{"id":340311,"date":"2025-02-02T13:00:03","date_gmt":"2025-02-02T07:30:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=340311"},"modified":"2025-02-02T15:07:14","modified_gmt":"2025-02-02T09:37:14","slug":"supreme-court-roundup-january-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2025\/02\/02\/supreme-court-roundup-january-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme Court Roundup January 2025 | Stories on Toilets in Courts; Royalty on Brick Earth; Misuse of S. 306 IPC; Tahir Hussain\u2019s bail plea; Scope of HCs Jurisdiction; and more"},"content":{"rendered":"
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ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION<\/h2>\n

Limitation for filing S. 17<\/a> application under Arbitration Act, 1940<\/a> begins from awareness of award’s availability, not receipt of copy, reaffirmed<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed against the order passed by the Delhi High Court, wherein the Court affirmed the District Court’s decision to declare the appellant’s application for making of the award as premature because it was filed before the commencement of the limitation period for filing objection against the award, the division bench of Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta, JJ. set aside the impugned order and directed the District Judge to take up and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of five months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The Court reaffirmed that the date of receiving the copy of the award is not the relevant trigger for limitation, but rather the point at which the party becomes aware of its availability. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

‘Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat purpose of 1996 Act’; Narrow scope of appellate court’s power under S. 37 reiterated<\/p>\n

In a civil appeal against the Delhi High Court’s decision allowing the respondent- National Highways Authority of India’s (‘NHAI’) appeal under Section 37<\/a> of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a> (‘the 1996 Act’) and setting aside the Single Judge’s view, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision. The Bench restored the Arbitral Tribunal’s award holding that the Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted Clause 51 in a reasonable manner based on the evidence on record and this interpretation was affirmed by the Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Bench held that the Division Bench of the High Court was not at all justified in setting aside the arbitral award exercising extremely limited jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act by merely using expressions like ‘opposed to the public policy of India’, ‘patent illegality’ and ‘shocking the conscience of the court’. The Court reiterated that it is necessary to remind the Courts that a great deal of restraint is required to be shown while examining the validity of an arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly or substantially, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat the very purpose of the 1996 Act. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

CRIMINAL LAW<\/h2>\n

Abetment To Suicide<\/p>\n

Section 306 IPC | Hyperboles employed in exchanges should not be glorified as an instigation to commit suicide<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal challenging the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court declining the appellant’s prayer to discharge him from the offences punishable under Section 306<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a>; the Abhay S. Oka and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ., took strict note of casual resorting of Section 306 by the Police. The Court said that while the persons involved in genuine cases where the high threshold under Section 306 is met should not be spared; the provision should not be deployed against individuals, only to assuage the immediate feelings of the distraught family of the deceased. The conduct of the proposed accused and the deceased, their interactions and conversations preceding the unfortunate death of the deceased should be approached from a practical point of view and not divorced from day-to-day realities of life. Hyperboles employed in exchanges should not, without anything more, be glorified as an instigation to commit suicide. “It is time the investigating agencies are sensitised to the law laid down by this Court under Section 306 so that persons are not subjected to the abuse of process of a totally untenable prosecution”. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Acquittal<\/p>\n

Trial Court’s decision acquitting 3 Constables in 20-year-old Murder case, upheld<\/p>\n

In a set of two criminal appeals against Uttarakhand High Court’s decisions, whereby the High Court confirmed the Head Constable’s conviction and sentence for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’) and Section 27(1)<\/a> of the Arms Act, 1959<\/a> (‘Arms Act’) and allowed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of constables for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the Division Bench of BR Gavai and Augustine George Masih, JJ. allowed the appeal and upheld the Trial Court’s decision. The Bench set aside the High Court’s decision reiterating that the prosecution failed to place any evidence to show that the three Constables had a common intention with the Head Constable to shoot the deceased. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Cognizance of FIR\/ Complaint<\/p>\n

‘Non-mentioning of vital facts of assault or criminal force in FIR\/ Complaint would vitiate cognizance taken by CJM’; SC quashes proceedings under S. 353 & 186 of IPC<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against a decision of Allahabad High Court, wherein the accused person’s plea for quashing of the chargesheet and order taking cognizance and issuing summons along with the proceedings for an alleged offence under Sections 353<\/a> and 186<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’), was rejected, the Division Bench of B.V. Nagarathna and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decisions. The Court quashed the case pending before CJM holding that non-mentioning of vital facts in the FIR\/first complaint, which would indicate assault or criminal force within the scope of Section 353 of the IPC, would vitiate the cognizance taken by the CJM. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Bail<\/p>\n

