{"id":297998,"date":"2023-07-29T12:30:06","date_gmt":"2023-07-29T07:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=297998"},"modified":"2023-07-29T12:26:29","modified_gmt":"2023-07-29T06:56:29","slug":"whether-slp-under-art-136-against-ncdrc-order-be-entertained-sc-answers-legal-news","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2023\/07\/29\/whether-slp-under-art-136-against-ncdrc-order-be-entertained-sc-answers-legal-news\/","title":{"rendered":"Consumer Dispute| Supreme Court explains the scope of maintainability of SLP under Art 136 against NCDRC orders"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Supreme Court:<\/b> In a Special Leave Petition to appeal under Article 136<\/a> of the Constitution of India<\/a> by Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited (‘petitioner’) against the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (‘NCDRC’) order, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the order passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (‘SCDRC’) was affirmed, holding that the complainant\/respondent was entitled to receive the claim amount and appropriate compensation from the petitioner and its joint venture partner viz. Allahabad Bank for the goods stolen from the premises in question, the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala*<\/b> and Manoj Misra, JJ., dismissed the appeal and held that both the Acts, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986<\/a> and Consumer Protection Act, 2019<\/a> provide for the remedy of appeal to the Supreme Court only with respect to the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in its original jurisdiction or as the Court of first instance (original orders) and no further appeal lies against the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

Factual Matrix<\/h4>\n

In the matter at hand, the Allahabad Bank acting as an intermediary issued a Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy and Burglary Insurance Policy in favour of the complainant through the petitioner. Both the policies covered a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs for the risk of fire and burglary. The policies were for the period between 25-11-2011 and 24-11-2012. Subsequently, on 29-06-2012, a theft took place at the petitioner’s premises and for that FIR was lodged on 30-06-2012. Both, the petitioner and the Bank were also informed about the theft. A surveyor was appointed by the petitioner to inspect the premises and on 01-07-2012, a formal complaint was lodged by the complainant with the petitioner. A fire had also broken out in the premises on 18-10-2012. Subsequently, the complainant filed claims for both, theft and fire amounting to Rs. 49 lakhs. The petitioner repudiated the theft and the fire claim and was closed on account of non- submission of documents by the complainant. Aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the petitioner, the complainant approached the SCDRC, Delhi under Section 17<\/a> of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986<\/a> (‘the Act 1986’). The complainant claimed Rs. 49 lakhs to be processed along with compensation of Rs. 20 lakh and interest at the rate the Allahabad Bank was charging from the complainant, with costs of the complaint.<\/p>\n

The SCDRC partly allowed the complaint holding that the petitioner and the Allahabad bank were jointly and severally liable for the deficiencies in providing services to the complainant and the complainant was entitled to be compensated for the theft of goods worth Rs. 41,31,180\/- at the rate of 12 percent interest per annum from the date of the claim. The petitioner and the Allahabad bank were also directed to pay Rs. 2 lakhs to the complainant towards compensation for mental agony, harassment and deficiency in providing services. The petitioner was further directed to finalise the fire claim of Rs. 4 lakhs of the complainant.<\/p>\n

Subsequently, aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner challenged the SCDRC order before the NCDRC. The NCDRC dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, thereby forming the impugned order.<\/p>\n

Analysis of the Issue<\/h4>\n

The preliminary issue for consideration before the Court was whether the said petition seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> directly against the order passed by the NCDRC should be entertained by the Court or relegate the petitioner to avail the remedy of filing a writ petition under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> or a petition invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 227<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>?<\/p>\n

The Court perused Section 58 and Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986<\/a> (‘the Act 1986’) as the complaints were instituted under the Act, 1986 and also highlighted the relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019<\/a>, which are pari materia<\/i> to the provisions of the Act 1986. The Court said that Section 21 and 23 of the Act, 1986 and Section 58 and 67 of the Act, 2019<\/a>, indicates that the remedy of appeal to the Supreme Court is available only with respect to the orders passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i) of the Act, 1986 and 58(1)(a)(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, 2019. Therefore, the Court said that both the Acts provide for the remedy of appeal to the Supreme Court only with respect to the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in its original jurisdiction or as the Court of first instance (original orders) and no further appeal lies against the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

Further, regarding the scope and grant of Special Leave under Article 136<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>, the Court relied on Pritam Singh<\/i> v. State<\/i>, 1950 SCC 189<\/a>, wherein it was held that “generally speaking this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against”.<\/i> Therefore, the Court stated that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal can be invoked in very exceptional circumstances<\/i>. The Court also added that the provisions of Article 136<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> as such are not circumscribed by any limitation, but when the party aggrieved has alternative remedy to go before the High Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction, the Court should not entertain petition seeking special leave. The Court also explained that the power to special leave is an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it must be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in very exceptional situations. It will only be used to advance the cause of justice and its exercise will be governed by well-established principles which govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers.<\/p>\n

The Court also relied on Ibrat Faizan<\/i> v. Omaxe Buildhome (P) Ltd.<\/i>, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 620<\/a>, wherein a similar issue was posed before the Court. Therein, the Court had while explaining the importance of approaching the High Court, more particularly when a remedy is available by way of a writ petition under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> or by way of a petition under Article 227<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> (supervisory jurisdiction) observed that “the Court may not exercise its powers under Article 136<\/a> of the Constitution of India<\/a>, in view of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party before the High Court concerned under Article 227<\/a> of the Constitution of India<\/a>, as it is appropriate that the aggrieved party approaches the High Court concerned by way of writ petition under Article 227<\/a> of the Constitution of India<\/a>”.<\/i><\/p>\n

Therefore, the Court concluded that the Court should not adjudicate the said petition on merits and thus directed the petitioner to first go before the jurisdictional High Court either by way of a writ application under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> or by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 227<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand Jain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 877<\/a>, Decided on 26-07-2023<\/span>]<\/p>\n

*Judgment Authored by: Justice J.B. Pardiwala<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Know Thy Judge| Justice J B Pardiwala<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n