{"id":328734,"date":"2024-08-15T10:00:05","date_gmt":"2024-08-15T04:30:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=328734"},"modified":"2024-08-15T11:15:08","modified_gmt":"2024-08-15T05:45:08","slug":"independence-day-2024-trailblazing-judgments-legislations-and-policies-viksit-bharat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2024\/08\/15\/independence-day-2024-trailblazing-judgments-legislations-and-policies-viksit-bharat\/","title":{"rendered":"Independence Day 2024: Celebrating Trailblazing Judgments, Legislations and Policies – Charting the path to ‘Viksit Bharat’"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

The Viksit Bharat Vision was introduced by the Government of India in 2023, setting a target to achieve the goal of a ‘Developed India’ by the hundredth Independence Day in 2047. 78 years into the age of an independent India, we look back on the legal developments the country has witnessed till date, by commemorating and briefly visiting the most notable judgments, legislations, and policies that were instrumental in shaping the India of today, and that still lend support in transforming this vision of Viksit Bharat into a reality.<\/p>\n

JUDGMENTS<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228<\/a><\/p>\n

    The Preventive Detention Act, 1950<\/a> was held to be a valid law except Section 14 being ultra vires to Article 22(5) insofar as it prevents the grounds from being disclosed to the Court.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 436<\/a><\/p>\n

    The right to circulation is a part of freedom of the press. The law restricting circulation of any document or publication is violative of Article 19(1)(a) unless saved by Article 19(2).<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, 1951 SCC 966<\/a><\/p>\n

    The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 inserting Articles 31A and 31B was held to be not ultra vires.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 25<\/a><\/p>\n

    The Constitutional validity of the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act, 1964<\/a>, which aimed to secure the constitutional validity of several land acquisition laws inserted in the 9th<\/span> Scheduled was upheld. It was held that Constitutional Amendment is not a “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2).<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    Berubari Union (I), Re, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 23<\/a><\/p>\n

    The power to cede national territory is included in the power to amend Article 1<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  6. \n

    Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 14<\/a><\/p>\n

    Overruling Sajjan Singh, it was held that “law” includes Constitutional Amendment.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  7. \n

    Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248<\/a><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. \n

      Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970<\/a> was within the legislative competence of the Parliament;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    2. \n

      It made hostile discrimination against the named banks in that it prohibits the named banks from carrying on banking business, whereas other Banks — Indian and Foreign — were permitted to carry on banking business, and even new Banks may be formed which may engage in banking business;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    3. \n

      It restricted the named banks from carrying on business other than banking as defined in Section 5(b)<\/a> of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949<\/a>; and<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    4. \n

      The Act violates the guarantee of compensation under Article 31(2) in that it provides for giving certain amounts determined according to principles which are not relevant in the determination of compensation of the undertaking of the named banks and by the method prescribed the amounts so declared cannot be regarded as compensation.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n

    5. \n

      K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 780<\/a><\/p>\n

      Classification of films into two categories of ‘U’<\/span> films and ‘A’<\/span> films is a reasonable classification. It is also for this reason that motion pictures must be regarded differently from other forms of speech and expression. A person reading a book or other writing or hearing a speech or viewing a painting or sculpture is not so deeply stirred as by seeing a motion picture. Therefore, the treatment of the latter on a different footing is also a valid classification.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    6. \n

      Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225<\/a><\/p>\n

      Under Article 368<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>, the Parliament cannot alter the Basic Structure of the Constitution<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    7. \n

      E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3<\/a><\/p>\n

      Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    8. \n

      Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717<\/a><\/p>\n

      The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice has been conferred on religious and linguistic minorities. Every section of the public, the majority as well as minority has rights in respect of religion as contemplated in Articles 25 and 26 and rights in respect of language, script, culture as contemplated in Article 29. The whole object of conferring the right on minorities under Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between the majority and the minority. If the minorities do not have such special protection they will be denied equality.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    9. \n

      ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521<\/a> [Habeas Corpus Case]<\/p>\n

      In view of the Presidential Order dated 27-6-1975 under Article 359(1)<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> no person has locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a person detained under the Act on the grounds that the order of detention or the continued detention is for any reason not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or mala fide.<\/p>\n

