{"id":280902,"date":"2023-01-03T14:30:18","date_gmt":"2023-01-03T09:00:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=280902"},"modified":"2023-01-03T14:27:55","modified_gmt":"2023-01-03T08:57:55","slug":"verdict-freedom-of-speech-of-public-functionaries-right-to-life-personal-liberty-of-citizens-impedes-same-legal-news-legal-reasearch-updates","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2023\/01\/03\/verdict-freedom-of-speech-of-public-functionaries-right-to-life-personal-liberty-of-citizens-impedes-same-legal-news-legal-reasearch-updates\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cStatement passed by a Minister cannot be vicariously attributed to the State\u201d; Supreme Court Constitution Bench rules against imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech of Ministers"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Supreme Court<\/b>: A Constitution Bench of S Abdul Nazeer, AS Bopanna, BR Gavai, V Ramasubramanian<\/b> & BV Nagarathna<\/b>, JJ, delivered verdict on the issue relating to freedom of speech of public functionaries and whether the right to life and personal liberty of citizens impedes the same. The issue emerged after Samajwadi Party (‘SP’) leader Azam Khan’s remarks on 2016 gang-rape of a minor and her mother in Uttar Pradesh, where he referred to the unfortunate incident as a “political conspiracy only and nothing else”.<\/p>\n

Justice V Ramasubramanian delivered the verdict for himself and SA Nazeer, AS Bopanna, BR Gavai, JJ, however, BV Nagarathna, J, while agreeing with the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the majority on certain questions referred, went on to lend a different perspective on the issues by way of separate opinion.<\/p>\n

The bench dealt with the following issues:<\/p>\n

1. Whether the Court can impose restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression beyond the present restrictions provided under Article 19(2)<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>?<\/p>\n

The Court held that the grounds lined up in Article 19(2)<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> for restricting the right to free speech, under the guise of invoking other Fundamental Rights is taking a competing climb against each other, additional restrictions not found in Article 19(2) cannot be imposed on the exercise of right conferred by Article 19(1)(a)<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>.<\/p>\n

2. Can a Fundamental Right under Articles 19<\/a> and 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> be claimed against anyone other than the ‘State’ or its instrumentalities?<\/p>\n

The Court held that the Article 19<\/a> and 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>, can be enforced even against persons other than the ‘State’ or its instrumentalities<\/p>\n

3. Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the right of the citizens under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> even if it is against a threat to the liberty of the citizen by the acts or omissions of another citizen or private agency?<\/p>\n

The Court held that the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of persons under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> whenever there is a threat to personal liberty even by a non-State actor.<\/p>\n

4. Whether the statement of a Minister, traceable to any affairs of the State, should be attributed vicariously to the government itself for not keeping in mind the principle of collective responsibility?<\/p>\n

The Court held that the Statement made by a Minister even if traceable to affairs of State or protecting the Government cannot be attributed vicariously to Government by invoking the principle of collective responsibility<\/p>\n

5. Whether a statement made by a Minister, which is inconsistent with the rights granted to the citizen under Part III of the Constitution, constitutes as a violation of such Fundamental Rights and is actionable as ‘Constitutional Tort’ (civil wrong)?<\/p>\n

The Court held that the mere statement made by a Minister inconsistent with the rights of citizens may not constitute violation of constitutional rights and to become actionable as constitutional tort. But, if as a consequence of such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done by the officers resorting in loss to a citizen then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort.<\/p>\n

Separate views of Justice BV Nagarathna<\/b><\/p>\n

BV Nagarathna, J. said that the freedom of speech is not contingent only upon the laws of the nation, the compulsions of social relations, and the informal pressures of conformity, exerted in a pervasive manner determined to a great extent the content and limits of permissible speech in a society. It is the laws, however, that, through their own unique methods, reinforce social sanctions. Therefore, the Constitution, that is the fundamental law of the land, as well as the other laws which are measured on the touchstone of the constitution must be interpreted having regard inter alia to the content and permissible limit in a peaceful society.<\/p>\n

She said that the present case is not concerned with the right to speech being imposed on the State. Further, the theoretical and doctrinal underpinnings justifying restraint on derogatory and disparaging speech, may be treated to two primary factors:<\/p>\n