Explained | Supreme Court’s split verdict on AIMIM member Tahir Hussain’s interim bail plea to contest Delhi Assembly Elections<\/p>\n

While deliberating over the instant petition filed by politician Tahir Hussain, who is in custody in connection with several cases including offences under PMLA Act, rioting and murder, had sought interim bail for the purposes of contesting in upcoming Legislative Assembly Elections for NCT of Delhi; the Bench of Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ., delivered a split verdict in this regard. While Mithal, J., opined that interim bail is not permissible for the purposes of contesting elections, much less for campaigning; Amanullah, J., on the other hand deemed the petitioner eligible to be enlarged on conditional bail for limited period. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

[Foreigners Act] SC says no to impleading Registration Officer in foreigner’s bail plea; Directs for informing Registration Officer, if bail is granted<\/p>\n

In a set of two criminal appeals, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. answered the issue that whether it is necessary to implead a Foreign Registration Officer appointed under Rule 3 of the Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1992 (‘the Rules’) in the bail application filed by a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946<\/a> (‘the Act’) in negative. The Bench opined that while releasing a foreigner on bail, the Court should direct the investigating agency or the State, as the case may be, to immediately inform the concerned Registration Officer appointed under Rule 3 of the Rules about the grant of bail so that the Registration Officer can bring the fact of the grant of bail to the notice of Civil Authority concerned. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

[MCOCA] SC sets aside bail granted without considering embargo placed by special statute; remands matter to HC for fresh consideration<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal by the deceased’s widow against the grant of bail to accused persons 1 and 2 for offences punishable under Sections 320<\/a>, 120-B<\/a>, 201<\/a>, and 212<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’), Section 3<\/a>\/25<\/a> of the Arms Act, 1959<\/a>; Section 37(1)(3)<\/a> read with Section 135<\/a> of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951<\/a> and Sections 3(1)(ii)<\/a>, 3(2)<\/a> and 3(4)<\/a> of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999<\/a> (‘MCOCA’), the Division Bench of CT Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ. allowing the appeal, remanded the bail application for offence under MCOCA for fresh consideration by the Bombay High Court. Read more HERE<\/a><\/p>\n

S. 306 IPC | Anticipatory bail granted to wife accused of abetting husband’s suicide<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision, whereby the anticipatory bail application of the accused-wife for offence under Section 306<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’) was dismissed, the Division Bench of Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. allowed the plea for anticipatory bail noting that the accused-wife had joined the investigation and that she was not required for further investigation. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Conviction<\/p>\n

Conviction of two brothers turned from S. 302 to S. 304 Part I of IPC in 23-year-old co-villager’s murder case<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against a decision of the Chhattisgarh High Court, whereby the conviction and sentence imposed upon the present two convicts under Section 302 read with Section 34<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’) was upheld, and the third accused (father of convicts) was acquitted, the Three-Judge Bench of BR Gavai, KV Viswanathan and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. partly allowed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s view that there was no patent illegality in the Trial Court’s decision. However, the Court converted their conviction to under Part I of Section 304 of the IPC. The Court said that the fact that the father of the convicts was acquitted would not warrant their acquittal as there was sufficient and cogent material evidence against them to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Man’s conviction under S. 498A IPC and S. 4 of DP Act in 19-year-old dowry case, confirmed; sentence reduced to time served in custody<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against Madras High Court’s decision, whereby the accused person’s conviction for offence under Section 498-A<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’) and Section 4<\/a> of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961<\/a> (‘DP Act), was confirmed, the Division Bench of KV Viswanathan and SVN Bhatti, JJ. partly allowed the appeal, while sustaining the conviction for the offences mentioned above. However, the Bench set aside the High Court’s decision to the extent of imposing and modifying the sentence, considering that the case went along for nearly 19 years and that the accused had already undergone custody for three months. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Crimes Against Women and Children<\/p>\n

