{"id":267091,"date":"2022-05-19T15:00:02","date_gmt":"2022-05-19T09:30:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=267091"},"modified":"2022-05-19T15:12:16","modified_gmt":"2022-05-19T09:42:16","slug":"whether-unavailability-of-self-induced-intoxication-as-a-defence-in-cases-of-assault-withstands-the-challenge-of-constitutionality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2022\/05\/19\/whether-unavailability-of-self-induced-intoxication-as-a-defence-in-cases-of-assault-withstands-the-challenge-of-constitutionality\/","title":{"rendered":"Whether unavailability of \u2018self-induced intoxication\u2019 as a defence in cases of assault, withstands the challenge of constitutionality? SC of Canada answers\u00a0\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"

Supreme Court of Canada: <\/strong>The instant matter revolved around a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 33.1 of the Criminal Code <\/em>which dealt with the unavailability of self-induced intoxication as a defence for criminal acts like assault etc. The bench of the Court comprising of Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, C\u00f4t\u00e9, Brown, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer and Jamal JJ., in an unanimous decision, held that, Sec. 33.1 violates S. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms<\/em> by allowing a conviction without proof of mens rea or proof of voluntariness. It was observed that, \u201cSection 33.1(1) of the Criminal Code eliminates the defence of self-induced intoxication akin to automatism applied to violent offences… Section 33.1 does not create a new predicate act offence of self-induced extreme intoxication or a new criminal negligence offence. The accused faces the full stigma of conviction and the full brunt of punishment for the general intent offence<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Facts of the Case: <\/strong>The appellant [hereinafter \u2018B\u2019], at a house party, had consumed \u2018magic mushrooms\u2019 which is a hallucinogen. The consumption of the drug led to \u2018B\u2019 losing his grip over reality. As per \u2018B\u2019, he was not simply drunk or high: while capable of physical movement, he was in a psychotic state and had no willed control over his actions.<\/p>\n

He broke into the nearby house of a stranger and attacked the occupant, causing permanent injuries. He further broke into another residence and the occupants called the police. Consequently, \u2018B\u2019 was charged with break and enter and aggravated assault, and mischief to property.<\/p>\n

Contentions: <\/strong>The appellant contended that he is not guilty of the offences by reason of automatism. The appellant\u2019s contentions were corroborated by the expert witnesses who confirmed that \u2018B\u2019 had no voluntary control over his conduct at the time.<\/p>\n

The respondent (the Crown) invoked S. 33.1 of the Criminal Code<\/em> preventing \u2018B\u2019 from relying on self-induced intoxication akin to automatism as a defence to the charge of aggravated assault. The respondents stated that the Canadian Parliament added S. 33.1 in response this Court\u2019s ruling in Henri Daviault v. Her Majesty the Queen<\/em>, 1994 SCC OnLine Can SC 83<\/a>, wherein the majority had confirmed a common law rule that intoxication is not a defence to crimes of general intent.<\/p>\n

The respondents, however, prayed to the Court to interpret S. 33.1 as validly imposing liability for violent crimes based on a standard of criminal negligence<\/p>\n

Observations: <\/strong>Perusing the facts and contentions of the case, Justice Kasirer (who delivered the unanimous decision) observed that the impugned provision does not establish a proper measure of criminal fault by reason of intoxication; instead, it imposes liability for the violent offence if an accused interferes with the bodily integrity of another \u201cwhile\u201d in a state of self-induced intoxication rendering them incapable of consciously controlling their behaviour.<\/p>\n

Given the gravity of the issue, the Court some salient observations –<\/p>\n