{"id":344254,"date":"2025-03-24T15:00:58","date_gmt":"2025-03-24T09:30:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=344254"},"modified":"2025-03-24T14:21:33","modified_gmt":"2025-03-24T08:51:33","slug":"does-the-sessions-court-have-the-power-to-pass-interim-orders-under-the-domestic-violence-act","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2025\/03\/24\/does-the-sessions-court-have-the-power-to-pass-interim-orders-under-the-domestic-violence-act\/","title":{"rendered":"Does the Sessions Court have the Power to Pass Interim Orders Under the Domestic Violence Act?"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

H<\/span>ow much leeway does the Sessions Court have under Section 29<\/a>1<\/sup><\/a> of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005<\/a> (hereinafter referred to as “the Domestic Violence Act” or “the Act” as the case may be) to pass interim orders? Is its power confined to only deciding the appeal before it filed by the aggrieved person or the respondent or can it pass interim orders including orders in the nature of stay of execution or suspension of sentence pending the decision in appeal? This is the subject-matter of the present piece.<\/p>\n

The statutory scheme of things<\/h2>\n

The Domestic Violence Act2<\/sup><\/a>, as its long title suggests, is “An Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” Chapter IV of the said Act sets out the “procedure for obtaining orders of reliefs”. An aggrieved person or a person on her behalf or a Protection Officer can under Section 12 make an application to the jurisdictional Magistrate seeking certain reliefs including payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages.3<\/sup><\/a> While disposing an application under Section 12(1), the Magistrate under Section 204<\/sup><\/a> also has the power to grant monetary reliefs. Compensation orders can also be passed under Section 225<\/sup><\/a> of the Domestic Violence Act. Sections 186<\/sup><\/a>, 197<\/sup><\/a> and 218<\/sup><\/a> of the Act give powers to the Magistrate to pass protection orders, residence orders and custody orders respectively. There are three other important provisions within the Domestic Violence Act which are required to be noted. Section 239<\/sup><\/a> grants express powers to the Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte orders. Section 2610<\/sup><\/a> clearly states that reliefs available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Domestic Violence Act “may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, Family Court or a criminal court”. And Section 36 which is a miscellaneous provision in Chapter V clearly states that the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act “shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in force”11<\/sup><\/a>. Therefore, while Section 23 grants specific power to the Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte orders, such power is not specifically bestowed by the legislature upon the Sessions Court under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act. Notwithstanding this, can the Sessions Court still pass interim orders in pending appeals? This question seems to have caused some confusion due to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shalu Ojha<\/span> v. Prashant Ojha<\/span>12<\/sup><\/a> (hereinafter referred to as “Shalu Ojha<\/span>”).<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shalu Ojha<\/h2>\n

If the adage, “some things are better left unsaid” were to ever apply a decision of the Supreme Court, then Shalu Ojha<\/span>13<\/sup><\/a> would be that decision. In Shalu Ojha<\/span>14<\/sup><\/a>, the appellant filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act which was disposed of by the Magistrate who had granted a certain amount towards monthly maintenance on certain terms. An appeal was filed by the respondent to the Additional Sessions Judge under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act challenging the Magistrate’s order. The Additional Sessions Judge while granting stay of execution directed the respondent to pay the arrears of maintenance within two months. Since the respondent defaulted in paying the arrears, the appellant moved an application for execution. In the meantime, during the pendency of the execution proceedings, the appeal filed before the Additional Sessions Judge was dismissed for non-compliance with the interim directions passed by it. The respondent challenged the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge before the High Court who had initially declined to pass interim orders. The respondent thereafter approached the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s order. The Supreme Court refused to interfere but directed parties to mediate the dispute. The mediation failed and on receipt of the failure report, the appeal was listed before the High Court who directed the respondent to pay the appellant a certain amount of maintenance in two instalments and stayed the execution proceedings. The interim stay on execution granted by the High Court was set aside by the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the appellant’s application for payment of “current maintenance” before the High Court was dismissed as “not pressed” on recording the statement of the appellant’s High Court counsel. The appellant challenged this dismissal yet again before the Supreme Court on the ground that no such instructions were given by her to her advocate for not pressing the application. Therefore, the Supreme Court in its judgment has rightly stated,<\/p>\n

