{"id":310175,"date":"2023-12-26T17:00:21","date_gmt":"2023-12-26T11:30:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=310175"},"modified":"2024-01-03T18:13:45","modified_gmt":"2024-01-03T12:43:45","slug":"cal-hc-rejects-time-barred-claim-in-arbitration-dispute-over-alleged-failure-to-deliver-signed-copy-of-award-scc-blog","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2023\/12\/26\/cal-hc-rejects-time-barred-claim-in-arbitration-dispute-over-alleged-failure-to-deliver-signed-copy-of-award-scc-blog\/","title":{"rendered":"Calcutta High Court rejects time-barred claim in arbitration dispute over alleged failure to deliver signed copy of award"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Calcutta High Court:<\/span> In a petition filed by the petitioners seeking to set aside an award dated 30-12-2017, a single-judge bench comprising of Moushumi Bhattacharya,* J.<\/span>, rejected the respondent’s preliminary objection of petition being time-barred and held that there is insufficient material to prove the delivery of a signed copy of the award to the petitioner. The Court held that the balance of convenience favors the petitioner, who will have the opportunity to argue for setting aside the award and the respondent can continue enforcement proceedings until the petitioner takes appropriate measures to stay the award.<\/p>\n

Brief Facts<\/p>\n

The primary issue in the instant matter is the maintainability of the arbitration petition filed by the petitioners seeking to set aside an award dated 30-12-2017. The respondent contended that the petition is time-barred under section 34(3)<\/a> of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a> (the Act).<\/p>\n

Parties’ Contentions<\/p>\n

The respondent objected to the maintainability of the arbitration petition, citing it as time-barred under Section 34(3) of the Act. It was argued that the petition, filed on 11-10-2023, is barred by law as the 90-day period expired on 16-04-2018, and the additional 30 days expired on 16-05-2018. The respondent asserted that documents and communications sent to the petitioner’s address establish a presumption of deemed service under Section 3 of the Act, read with Section 27<\/a> of the General Clauses Act, 1897<\/a>, and Section 114<\/a> of the Evidence Act, 1872<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The petitioners claimed that they learned of the ex parte award only upon receiving the application for execution of the award in January 2023 and they did not receive any signed copy of the award to date. The petitioners argued that Section 31(5) of the Act mandates delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party, and since this has not been complied with, the limitation period under Section 34(3) has not started.<\/p>\n

Legal Considerations<\/p>\n