‘Application of force must be with intent to outrage modesty of woman’; Proceedings against man for offence under S. 354 and 506 IPC, quashed<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal assailing the Allahabad High Court’s judgment, whereby the accused person’s application under Section 482<\/a> of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/a> (‘CrPC’) to quash the chargesheet and proceedings for an offence under Section 354<\/a> and 506<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’) was allowed, the Division Bench of CT Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ. held that the sum total of the circumstances, submissions and documents on record, did not point to the committal of any offence against the complainant. Hence, the Court set aside the impugned judgement of the High Court of Judicature and resultantly, the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR were also quashed qua the present accused person. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

‘Filthy language’ examined in isolation without any context indicating intention to insult modesty, doesn’t fall under S. 506 IPC<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal challenging Karnataka High Court’s decision refusing to quash chargesheet filed against the appellants for offences under Sections 323<\/a>, 504<\/a>, 506<\/a>, 509<\/a>, and 511<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> and for allegedly using filthy language against the complainant; the Division Bench of Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ., explained that in the instant case it will be essential for the Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman. The Court pointed out that the term “filthy language,” when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Juvenile<\/p>\n

“Consistent failure of judicial machinery to recognise and act upon plea of juvenility”; Convict directed to be released after 25 years in prison<\/p>\n

While deliberating over the instant case wherein the Division Bench of M.M Sundresh and Aravind Kumar, JJ., observed grave injustice that had been perpetrated on account of consistent failure on part of the judicial machinery to recognise and act upon the constitutional mandate vis-a-vis the plea of juvenility in the instant case and allowed the appeal and set aside the appellant’s sentence imposed in excess of the upper limit for commission of culpable homicide amounting to murder in 1994. In the instant case, the Court found that the appellant had undergone imprisonment for almost 25 years, during which time, the society has undergone significant transformation which the Appellant might be unaware of and find difficult to adjust with. Therefore, the Court directed the Uttarakhand State Legal Services Authority to play a proactive role in identifying any welfare scheme of the State\/Central Government, facilitating the Appellant’s rehabilitation and smooth reintegration into the society upon his release, with particular emphasis on his right to livelihood, shelter and sustenance guaranteed under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Quashing of Proceedings\/ FIR<\/p>\n

‘High Court can quash proceedings using power either under Art. 226 or under S. 482 of CrPC’; SC reiterates while quashing FIR against foreign national<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against a decision of Allahabad High Court, refusing to quash the First Information Report (FIR), the Division Bench of CT Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ. held that the High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR, as the FIR did not disclose the commission of the offence as alleged. The Bench added that besides the vague allegations, the rest of them, even if taken as true, did not disclose the commission of any offence and made out a case against, the present accused. Thus, allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the impugned decision along with the subject FIR. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

‘Acts of accused were too remote and indirect to constitute offence under S. 306 IPC’; Proceedings against mother accused of abetting suicide of son’s girlfriend, quashed<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against Calcutta High Court’s decision, whereby the chargesheet for offence under Section 306<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’) against the other two accused persons was quashed, while the present applicant’s (‘accused’) plea for quashing the chargesheet was rejected, the Division Bench of BV Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s decision to the extent of refusing to quash the chargesheet qua the present accused. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

‘Non-mentioning of vital facts of assault or criminal force in FIR\/ Complaint, would vitiate cognizance taken by CJM’; Proceedings under S. 353 & 186 of IPC, quashed<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against a decision of Allahabad High Court, wherein the accused person’s plea for quashing of the chargesheet and order taking cognizance and issuing summons along with the proceedings for an alleged offence under Sections 353<\/a> and 186<\/a> of the Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’), was rejected, the Division Bench of B.V. Nagarathna and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decisions. The Court quashed the case pending before CJM holding that non-mentioning of vital facts in the FIR\/first complaint, which would indicate assault or criminal force within the scope of Section 353 of the IPC, would vitiate the cognizance taken by the CJM. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