20<\/span>. … Whether the Sessions Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 29 of the Act has any power to pass interim orders staying the execution of the order appealed before it is a matter to be examined in an appropriate case.15<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

With due respect, the Court should have stopped there and said nothing more of Section 29 because that was not the issue before it. However, the Court went onto further observe16<\/sup><\/a> the following:<\/p>\n

20<\/span>. … We only note that there is no express grant of power conferred on the Sessions Court while such power is expressly conferred on the Magistrate under Section 23. Apart from that, the power to grant interim orders is not always inherent in every court. Such powers are either expressly conferred or implied in certain circumstances. This<\/span> Court in<\/span> Super Cassettes Industries Ltd.<\/span> v. Music Broadcast (P) Ltd.<\/span>17<\/sup><\/a>, examined this question in detail<\/span>. At any rate, we do not propose to decide whether the Sessions Court has the power to grant interim order such as the one sought by the respondent herein during the pendency of his appeal, for that issue has not been argued before us.<\/p>\n

21<\/span>. We presume (we emphasise that we only presume for the purpose of this appeal) that the Sessions Court does have such power. If such a power exists then it can certainly be exercised by the Sessions Court on such terms and conditions which in the opinion of the Sessions Court are justified in the facts and circumstances of a given case. In the alternative, if the Sessions Court does not have the power to grant interim orders during the pendency of the appeal, the Sessions Court ought not to have stayed the execution of the maintenance order passed by the Magistrate. Since the respondent did not comply with such conditional order, the Sessions Court thought it fit to dismiss the appeal. Challenging the correctness of the said dismissal, the respondent carried the matter before the High Court invoking Section 482<\/a> of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a>18<\/sup><\/a> and Article 227<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>19<\/sup><\/a>. (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n

Despite the caveats set out by the Supreme Court in its judgment, it is submitted that as expected, advocates in several matters before the High Courts relied on the observations of the Supreme Court that are highlighted above, thereby bestowing upon the High Courts with the onerous task of interpreting the Supreme Court’s observations in Shalu Ojha<\/span>20<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n

The opinions of three High Courts<\/h2>\n

The Karnataka High Court<\/p>\n

(1) In Yashaswini<\/span> v. M. Anegudde Ganesh<\/span>21<\/sup><\/a> (hereinafter referred to as “Yashaswini<\/span>”) the Magistrate had partly allowed a petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act and ordered payment of monthly maintenance along with compensation. The order was challenged by the husband under Section 29 along with an interim application before the Sessions Court who stayed the execution of the Magistrate’s order for three months with a condition of paying a certain amount of monthly maintenance till further orders.22<\/sup><\/a> The Sessions Court order was challenged in the Karnataka High Court. The observations of the Supreme Court in Shalu Ojha<\/span>23<\/sup><\/a> were predictably relied on by the advocate for the respondent husband24<\/sup><\/a>; along with Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. case<\/span>25<\/sup><\/a> (hereinafter referred to as “Super Cassettes<\/span>”) and Munilakshmamma<\/span> v. Commr., Kolar District<\/span>26<\/sup><\/a> (which will be dealt with later).27<\/sup><\/a> The High Court eventually held that the order of the Magistrate awarding monetary benefits under the Domestic Violence Act was civil in nature and not criminal and therefore, in the absence of any express or implied provision under the Domestic Violence Act the benefits of Section 389<\/a> of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a>28<\/sup><\/a> (dealing with suspension of sentence) would not apply to each and every proceedings under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act.29<\/sup><\/a> Therefore, the Sessions Court has no power to stay the operation of the order passed by the Magistrate particularly when there is no criminal\/penal consequence to such an order.30<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