      H.R. Khanna, J., (Dissenting): Article 21 cannot be considered to be the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty. Even in the absence of Article 21<\/a> in the Constitution<\/a>, the State has got no power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty without the authority of law. That is the essential postulate and basic assumption of the rule of law in every civilised society.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    10. \n

      Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248<\/a><\/p>\n

      “Law” in Article 21 affecting Personal Liberty, must satisfy the test of one or more of the rights under Article 19 and the test of reasonableness under Article 14. “Procedure’ under Article 21 cannot be arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    11. \n

      Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684<\/a><\/p>\n

      Death Penalty must be given only in the Rarest of the Rare cases.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    12. \n

      Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625<\/a><\/p>\n

      Articles 368(4) and (5) as introduced by the 42nd<\/span> Amendment, was declared unconstitutional for damaging the Basic Structure. Further held that, Directive Principles of State Policy cannot have primacy over Fundamental Rights.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    13. \n

      Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556<\/a><\/p>\n

      Section 125, CrPC is secular in nature and not in conflict with any religion or personal law. There is no question of conflict vis-a-vis a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for his divorced wife. Right of a divorced Muslim woman to claim maintenance is not affected by personal law.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    14. \n

      Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545<\/a><\/p>\n

      Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> includes the Right to Livelihood.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    15. \n

      Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615<\/a><\/p>\n

      Expulsion of the three children from the school for not singing the National Anthem, because of their conscientiously held religious faith, though they stood up respectfully when the Anthem was sung, was a violation of their fundamental right “to freedom of conscience and freely to profess, practise and propagate religion”.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    16. \n

      M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram – Oleum Gas), (1987) 1 SCC 395<\/a><\/p>\n

      It was held that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, then such enterprise is Strictly and Absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands<\/span> v. Fletcher.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    17. \n

      Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 4 SCC 373<\/a><\/p>\n

      Prisoners are entitled to rights under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    18. \n

      Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217<\/a><\/p>\n

      Multiple questions surrounding Caste Based Reservations were discussed and answered. The Court stated that Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the subject of reservation in favour of backward class of citizens; Neither the Constitution nor the law prescribes the procedure or method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the authority appointed to identify. Furthermore, Article 16(4) does not permit provision for reservations in the matter of promotion.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    19. \n

      Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645<\/a><\/p>\n

      The citizens of India have a fundamental Right to Education. The said right flows from Article 21. This right is, however, not an absolute right. Its content and parameters have to be determined in the light of Articles 45 and 41. In other words every child\/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years. Thereafter his right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the State.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    20. \n

      Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441<\/a><\/p>\n

      Appointment of Judges- Initiation of the proposal for appointment in the case of the Supreme Court must be by the Chief Justice of India, and in the case of a High Court by the Chief Justice of that High Court; and for transfer of a Judge\/Chief Justice of a High Court, the proposal has to be initiated by the Chief Justice of India. In the event of conflicting opinions by the constitutional functionaries, the opinion of the judiciary ‘symbolised by the view of the Chief Justice of India’, has primacy.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    21. \n

      S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1:<\/a><\/p>\n

      ‘Secularism’ is a constitutional goal and a part of Basic Structure of the Constitution.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    22. \n

      Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648<\/a>:<\/p>\n

      there is no ground to hold that Section 309<\/a> of Penal Code, 1860<\/a> is constitutionally invalid. Right to Life does not include the right to die.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    23. \n

      People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301<\/a><\/p>\n

      Right to transmit telephone message or hold telephone conversation in privacy, forms part of Right to Privacy and is protected under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    24. \n

      L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261<\/a>:<\/p>\n

      Power of Judicial Review was held to be a Basic\/Essential feature of the Constitution.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    25. \n

      Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241<\/a><\/p>\n

      Women have rights to gender equality, to work with dignity and safe working environment protected from sexual harassment and abuse. Supreme Court framed Guidelines to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at workplaces, which came to be known as “Vishakha Guidelines<\/span>”<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    26. \n

      Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, Re, (1998) 7 SCC 739<\/a><\/p>\n

      Opinion of Chief Justice of India has primacy vis-a-vis appointment of puisne Judges of Supreme Court. Furthermore, it was held that Supreme Court Collegium should comprise of Chief Justice of India and 4 seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    27. \n

      Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1<\/a><\/p>\n

      By majority of 3:2, Talaq-e-Biddat popularly known as Triple Talaq was set aside.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    28. \n

      National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438<\/a><\/p>\n