NDPS<\/h2>\n

‘No bar under NDPS Act on interim release of seized vehicle’; Truck ordered to be released from seizure for transporting 24.8 gm heroin<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against Gauhati High Court’s decision, whereby, the appellant truck owner had sought release of his vehicle which was seized by the police on recovery of heroin after his application was dismissed by Trial Court, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol and Manmohan, JJ. allowed the appeal and directed the Trial Court to release the vehicle in question in the interim on superdari after preparing a video and still photographs of the vehicle and after obtaining all information\/documents necessary for identification of the vehicle, which shall be authenticated by the Investigating Officer, owner of the Vehicle and accused by signing the same. Further, the Court directed that the appellant shall not sell or part with the ownership of the vehicle till conclusion of the trial and shall furnish an undertaking to the Trial Court that he shall surrender the vehicle within one week of being so directed and\/or pay the value of the vehicle (determined according to Income Tax law on the date of its release), if so ultimately directed by the Court. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE<\/h2>\n

Private complaint allowed for offence of false evidence before a Tribunal, considered as the only remedy<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against the Calcutta High Court’s decision on an application filed by the accused-respondent under Section 482<\/a> of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/a> (‘CrPC’), declining to grant relief to the appellant for allowing his private complaint for alleged offences under Section 193, 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) before a Tribunal, on grounds that such a complaint under CrPC can only be made on directions of the Court concerned, the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. allowed the appeal and held that the only way out available for the appellant was to file a private complaint. Therefore, the Court set aside the High Court’s decision and directed the Tribunal to entertain the private complaint. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Legitimacy determines paternity under Section 112 Evidence Act, until the presumption is rebutted by proving ‘non-access’<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal challenging the decision of Kerala High Court wherein it had held that the legitimacy of birth was irrelevant when considering the right of the child to receive maintenance from their biological father; the Division Bench of Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ., set aside the impugned decision of the High Court and held that legitimacy determines paternity under Section 112<\/a> of the Evidence Act, 1872<\/a>, until the presumption is successfully rebutted by proving ‘non-access’. The Court also clarified that an ‘additional’ access or ‘multiple’ access does not automatically negate the access between the spouses and prove non-access thereof. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Section 319 CrPC | Person can be summoned to face trial even if police does not name him as an accused in chargesheet<\/p>\n

In a criminal petition against the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision, rejecting the criminal revision application and affirming the Trial Court’s decision summoning the accused persons herein to face trial for murder, the Division Bench of JB Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ., dismissed the petition and upheld the High Court’s decision. The Court held that the Trial Court has undoubted jurisdiction to add any person not being the accused before it to face the trial along with other accused persons, if the Court is satisfied at any stage of the proceedings on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

CBI doesn’t require State Govt’s consent to register FIR under Central Law against Central Govt employee posted within State<\/p>\n

In a set of two criminal appeals by the Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’) assailing the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s judgments for quashing of proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988<\/a> (‘PC Act’), the Division Bench of CT Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, JJ. allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned decision reiterating that the CBI does not require permission from the State Government to register an FIR under the Central Legislation against a Central Government employee. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

PRISONS, PRISONERS AND PROBATION OF OFFENDERS<\/h2>\n

State of Jharkhand directed to formulate Jail Manual incorporating provisions of Model Prison Manual, 2016<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeal by the State against final order of the High Court quashing the memo issued by Inspector General of Prisons, Ranchi, making intra-State transfer of the respondent from Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narayan Central Jail, Hazaribagh, to Central Jail, Dumka, within Jharkhand; the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ., reiterated the call for prison reforms for creating a better environment and prison culture to ensure the prisoners enjoy their right to dignified life under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>. The Court pointed out that there is no clear-cut picture regarding prison administration and the facilities available to the prisoners in the prisons in the State of Jharkhand. Therefore, the Court directed State of Jharkhand to formulate or expedite the formulation of a Jail Manual incorporating the applicable provisions of the 2016 Model Prison Manual, for effective prison administration and ensure its strict compliance by the prison authorities. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Benefit under Probation of Offenders Act granted to 70-yr-old involved in armed clash following family feud<\/p>\n