(2) A Coordinate Bench of the Karnataka High Court in K.M. Leelavathi<\/span> v. K.M. Sonia Madaiah<\/span>31<\/sup><\/a> disagreed with the earlier view of the Court in Yashaswini<\/span>32<\/sup><\/a> and held that the view of the Court in Yashaswini<\/span>33<\/sup><\/a> was contrary to the principle of law laid down in Munilakshmamma<\/span> case<\/span>34<\/sup><\/a> (invertedly referring to it as a Supreme Court decision35<\/sup><\/a>) viz.:<\/p>\n

When a statute provides a remedy by way of appeal to the appellate authority against the impugned order, such a legal remedy should not be frustrated by an order of refusal to grant a stay of the operation of the impugned order because the implementation of the impugned order would not only disturb the status of the appellant but also defeat the very purpose for which the remedy is sought before the appellate authority.36<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The Court also observed that the Supreme Court in Shalu Ojha<\/span>37<\/sup><\/a> had not delved into the question of the powers of the Sessions Court to grant interim relief pending an appeal under the Domestic Violence Act.38<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The Punjab and Haryana High Court<\/p>\n

In an elaborate yet well-reasoned judgment delivered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhanu Kiran<\/span> v. Rahul Khosla<\/span>39<\/sup><\/a>, after relying on several decisions of the Supreme Court including State of Karnataka<\/span> v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society<\/span>40<\/sup><\/a>, CIT<\/span> v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi<\/span>41<\/sup><\/a> and J.K. Synthetics Ltd.<\/span> v. CCE<\/span>42<\/sup><\/a>, the High Court held:<\/p>\n

20<\/span>. … If it is held that under Section 29 appellate court is not bestowed with power to pass interim order against interim order because there is no specific power under Section 29, the appellate court would be denuded from power to pass interim order even against final order because there is no such specific power qua final order. Existence of power and use of power are two different dimensions of legal jurisprudence.<\/p>\n

Matter needs to be examined from one more angle. The appellate court may or may not exercise power to pass interim order, however, if it is held that appellate court in terms of Section 29 has no power to pass interim order, it would amount to curtailing the powers of appellate court. It seems to be contrary to settled canons of law that appellate authority or court unless specifically barred can exercise all those powers which are vested in subordinate authority. It cannot be approved that Magistrate has power to pass interim order, however, appellate court has no power to pass interim order. Due to overburden, more often than not, appellate courts are unable to finally adjudicate appeal against interim order and if it is held that appellate court has no power to pass interim order, Magistrate may finally decide the issue and appeal would become infructuous.43<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The High Court also referred to Shalu Ojha<\/span>44<\/sup><\/a> (cited by Counsel) and observed that the issue of the power of the appellate court to grant interim relief was left open by the Supreme Court.45<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The Kerala High Court<\/p>\n

The aforesaid decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was followed by the Kerala High Court in Farsana P.S.<\/span> v. Razveen Raffique<\/span>46<\/sup><\/a>. Before the Kerala High Court, Shalu Ojha<\/span>47<\/sup><\/a> was yet again cited by counsel.48<\/sup><\/a> However, the Kerala High Court followed the line of reasoning set out by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and held that the Sessions Court under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act does have the power to pass interim orders; the High Court also followed the maxim et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist) to come to its conclusion.49<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The author’s view on the issue<\/h2>\n

In the author’s opinion, the Sessions Court would have the power to pass interim orders in pending appeals under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act for the following reasons:<\/p>\n

