharkhand HC order disqualifying master’s degree holders for FSO Post<\/p>\n

In an appeal seeking a direction upon the respondents to consider the candidature of the appellants for the appointment as Food Safety Officers (‘FSO’), pursuant to the notification dated 7-10-2015 issued by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission (‘JPSC’) upon the requisition of the State of Jharkhand, the division bench of Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta*, JJ. held that the appellants who possessed post-graduate degrees in subjects covered under Clause 2.1.3 of the Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 (‘FSS Rules’) were unquestionably qualified for the post of FSO under the subject advertisement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the impugned judgments, of the Division Bench of the High Court and Single Bench of the High Court, did not stand to scrutiny and were liable to be set aside. However, the Court concluded that the prayer made by the appellants to appear in the interview under the Advertisement issued by JPSC, cannot be acceded to as they did not apply under this advertisement. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

‘Employee already considered ‘initial constituent’ under Recruitment Rules cannot be treated as contractual employee’; SC dismisses SAI’s plea<\/p>\n

In a batch of civil appeals by the Sports Authority of India (SAI) challenging the dismissal of their recall applications by the Delhi High Court, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. held that once an employee was considered as an ‘initial constituent’ under the Sports Authority of India (Sports Sciences and Sports Medicine) Staff Recruitment Rules, 1992 (Rules), it would mean that the said person could not be treated as a contractual employee but as a regular employee, who comes under direct enrolment\/control of SAI. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY<\/p>\n

Penalties imposed by NCDRC are regulatory in nature & do not constitute “debt” under IBC, 2016: Supreme Court<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal against the final judgment and order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), wherein 27 penalties were imposed on the appellant for failing to deliver possession of residential units to homebuyers as per the agreed timeline; the Division Bench of Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ., had to consider whether execution proceedings under Section 27<\/doclink> of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986<\/doclink> (CP Act), can also be stayed during an interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC. The Court held that penalties imposed by the NCDRC are regulatory in nature and do not constitute “debt” under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016<\/doclink> (IBC). The moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC does not extend to regulatory penalties imposed for non-compliance with consumer protection laws. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

ELECTION<\/p>\n

“Each vote’s sanctity must be protected, irrespective of its effect on election outcome”; SC orders recount in Prayagraj Gram Panchayat election<\/p>\n

In a matter concerning the fairness of the election process for the Gram panchayat election and the recount of votes, the division bench of Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. having considered the circumstances and the issues surrounding the election process, set aside the judgment passed by the High Court, and restored the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, which had directed a recount of the votes. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

EXECUTION PETITION<\/p>\n

Supreme Court directs High Courts to ensure pending execution petitions to be decided within six months without fail<\/p>\n

In batch of appeals against the judgment and order passed by the Madras High Court, wherein the Court rejected the revision petitions and affirmed the orders passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge, (‘ASJ’) allowing the application filed by the respondent 1 and 2 under Section 47<\/doclink> of the Code of Civil Procedure, CPC, 1908<\/doclink> and rejecting the application filed by the appellants seeking amendment in the execution petition, the division bench of JB Pardiwala* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ. while setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the orders passed by the Executing Court , directed the Executing Court to proceed to ensure that vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property is handed over to the appellants in their capacity as decree holders and if necessary, with the aid of police within a period of two months from the date of this judgment. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

BCI ORDER<\/p>\n

‘Conclusion must have reasons to stand on’: Supreme Court sets aside unreasoned BCI order dismissing revision petition on Advocates’ professional misconduct<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed against the order passed by the Bar Council of India (‘BCI’) wherein it upheld the order passed by the Bar Council of Delhi (‘BCD’) dismissing appellant’s complaint alleging professional misconduct committed by the respondent-advocates, the division bench of Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ. set aside the impugned order by noting that BCI order merely has six lines for dismissing the revision without recording any reason at all. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