In a criminal appeal against the Rajasthan High Court’s decision, whereby, the convict’s plea for setting aside his conviction was partly allowed, the Division Bench of B.V. Nagarathna and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. allowed the appeal by directing the release of the convict, extending the benefit of Section 4<\/a> of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958<\/a>, considering that a similar benefit was granted to the other accused persons in the cross-case and that a settlement was reached between the parties and neither any criminal antecedents nor any adverse material against the conduct of the convict was present. The Court directed the convict to execute a personal bond of Rs.10,000\/- with surety of like amount for six months with the undertaking that he will maintain peace and good conduct in the society, and that he will not repeat the crime and will appear at his own expense to face punishment when called by the Court. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Section 174A IPC is an independent and substantive offence that can continue despite extinguishment of proclamation under Section 82 CrPC<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed against the judgment and order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, whereby under Section 482<\/a> of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a> (‘CrPC’) the Court refused to quash complaint case, summoning order; and order declaring the accused a proclaimed offender passed by the Judicial Magistrate, the division bench of C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ. while setting aside the impugned judgment held that Section 174-A<\/a> of Penal code, 1860<\/a> (‘IPC’) is an independent, substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82 CrPC is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

MAINTANABILITY<\/h2>\n

SC 5-Judge Bench to decide if writ under Art. 226 would be maintainable against an order passed by Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council<\/p>\n

While considering the instant matter wherein the Court had to consider whether a writ petition under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> would be maintainable against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) in exercise of power under Section 18<\/a> of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006<\/a> (MSMED Act) and if yes, then under what circumstances; the 3-Judge Bench of Sanjiv Khanna, CJ., Sanjay Kumar and Manmohan, JJ., deemed it fit to refer the matter to a larger bench of 5 Judges. The Court identified the following issues to be determined by a larger Bench: Whether the ratio in India Glycols Limited v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Medchal — Malkajgiri, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1852<\/a>, that a writ petition could never be entertained against any order\/award of the MSEFC, completely bars or prohibits maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court? If the bar\/prohibition is not absolute, when and under what circumstances will the principle\/restriction of adequate alternative remedy not apply? Whether the members of MSEFC who undertake conciliation proceedings, upon failure, can themselves act as arbitrators of the arbitral tribunal in terms of Section 18 of the MSMED Act read with Section 80 of the A&C Act? Read more HERE<\/a><\/p>\n

GIFT DEED<\/h2>\n

Supreme Court quashes gift deed executed by elderly mother in favour of son due to non-compliance with maintenance obligations under MWPSC Act<\/p>\n

In an appeal filed against the judgment and order passed by Madhya Pradesh High Court, wherein the Single Judge affirmed the judgment passed by the Collector and the SDM allowing the application filed by the appellant mother under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens MWPSC Act, 2007 (‘MWPSC Act,’) seeking setting aside of Gift deed dated 09-09-2019, the division bench of C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ. set the gift deed executed by a mother in favour of her son after conditions for her maintenance were not complied with. Further, directed the possession of the premises to be restored to the appellant by 28-02-2025. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

HERITAGE<\/h2>\n

SC directs Defence Colony RWA to handover heritage site Gumti of Shaikh Ali’s possession to Ministry of Urban Affairs<\/p>\n

While considering the instant matter revolving around unauthorised occupation of site known as the Gumti of Shaikh Ali by the Defence Colony Resident Welfare Association (Respondent 4); the Division Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ., directed Respondent 4 to handover the peaceful possession of the site to the concerned officer in Land and Development Office, Ministry of Urban Affairs, Government of India. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS<\/h2>\n

Proviso to S. 31(4) IBC mandatory in nature; 2:1 verdict holding AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan for HNGIL unsustainable<\/p>\n

While considering the instant appeals revolving around Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of the Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL) and set of appeals arising out of the NCLAT order dated 28-07-2023, pertaining to the approval accorded to the combination between HNGIL and AGI Greenpac; the 3- Judge Bench of Hrishikesh Roy, Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N Bhatti, JJ., with a ratio of 2:1 held that the statutory provision and legislative intent unequivocally affirm the mandatory nature of the proviso to Section 31(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The majority opined that for a Resolution Plan containing a combination, the CCI’s approval to the Resolution Plan must be obtained before and consequently, the Committee of Creditors’ (CoC) examination and approval should be only after the CCI’s decision. This interpretation respects the original legislative intent, and deviation from the same would not only undermine the statute but would also erode the faith posed by the stakeholders in the integrity of the legal and regulatory framework. The majority thus held that AGI Greenpac’s Resolution Plan is unsustainable as it failed to secure prior approval from the CCI, as mandated under the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. Consequently, the approval granted by the CoC to the Resolution Plan dated 28-10-2022 without the requisite CCI approval, cannot be sustained. Justice S.V.N Bhatti expressed his dissent in the matter. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