A. The peculiar nature of proceedings under the Act<\/span>: The Supreme Court in Alisha Berry<\/span> v. Neelam Berry<\/span>50<\/sup><\/a> has held that proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act “are quasi-criminal proceedings which do not have any penal consequence except where there is a violation or breach of a protection order”. The Bombay High Court in Raosaheb Pandharinath Kamble<\/span> v. Shaila Raosaheb Kamble<\/span>51<\/sup><\/a> has termed proceedings under this Act as “quasi civil” in nature. Therefore, the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act are neither purely criminal nor civil. This is further evident from a reading of Section 28 of the Domestic Violence Act52<\/sup><\/a> which confines the application of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a>53<\/sup><\/a> only to Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Act, except as otherwise provided for in the Act.54<\/sup><\/a> If that be the case, then Section 36 of the Domestic Violence Act which states that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation with other laws would have some bearing on the issue at hand. Once Section 36 comes into play, then obviously the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a>55<\/sup><\/a> (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) as well as the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a> (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) or the Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 202356<\/sup><\/a> (hereinafter referred to as “BNSS”) as the case may be, would have some application as these enactments would have to be read along with the Domestic Violence Act particularly in cases when the Act is silent on certain aspects. If the proceedings are “quasi civil” in nature, then the appellate court would be able to derive its power to grant interim measures\/pass interim orders from certain provisions of the CPC. Order 21 Rule 26 CPC grants power to the appellate court to stay execution of a decree or pass an order relating to the decree or execution.57<\/sup><\/a> Order 41 XLI Rule 5 CPC also enables the appellate court to grant stay of proceedings under a decree or order58<\/sup><\/a>; not to mention the inherent power of the Court under Section 15159<\/sup><\/a> CPC. Similarly, if these proceedings are also “quasi criminal” as the Supreme Court seems to suggest, then the Sessions Court under Section 389 CrPC60<\/sup><\/a> which is now Section 430 of the BNSS61<\/sup><\/a>, would have the power to suspend a sentence pending appeal. Therefore, in either scenario, the Sessions Court would have been able to pass interim orders. To substantiate this proposition, one would also have to peruse Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act which makes it clear that reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act may also be sought in any legal proceeding before a civil court, Family Court or criminal court. Therefore, if such reliefs are sought before a civil court or criminal court, then obviously it would be incongruous to suggest that the powers to grant interim orders by a criminal court including the Sessions Court are curtailed.<\/p>\n

B. The principles of law in<\/span> Super Cassettes cannot be applied to the Domestic Violence Act<\/span>: Shalu Ojha<\/span>62<\/sup><\/a> refers to Super Cassettes<\/span>63<\/sup><\/a> while observing that the power to grant interim orders are not always inherent in every court.64<\/sup><\/a> The issue before the Supreme Court in Super Cassettes<\/span>65<\/sup><\/a> was whether the Copyright Board under Section 31<\/a> of the Copyright Act, 1957<\/a>66<\/sup><\/a> could pass an interim order in a pending complaint.67<\/sup><\/a> In the case before the Supreme Court, the Copyright Board had granted “an interim compulsory licence” pending disposal of the complaint.68<\/sup><\/a> The majority opinion penned by Justice Altamas Kabir (for himself and Justice Nijjar) held that though “tribunals” such as the Copyright Board “discharging quasi-judicial functions” and “having trappings of a court” are generally considered to be vested with incidental and ancillary powers; but in the absence of any provision to the contrary, such tribunal would not have the power to pass interim orders.69<\/sup><\/a> The concurring opinion echoed the same view.70<\/sup><\/a> However, the principles laid down for Section 31<\/a> of the Copyright Act, 1957<\/a> cannot be applied to Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act as the schemes of both Acts are entirely different and both of them apply to their own fields. Even for provisions in statutes that are pari materia, the Supreme Court has clearly held that words in a provision in one statute cannot be used to interpret another. “A one-size-fits-all analogy” cannot be always used (see Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.<\/span> v. Amit Gupta<\/span>71<\/sup><\/a>). Therefore, it would be a case of apples and oranges if one were to apply the principles of law laid down for a provision in a statute and apply it to another entirely different statute. Moreover, the powers of a “court” are far wider than that of a “tribunal”. What was before the Supreme Court in Super Cassettes<\/span>72<\/sup><\/a> was the power of a tribunal to pass interim orders and not that of a court. “Every court may be a tribunal but every tribunal necessarily may not be a court.”73<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