MAHARASHTRA REGIONAL AND TOWN PLANNING ACT, 1966<\/p>\n

Strict adherence to MRTP Act’s acquisition timeline is essential, land reservation lapses if no action is taken: Supreme Court<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed against the order passed by the Bombay High Court, wherein it was held that a person intending to develop their property at the earliest can take recourse of Section 49 otherwise they would have to wait for a period of 10 years as envisaged under Section 127(1)<\/doclink> of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966<\/doclink> (‘MRTP Act’), the division bench of JB Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ., while setting aside the impugned order, held that the principles underlying in Section 127 of the MRTP Act is either to utilize the land for the purpose for which it is reserved in the timeline given or let the owner utilize the land for the purpose as permissible under the town planning scheme. The reservation shall be deemed to have lapsed if no steps are taken for acquisition of the said land within the prescribed period. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

SENIOR CITIZEN’S ACT, 2007<\/p>\n

‘The very concept of family is being eroded’; SC dismisses appeal seeking eldest son’s eviction<\/p>\n

While considering the instant dispute wherein the filed an appeal seeking eviction of her son from the house; the Division Bench of Pankaj Mithal* and SVN Bhatti, JJ., grimly remarked that though Indian society believes in “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” i.e. the earth, as a whole, is one family; however, today there is an inability to retain the unity in the immediate family. “The very concept of ‘family’ is being eroded and we are on the brink of one person one family”. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Never Reported Judgments<\/p>\n

NRJ Series | Leave of court can be granted to determine the liability of a person who claimed to be firm’s partner in execution of decree against firm [(1954) 2 SCC 917<\/a>]<\/p>\n

In the present case, an appeal was made against the decision of the Patna High Court (‘the High Court’) confirming the order of the Subordinate Judge, Motihari in execution proceedings. The 4-Judges Bench of M.C. Mahajan, C.J., and N.H. Bhagwati*, B. Jagannadhadas, and T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar, JJ., noted that the appellants (decree-holder) filed an application for execution of a decree and sought leave under Order 21 Rule 50(2)<\/doclink> of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/doclink> (‘CPC’) to proceed against the respondent as legal representative of the respondent’s father, Khemchand Lohia, who had died in the meanwhile. The Supreme Court held that the procedure adopted by the courts below were erroneous and the courts were wrong in dismissing the appellants’ execution application on the ground that in absence of service of summons upon Khemchand Lohia as partner, he was not liable to pay decretal amount. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

NRJ Series| Agreement to be effectual as an assignment of actionable claim must be in writing and comply with Section 130<\/doclink> of Transfer of Property Act, 1882<\/doclink> [(1954) 2 SCC 869<\/a>]<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed by the third-party claimant (‘appellant’) in a garnishee proceeding, the three-Judges Bench of B.K. Mukherjea*, S.R. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ., stated that an agreement to be effectual as an assignment of a claim to a debt (actionable claim) must be in writing and comply with the provisions of Section 130<\/doclink> of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882<\/doclink>. Thereafter, referring to the letter, which referred to security deposits, the Supreme Court stated that it was difficult to say that it operated as an assignment of the existing security deposits lying with the Railway Authorities to the credit of the defendants or was intended to operate as such. It was not addressed to the creditor, nor used the language of an assignment. Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

NRJ Series | When SC held that rights of charge-holder cannot prevail against mortgagees under Section 100<\/doclink> of Transfer of Property Act, 1882<\/doclink> [(1954) 2 SCC 865<\/a>]<\/p>\n

In the present case, as maintenance amount, payable to charge-holder, as a charge on the mortgaged property was not known to the mortgage, the 4-Judges Bench of M.C. Mahajan, C.J., and N.H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas and T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar*, JJ., held that the mortgagees had no actual or constructive notice of the charge in favour of charge-holder, and were bona fide transferees for consideration. Therefore, the rights of the charge-holder could not prevail. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Nagpur High Court (‘the High Court’) and opined that the rights of the charge-holder could not prevail as against those of the mortgagees, under Section 100<\/doclink> of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882<\/doclink> (‘the 1882 Act’). Read more<\/a><\/p>\n

Know Thy Judge<\/p>\n