LABOUR LAW<\/p>\n

Union directed to constitute Committee to consider legal framework for benefit, protection & regulation of domestic workers’ rights<\/p>\n

In a set of two criminal appeals preferred by the accused and the State against Uttarakhand High Court’s decisions for compounding and quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused\/ appellant, and allowing the co-accused’s application for discharge from allegations of wrongfully confining and trafficking of a female domestic worker—the complainant, the Division Bench of Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. allowed the accused’s appeal and set aside the High Court’s decision considering that no prima facie offence under Section 370 and Section 343 of the IPC was made out, as there was no evidence of neglect or exploitation of the complainant. The Bench also dismissed the State’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision discharging the co-accused. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

PwD<\/h2>\n

SC issues directions on availability of toilet facilities for males\/females\/PwD\/transpersons in all Court premises<\/p>\n

While considering the instant petition seeking Writ of Mandamus directing all the States and Union Territories to ensure that basic toilet facilities are made available in all Courts\/ Tribunals in the Country for men, women and handicapped persons including transgenders, and to provide and maintain urinals and similar conveniences at appropriate locations in every Court premises and to construct public toilets and public conveniences in all the Courts\/ Tribunals and the same should be identifiable and accessible by the advocates\/ litigants\/ court staff etc. for men and women, transgender persons and to provide amenities for persons with disabilities and maintain the same; the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ., issued directions. Read more HERE<\/a><\/p>\n

RESERVATIONS IN ADMISSION\/ EDUCATION LAW<\/h2>\n

Domicile\/residence-based reservation in admission to PG Medical Courses within State quota is impermissible<\/p>\n

In a significant decision, the 3-Judge Bench of Hrishikesh Roy, Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N Bhatti, JJ., while deliberating over whether residence-based reservation in Postgraduate (PG) Medical Courses by a State is constitutionally valid, held that, considering the importance of specialist doctors’ in PG Medical Course, reservation at the higher level based on ‘residence’ would be violative of Article 14<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

ROYALTY<\/h2>\n

‘Litigant cannot claim negative discrimination seeking direction to department to act in violation of statutory Rules’; SC rejects retired peon’s plea for promotion to Tracer post<\/p>\n

In a civil appeal against Orissa High Court’s decision, setting aside the decision of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar (‘Tribunal’) directing for promotion of the present appellant to the post of Tracer from Peon, the Division Bench of JK Maheshwari and Rajesh Bindal, JJ., dismissed the appeal stating that the post of Tracer, not being promotional post from the post of Peon, there was no merit in the claim. Read more HERE<\/a><\/p>\n

State Government can levy royalty on production and disposal of brick earth being a minor mineral<\/p>\n

In a batch of civil appeals, against Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision, allowing the appeal of the present respondents, holding that mere declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral, no rights were vested in the State Government to levy royalty, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s decision and restored the Trial Court’s decree dismissing the respondents’ suit. The Court held that once it was accepted that brick earth was a minor mineral under the Mineral Rules, the State Government had the right to levy royalty on the production and disposal of minor minerals. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

JURISDICTION OF HC<\/h2>\n

SC stays proceedings before Karnataka HC deciding HC’s jurisdiction to decide election dispute questioning caste of a returned candidate<\/p>\n

While considering the instant petition filed against a decision of Karnataka High Court in G. Swamy v. B. Devendrappa1, wherein it had held that the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments, etc.) Act, 1990, does not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court, to decide an election dispute questioning the caste of a returned candidate to the Legislative Assembly; the Division Bench of Surya Kant and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ., put a stay on further proceedings in G. Swamy (supra). Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

SERVICE LAW<\/h2>\n

‘Government officials stooped too low to punish a senior doctor on the verge of retirement’; SC sets aside penalty of 2% pension cut imposed in disciplinary action<\/p>\n

In a civil appeal against Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision giving partial relief to the appellant by modifying the punishment from the penalty of a 2% pension cut with cumulative\/permanent effect to a 2% pension cut for 5 years whereafter the appellant would be made entitled to a full pension, for alleged misconduct and taking unsanctioned leave, the Division Bench of Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision. The Bench said that there was no record of the Civil Surgeon’s refusal to sanction leave being communicated to the appellant. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Know Thy Judges<\/h2>\n