C. The issue before the Supreme Court in<\/span> Shalu Ojha was not concerning Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act<\/span>: As has already been set out earlier, before the Supreme Court, the appellant was not challenging an interim order of the Sessions Court under Section 29 but a High Court order dismissing an application for “current maintenance”. The Supreme Court has clearly stated in Shalu Ojha<\/span>74<\/sup><\/a> that it was not taking a decision on the powers of the Sessions Court to grant interim relief under Section 29 and left the issue to be decided in an appropriate case. A decision is an authority for what it specifically decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom75<\/sup><\/a> and not everything that is said by a Judge in a judgment constitutes a precedent.76<\/sup><\/a> Therefore, the observations made by the Supreme Court viz., that powers to grant interim orders is not always inherent in every court77<\/sup><\/a> cannot even be termed as obiter dicta as the Supreme Court has itself clarified that it was not deciding the issue on the scope of the Sessions Court to grant interim relief under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act.<\/p>\n

Hence, the Sessions Court would have the power to pass interim orders in pending appeals filed before it under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n

*Arbitrator and a practising Advocate at the Bombay High Court.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.<\/a> 29. Appeal<\/span>.—There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later.<\/a><\/p>\n

2.<\/a> Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005<\/a>.<\/p>\n

3.<\/a> 12. Application to Magistrate<\/span>.— (1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act:<\/p>\n

Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.<\/p>\n

(2) The relief sought for under sub-s. (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent:<\/p>\n

Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a>, or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set off.<\/p>\n

(3) Every application under sub-s. (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.<\/p>\n

(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court.<\/p>\n

(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-s. (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.<\/p>\n

4.<\/a> 20. Monetary reliefs<\/span>.— (1) While disposing of an application under sub-s. (1) of S. 12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but not limited to,—<\/a><\/p>\n

(a<\/span>) the loss of earnings;<\/a><\/p>\n

(b<\/span>) the medical expenses;<\/a><\/p>\n

(c<\/span>) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and<\/a><\/p>\n

(d<\/span>) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under S. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force.<\/a><\/p>\n

(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed.<\/a><\/p>\n

(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.<\/p>\n

(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-s. (1) to the parties to the application and to the in charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides.<\/a><\/p>\n

(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the order under sub-s. (1).<\/a><\/p>\n

(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order under sub-s. (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent<\/a>.<\/p>\n

5.<\/a> 22. Compensation orders<\/span>.— In addition to other reliefs as may be granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on an applications being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent.<\/a><\/p>\n

6.<\/a> Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, S. 18<\/a>.<\/p>\n

7.<\/a> Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, S. 19<\/a>.<\/p>\n

8.<\/a> Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, S. 21<\/a>.<\/p>\n

9.<\/a> 23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders<\/span>.—(1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper.<\/a><\/p>\n

(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Ss. 18, 19, 20, 21 or, as the case may be, S. 22 against the respondent<\/a>.<\/p>\n

10.<\/a> 26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings<\/span>.—(1) Any relief available under Ss. 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, Family Court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.<\/a><\/p>\n

(2) Any relief referred to in sub-s. (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.<\/a><\/p>\n

(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief<\/a>.<\/p>\n

11.<\/a> 36. Act not in derogation of any other law<\/span>.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in force<\/a>.<\/p>\n

12.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

13.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

14.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>, paras 2-8.<\/p>\n

15.<\/a> Shalu Ojha case<\/span>, (2015) 2 SCC 99, 106<\/a>.<\/p>\n

16.<\/a> Shalu Ojha case<\/span>, (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>, 106 and 107.<\/p>\n

17.<\/a> (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/a>.<\/p>\n

18.<\/a> Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 482<\/a>.<\/p>\n

19.<\/a> Constitution of India, Art. 227<\/a>.<\/p>\n

20.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

21.<\/a> 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>.<\/p>\n

22.<\/a> Yashaswini case<\/span>, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>, paras 2 and 3.<\/p>\n

23.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

24.<\/a> Yashaswini case<\/span>, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>, para 7.<\/p>\n

25.<\/a> (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/a>.<\/p>\n

26.<\/a> 1988 SCC OnLine Kar 202<\/a>.<\/p>\n

27.<\/a> Yashaswini case<\/span>, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>, paras 4 and 5.<\/p>\n

28.<\/a> Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 389<\/a>.<\/p>\n

29.<\/a> Yashaswini case<\/span>, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>, paras 16-18.<\/p>\n

30.<\/a> Yashaswini case<\/span>, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>, paras 16-18<\/a>.<\/p>\n

31.<\/a> 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 861<\/a>.<\/p>\n

32.<\/a> 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>.<\/p>\n

33.<\/a> 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6802<\/a>.<\/p>\n

34.<\/a> 1988 SCC OnLine Kar 202<\/a>.<\/p>\n

35.<\/a> K.M. Leelavathi case<\/span>, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 861<\/a>, para 9.<\/p>\n

36.<\/a> K.M. Leelavathi case<\/span>, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 861<\/a>, paras 9 and<\/a>.<\/p>\n

37.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

38.<\/a> K.M. Leelavathi case<\/span>, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 861<\/span>, paras 8 and 9.<\/p>\n

39.<\/a> 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 7234.<\/p>\n

40.<\/a> (2003) 2 SCC 412<\/a>.<\/p>\n

41.<\/a> 1968 SCC OnLine SC 71<\/a>.<\/p>\n

42.<\/a> (1996) 6 SCC 92<\/a>.<\/p>\n

43.<\/a> Bhanu Kiran<\/span> v. Rahul Khosla<\/span><\/span>, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 7234.<\/p>\n

44.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

45.<\/a> Bhanu Kiran<\/span> v. Rahul Khosla<\/span>, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 7234.<\/p>\n

46.<\/a> 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6055, para 6<\/a>.<\/p>\n

47.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

48.<\/a> Farsana P.S.<\/span>, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6055<\/a>, para 5.<\/p>\n

49.<\/a> Farsana P.S.<\/span>, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6055, para 6.<\/p>\n

50.<\/a> 2025 SCC OnLine SC 483.<\/p>\n

51.<\/a> 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1957<\/a>.<\/p>\n

52.<\/a> Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, S. 28<\/a>.<\/p>\n

53.<\/a> Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a>.<\/p>\n

54.<\/a> 28. Procedure<\/span>.— (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under Ss. 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under S. 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.<\/a><\/p>\n

(2) Nothing in sub-s. (1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under S. 12 or under sub-s. (2) of S. 23.<\/a><\/p>\n

55.<\/a> Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a>.<\/p>\n

56.<\/a> Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.<\/a><\/p>\n

57.<\/a> 26. When court may stay execution<\/span>.— (1) The court to which a decree has been sent for execution shall, upon sufficient cause being shown, stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time, to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the court by which the decree was passed, or to any court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decree or the execution thereof, for an order to stay execution, or for any other order relating to the decree or execution which might have been made by such court of first instance or appellate court if execution had been issued thereby, or if application for execution had been made thereto.<\/a><\/p>\n

(2) Where the property or person of the judgment-debtor has been seized under an execution, the Court which issued the execution may order the restitution of such property or the discharge of such person pending the result of the application<\/a>.<\/p>\n

58.<\/a> Stay by appellate court<\/span>.— (1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the appellate court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the appellate court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.<\/a><\/p>\n

Explanation<\/span>.— An order by the appellate court for the stay of execution of the decree shall be effective from the date of the communication of such order to the court of first instance, but an affidavit sworn by the appellant, based on his personal knowledge, stating that an order for the stay of execution of the decree has been made by the appellate court shall, pending the receipt from the appellate court of the order for the stay of execution or any order to the contrary, be acted upon by the court of first instance.<\/a><\/p>\n

(2) Stay by court which passed the decree<\/span>.— Where an application is made for stay of execution of an appealable decree before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing therefrom, the court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution to be stayed.<\/a><\/p>\n

(3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-r. (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the court making it is satisfied—<\/a><\/p>\n

(a<\/span>) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made;<\/a><\/p>\n

(b<\/span>) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and<\/a><\/p>\n

(c<\/span>) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him.<\/a><\/p>\n

(4) Subject to the provision of sub-r. (3), the court may make an ex parte order for stay of execution pending the hearing of the application.<\/a><\/p>\n

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-r. (3) of Rule 1, the court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree<\/a>.<\/p>\n

59.<\/a> 151. Saving of inherent powers of court<\/span>.— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court<\/a>.<\/p>\n

60.<\/a> 389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail<\/span>.— (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the appellate court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond:<\/a><\/p>\n

Provided that the appellate court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release:<\/a><\/p>\n

Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail.<\/a><\/p>\n

(2) The power conferred by this section on an appellate court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a court subordinate thereto.<\/a><\/p>\n

(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the court shall,—<\/a><\/p>\n

(i<\/span>) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years; or<\/a><\/p>\n

(ii<\/span>) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail,<\/a><\/p>\n

order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the appellate court under sub-s. (1); and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended.<\/a><\/p>\n

(4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced.<\/a><\/p>\n

61.<\/a> Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, S. 430<\/a>.<\/p>\n

62.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

63.<\/a> (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/a>.<\/p>\n

64.<\/a> Shalu Ojha case<\/span>, (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>, 106, para 20.<\/p>\n

65.<\/a> (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/a>.<\/p>\n

66.<\/a> Copyright Act, 1957, S. 31<\/a>.<\/p>\n

67.<\/a> Super Cassettes<\/span>, (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/a>, 493, para 1.<\/p>\n

68.<\/a> Super Cassettes<\/span>, (2012) 5 SCC 488, 494, para 4.<\/p>\n

69.<\/a> Super Cassettes<\/span>, (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/span>, 507, para 69.<\/p>\n

70.<\/a> Super Cassettes<\/span>, (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/a>, 508-510, paras 71-86.<\/p>\n

71.<\/a> (2021) 7 SCC 209<\/a>.<\/p>\n

72.<\/a> (2012) 5 SCC 488<\/a>.<\/p>\n

73.<\/a> S.D. Joshi<\/span> v. High Court of Bombay<\/span>, (2011) 1 SCC 252<\/a>, 269, para 30.<\/p>\n

74.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>.<\/p>\n

75.<\/a> Secunderabad Club<\/span> v. CIT<\/span>, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004<\/a>, para 21.<\/p>\n

76.<\/a> Secunderabad Club<\/span>, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004<\/a>, para 14.<\/p>\n

77.<\/a> Shalu Ojha case<\/span>, (2015) 2 SCC 99<\/a>, 106, para 20.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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Therefore, passing of an interim order of the nature as defined under Section 19 of the Act is well within the jurisdiction of a Magistrate.\u201d","rel":"","context":"In "Case Briefs"","block_context":{"text":"Case Briefs","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/category\/casebriefs\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/03\/Jammu-and-Kashmir-and-Ladakh-High-Court.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/03\/Jammu-and-Kashmir-and-Ladakh-High-Court.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/03\/Jammu-and-Kashmir-and-Ladakh-High-Court.webp?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/03\/Jammu-and-Kashmir-and-Ladakh-High-Court.webp?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":165054,"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2017\/10\/25\/maintenance-domestic-violence-act-paid-addition-not-substitution-maintenance-awarded-s-125-cr-pc\/","url_meta":{"origin":344254,"position":1},"title":"Maintenance under Domestic Violence Act to be paid in addition to and not in substitution of maintenance awarded under S. 125 Cr PC","author":"Saba","date":"October 25, 2017","format":false,"excerpt":"Bombay High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Dr. Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, J. heard a case involving counter-petitions filed by both the parties to the matrimonial proceedings. The issue before the Court was \u201cwhether the order of maintenance passed in the proceedings filed under Section 125 of CrPC is to\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Case Briefs"","block_context":{"text":"Case Briefs","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/category\/casebriefs\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Bombay-HC.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Bombay-HC.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Bombay-HC.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Bombay-HC.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Bombay-HC.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":198240,"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2018\/07\/07\/prima-facie-case-of-domestic-violence-is-necessary-for-ordering-interim-maintenance-under-s-23-of-dv-act\/","url_meta":{"origin":344254,"position":2},"title":"Prima facie case of domestic violence is necessary for ordering interim maintenance under Section 23 of DV Act","author":"Bhumika Indulia","date":"July 7, 2018","format":false,"excerpt":"Himachal Pradesh High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. dismissed a criminal revision petition that was filed against the order of the Sessions Judge wherein he reversed the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate granting maintenance to the petitioner under Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The petitioner\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Case Briefs"","block_context":{"text":"Case Briefs","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/category\/casebriefs\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/11\/Himachal-HC_1.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/11\/Himachal-HC_1.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/11\/Himachal-HC_1.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/11\/Himachal-HC_1.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/11\/Himachal-HC_1.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":343965,"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2025\/03\/20\/paradox-of-the-protection-order\/","url_meta":{"origin":344254,"position":3},"title":"Paradox of the Protection Order","author":"Bhumika Indulia","date":"March 20, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"by Vilasini Balasubramanian*","rel":"","context":"In "Op Eds"","block_context":{"text":"Op Eds","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/category\/op-ed\/legal-analysis\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"Paradox of the Protection Order","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Paradox-of-the-Protection-Order.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Paradox-of-the-Protection-Order.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Paradox-of-the-Protection-Order.webp?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/Paradox-of-the-Protection-Order.webp?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":308496,"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2023\/12\/06\/delhi-hc-focus-of-domestic-violence-act-to-provide-immediate-relief-to-victims-by-way-of-maintenance-legal-news\/","url_meta":{"origin":344254,"position":4},"title":"Domestic Violence Act focuses on providing immediate relief to victims through maintenance, not Imprisonment for non-payment of maintenance: Delhi High Court","author":"Editor","date":"December 6, 2023","format":false,"excerpt":"\u201cThe Domestic Violence Act was enacted to offer certain civil remedies to the victims of domestic violence. These remedies encompass an array of protective measures, residence orders, and monetary reliefs, designed to address the multifaceted nature of abuse.\u201d","rel":"","context":"In "Case Briefs"","block_context":{"text":"Case Briefs","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/category\/casebriefs\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"delhi high court","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/delhi-high-court.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/delhi-high-court.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/delhi-high-court.webp?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/delhi-high-court.webp?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":352674,"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2025\/07\/07\/inherent-powers-dv-act-interim-order-kerala-high-court\/","url_meta":{"origin":344254,"position":5},"title":"No Scope for inherent powers to interfere with interim orders passed under DV Act without manifest illegality: Kerala High Court","author":"Apoorva","date":"July 7, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"\u201cAs far as the present case is concerned, the interim order passed by the Magistrate cannot be said to be gross illegality or irregularity. The petitioner could very well approach the same court seeking order, modifying or vacating the aforesaid order if there are sufficient reasons. That apart, appeal is\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Case Briefs"","block_context":{"text":"Case Briefs","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/category\/casebriefs\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"inherent powers DV Act","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/inherent-powers-DV-Act.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/inherent-powers-DV-Act.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/inherent-powers-DV-Act.webp?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/inherent-powers-DV-Act.webp?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]}],"amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/344254","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8808"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=344254"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/344254\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/344255"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=344254"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=344254"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=344254"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}